

# Codebook:

## Atlas of 19th century African Centralized Polities

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# 1 Introduction to the Dataset

The Atlas of 19th century African Centralized Polities measures the extent of political centralization in sub-Saharan Africa prior to the onset of colonial rule. Below, I detail the conceptual definition of centralization employed by the project as well as the process of populating the universe of cases. As I hope to maintain this dataset, please email at [martha.wilfahrt@berkeley.edu](mailto:martha.wilfahrt@berkeley.edu) if you think any potential cases are missing or if you encounter any errors in the dataset.

## 1.1 Defining Centralization

I specify a minimal definition of political centralization in recognition of a diversity of political forms in African history. The definition nonetheless builds on key themes of political order that have emerged in anthropology, political science and sociology. I define a centralized polity as possessing three dimensions. Power is centralized towards a *clear center* when we see:

1. Social segmentation: A centralized polity necessitates the command of political authority by an elite class. Such an elite class must sit atop a durable social hierarchy that limits political, economic and social mobility along prescribed channels. Social differentiation is core to many classic definitions of states or political centralization (e.g. [Radcliffe-Brown, 1940](#); [Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940](#); [Claessen, 1984](#); [Johnson and Earle, 1987](#)). For North et al. (2009, 5-9), for example, the natural state is distinguished from more diffuse political structures by virtue of an elite who are tied together through personal relations and whose place at the top of the political hierarchy is structured upon patron-client relationships with the masses. Note that the existence of a single leader alone would not be sufficient to meet this condition; there must be a clearly distinguished elite body who, by virtue of their social status, durably command political, economic, and social authority. In the context of precolonial Africa, this is at times assured by a royal lineage or a conquering ethnic group (e.g., Fulani notables in the Adamawa Emirates). Among other things, this provides a means to distinguish between low-level chiefdoms and greater levels of centralization: a polity ruled by an established royal lineage would count, while those where the ‘elite’ is limited to an individual ruler, as in a small chieftaincy, would not.
2. Economic Extraction: A fundamental dimension of elite political authority is the ability to compel the periphery to transfer rents. This can be a system of regularized tribute, such yearly tribute from peasants as well as taxes on trade or obligatory labor. The extraction of revenue is a defining goal of the state for authors in the tradition of new institutional economics like Levi (1988) or North (1981), but it also features heavily in work by historians and anthropologists ([Hawthorne, 2013](#); [Monroe, 2013](#)). Economic surplus was a crucial source of rents for

elites (North et al., 2009) and enabled their maintenance and expansion of the political structure. The extraction of rents from the periphery to the center in this fashion enabled elites to legitimate the socio-political hierarchy, be it through patronage or through the projection of an ideological apparatus that imbues rulers with a religious nature (e.g., Claessen and Oosten, 1996).

3. Third, an institutionalized, territorial administration facilitates territorial integration by linking the periphery to the center. Such an administration must represent the center locally and have the authority to regulate social and economic life. This attribute is highly variable in its empirical manifestations. In many cases, this took the form of direct appointments from the royal court or, more commonly, a system whereby a local chief or religious figure was delegated to enforce the leadership's orders and laws. What is critical is that the polity must provide institutional structure for citizens, allowing us to distinguish between communities that were fully integrated into the political apparatus from those that may occasionally pay tribute but otherwise have little felt presence of the state. This condition is critical to classic definition of the state, yet is often vague in its invocation. Thus, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940, 8) speak of "administrative machinery and judicial institutions," Roscoe (1993) identifies the institutionalization of political power while Nadel (1942) and others discuss the critical role played by specialized office holders in state administration. A core feature of institutionalization is the capacity of the center to organize cooperation with the periphery; the classic manifestation of this would be the ability to raise troops from peripheral units to mount a common defense.

## 1.2 Populating the Universe of Cases

Following the definition laid out above, the universe of cases of political centralization was populated in an iterative process. First, historical dictionaries and historical atlases were consulted for all relevant countries to identify likely cases. I then consulted additional historical sources on each potential case to decide whether it met my conceptual criteria or not. In the process of reading extensively about the histories of each polity, cases were added as I encountered references to potential additional centralized polities. This process could also result in the *elimination* of cases as well, as for example was done with the case of the Nanumba as documented in the main text.

## 2 Attributes Coded by Polity

*Years in Existence:* When was the state formed and when did it decline?

*Variables:*

**Start\_Century:** century in which polity is founded

**End\_Decade:** decade of polity's end as an autonomous unit

**Polity\_Age:** polity age in 50-year increments (up to 300+)

*System of Rule & Stratification:* How was power exercised? What is the nature of leadership and to what degree is it centralized in an individual or class of individuals?

*Variables:*

**Councilors:** does the monarch rule with an institutionalized council (yes/no)?

**Caste?:** did the polity have caste hierarchies (yes/no)?

**Slavery?:** was there a form of domestic slavery (yes/no)?

*Method of Succession:* How was power passed between generations?

*Variables:*

**Succession\_Eligibility:** father-son, within patrilineage, within matrilineage, within broader royal lineage, rotation between eligible lineages

**Succession\_Method:** descent, rotation, election

**Kingmakers:** yes, no

*Forms of Local Representation:* How was state authority exercised at the local level? Were there other forms of social organizations (age-sets, spirit cults, or other regulatory societies) outside the polity's own institutional apparatus?

*Variables:*

**Elite\_Structure:** Despotic, Regal, Gatekeeper, Federation

**Regulatory\_Societies:** yes, no

*Economy:* What were the dominant economic activities of citizens? What were the key goods traded within the territory? What trade routes was the state involved in? *Note that a coding of 'no' does not mean the complete absence of an economic sector, merely that it is not cited by historical sources as having been central to a polity's economy.*

*Variables:*

**Economy\_Agriculture:** Yes, No

**Economy\_Pastoralism:** Yes, No



**Economy\_Trade:** Yes, No

**Trade\_Goods:** Food stuffs (salt, palm oil), minerals (ivory, gold, iron), enslaved persons

**Trade\_Rtes:** Regional, Atlantic, Saharan, Indian Ocean

*Elite Ethnicity:* what ethnicity dominates the elite?

*Variables:*

**Elite\_Ethnicity**

*Polity Ideology:* how does the polity legitimate itself?

*Variables:*

**Ideology:** Islamic theocracy, divine kingship, commerce, conquest, hereditary monarchy

**Islamic:** Yes, No

*Rising, Stable or declining on eve of colonization?* Was the polity's power rising, stable or declining in the years prior to colonization?

*Variables:*

**Stability:** declining, stable, rising

*Persistence:* Does the polity persist to the present in some form?

*Variables:*

**Persistence:** Yes, No

*Depth of historical record:* Polity coded from how many historical sources?

*Variables:*

# **Sources:** count of citations<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>This should be interpreted with caution. A single, thorough dissertation may provide more detail than a number of articles that only indirectly discuss a polity. On average, however, we can think of this as a generic barometer for the amount of historical attention a polity has received.

### 3 Details on Dataset

**Table 1:** Polities Included in Dataset

| Polity (By State System)     | Base | Base 1880 | Composite Polities | Composite 1880 |
|------------------------------|------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|
| Aboh                         | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Abron-Gyaman                 | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| <i>Abyssinia</i>             |      |           |                    |                |
| Early Ethiopia (pre-Menelik) | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Late Ethiopia                | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Shoa                         | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| <i>Adamawa Emirates</i>      |      |           | x                  | x              |
| Agorma                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Bame                         | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Banyo                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Bassewo                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Be                           | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Beka                         | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Bibemi                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Bindir                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Bogo                         | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Boumi                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Bourha                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Dembo                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Demsa                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Figuil                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Gamsargou                    | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Garoua                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Gawar                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Gazawa                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Golombe                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Gounna                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Guebake                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Guidir                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Khalfou                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Lagdo                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Loubouki                     | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Maya-Louwe                   | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Mbengui                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Mbongui                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Mindif                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Miskine                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Na'ari                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Ngaoundere                   | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Rey Bouba                    | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Tchamba                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Tchebowa                     | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Tibati                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Tignere                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Tourwa                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Woubawo                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Yola                         | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Adar                         | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Afar Sultanate               | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Agadez                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Akuapem                      | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Akwamu                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Akyem                        | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Anfillo                      | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Arewa                        | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Asante                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |

**Table 1:** Polities Included in Dataset

| Polity (By State System) | Base | Base 1880 | Composite Polities | Composite 1880 |
|--------------------------|------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|
| Azande                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Badibu                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Bafut                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Baguirmi                 | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Bali                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Bamum                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Baol                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Bardera                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Barotse/Lozi             | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Barue                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| BaSotho                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Benin                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Borgu                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Borno                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Bouna                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Boundou                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Buganda                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Bunyoro                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Cajor                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Calabar                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Changamire/Rozvi         | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Chokossi                 | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Dagomba                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Dahomey                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Damagaram                | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Dawro                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Djimara                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Djoloff                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Dosso                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Eropina                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Fouladou                 | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Fouta Djallon            | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Fouta Toro               | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Funj                     | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Fur                      | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Gadaaja                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Garsoogaue               | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Gaza                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Geledi                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Gera                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Gobir                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Gomma                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Gonja                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Gumma                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Harar                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Hehe                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Hoby                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Idenie                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Igala                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Janjero                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Jarra                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Jiddu                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Jimma                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Jokadu                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kaabu                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kaarta                   | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Kabadougou               | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kaffa                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kalongo                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |

**Table 1:** Polities Included in Dataset

| Polity (By State System) | Base | Base 1880 | Composite Polities | Composite 1880 |
|--------------------------|------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|
| Kantora                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Karagwe                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kasanje                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kenedogouou              | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kgatla                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Khasso                   | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Kiang                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kilindi                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kom                      | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Komba                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kong                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Konta                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kotoko                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kotokoli                 | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kuba                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Kwena                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Leqa Naqamte             | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Leqa Qellam              | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Lete                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Limmu-Ennarea            | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Liptako                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Loango                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Luba                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Lunda                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Lundu                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Macina                   | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Majeerteen               | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Mandara                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Manica                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Mankon                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Maradi                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Merina                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Mirambo                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Morounou                 | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| <i>Mossi States</i>      |      |           | x                  | x              |
| Boulsa                   | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Boussouma                | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Busu                     | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Darigma                  | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Gourma                   | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Kayao                    | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Konkistenga              | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Koupela                  | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Mane                     | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Nyesga                   | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Ouagadougou              | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Ratenga                  | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Riziam                   | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Tema                     | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Tenkadogo                | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Yako                     | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Yatenga                  | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Zitenga                  | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Moundang                 | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Nafana                   | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Ndebele                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Ngonde                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Ngoyo                    | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Ngwaketse                | x    | x         | x                  | x              |

**Table 1:** Polities Included in Dataset

| Polity (By State System)     | Base | Base 1880 | Composite Polities | Composite 1880 |
|------------------------------|------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|
| Ngwato                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Niamina                      | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Niani                        | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Niumi                        | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Nkomi                        | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Nkore                        | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Nso                          | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Nyungu-ya-Mawe               | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Orungu                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Ouadaï                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Oualo                        | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Ouli                         | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Ovambo                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Ovimbundu                    | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Porto Novo                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Quiteve                      | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Rip-Pakala                   | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Rwanda                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Sakalava                     | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Saloum                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| <i>Samory</i>                |      |           |                    |                |
| Core Samory                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Late Samory                  | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Sanwi                        | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Segou                        | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Shilluk                      | x    |           | x                  |                |
| Sine                         | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| <i>Sokoto Emirates</i>       |      |           | x                  | x              |
| Agaïe                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Bauchi                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Daura                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Gombe                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Gwandu                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Hadejia                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Jam'are                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Kano                         | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Katagum                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Katsina                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Kazaure                      | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Kebbi                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Kontagora                    | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Missau                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Muri                         | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Nupe                         | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Rano                         | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Sokoto                       | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Yauri                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Zaria                        | x    | x         |                    |                |
| Solima Yalunka               | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Swahili States               | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Swazi                        | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Taqali                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Tawana                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Tomani                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Toro                         | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Tyo                          | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Ugweno                       | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Umarian (El Hadji Umar Tall) | x    | x         | x                  | x              |
| Undi                         | x    | x         | x                  | x              |

**Table 1:** Polities Included in Dataset

| <b>Polity (By State System)</b> | <b>Base</b> | <b>Base 1880</b> | <b>Composite Polities</b> | <b>Composite 1880</b> |
|---------------------------------|-------------|------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Urundu (Burundi)                | x           | x                | x                         | x                     |
| Warsangali                      | x           | x                | x                         | x                     |
| Wolayta                         | x           | x                | x                         | x                     |
| Yagha                           | x           | x                | x                         | x                     |
| Yeke                            | x           | x                | x                         | x                     |
| <i>Yoruba</i>                   |             |                  | x                         | x                     |
| Egba                            | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Egbado                          | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Ekiti                           | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Ife                             | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Igbomina                        | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Ijebu                           | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Ijesha                          | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Ketu                            | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Ondo                            | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Owo                             | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Owu                             | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Oyo                             | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Sabe                            | x           | x                |                           |                       |
| Zulu                            | x           | x                | x                         | x                     |

**Table 2: # of Uncertainty Estimates by Polity**

| <b>Polity (By State System)</b> | <b># Estimates</b> | <b>Notes</b> | <b>Polity (By State System)</b> | <b># Estimates</b> | <b>Notes</b>                         |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Aboh                            | 1                  |              | Woubawo                         | 1                  |                                      |
| Abron-Gyaman                    | 2                  |              | Yola                            | 2                  |                                      |
| Abyssinia                       | 3                  |              | Adar                            | 2                  |                                      |
| <i>Adamawa Emirates</i>         |                    |              | Afar Sultanate                  | 1                  |                                      |
| Agorma                          | 1                  |              | Agadez                          | 1                  |                                      |
| Bame                            | 1                  |              | Akuapem                         | 2                  |                                      |
| Banyo                           | 1                  |              | Akwamu                          | 1                  |                                      |
| Bassewo                         | 1                  |              | Akyem                           | 3                  |                                      |
| Be                              | 1                  |              | Anfillo                         | 2                  |                                      |
| Beka                            | 1                  |              | Arewa                           | 2                  | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> |
| Bibemi                          | 1                  |              | Asante                          | 7                  |                                      |
| Bindir                          | 1                  |              | Azande                          | 3                  |                                      |
| Bogo                            | 1                  |              | Badibu                          | 3                  |                                      |
| Boumi                           | 1                  |              | Bafut                           | 1                  |                                      |
| Bourha                          | 1                  |              | Baguirmi                        | 3                  |                                      |
| Dembo                           | 1                  |              | Bali                            | 2                  |                                      |
| Demsa                           | 2                  |              | Bamum                           | 1                  |                                      |
| Figuil                          | 1                  |              | Baol                            | 6                  |                                      |
| Gamsargou                       | 1                  |              | Bardera                         | 2                  | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> |
| Garoua                          | 1                  |              | Barotse/Lozi                    | 4                  |                                      |
| Gawar                           | 1                  |              | Barue                           | 2                  |                                      |
| Gazawa                          | 1                  |              | BaSotho                         | 5                  |                                      |
| Golombe                         | 1                  |              | Benin                           | 6                  |                                      |
| Gounna                          | 1                  |              | Borgu                           | 5                  |                                      |
| Guebake                         | 1                  |              | Borno                           | 4                  |                                      |
| Guidir                          | 1                  |              | Bouna                           | 2                  |                                      |
| Khalfou                         | 1                  |              | Boundou                         | 7                  |                                      |
| Lagdo                           | 1                  |              | Buganda                         | 7                  |                                      |
| Loubouki                        | 1                  |              | Bunyoro                         | 5                  |                                      |
| Maya-Louwe                      | 1                  |              | Cajor                           | 7                  |                                      |
| Mbengui                         | 1                  |              | Calabar                         | 1                  |                                      |
| Mbongui                         | 1                  |              | Changamire/Rozvi                | 4                  |                                      |
| Mindif                          | 1                  |              | Chokossi                        | 1                  |                                      |
| Miskine                         | 1                  |              | Dagomba                         | 2                  |                                      |
| Na'ari                          | 1                  |              | Dahomey                         | 2                  |                                      |
| Ngaoundere                      | 1                  |              | Damagaram                       | 2                  |                                      |
| Rey Bouba                       | 1                  |              | Dawro                           | 2                  | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> |
| Tchamba                         | 1                  |              | Djimara                         | 1                  |                                      |
| Tchebowa                        | 1                  |              | Djoloff                         | 7                  |                                      |
| Tibati                          | 2                  |              | Dosso                           | 2                  | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> |
| Tignere                         | 1                  |              | Eropina                         | 1                  |                                      |
| Tourwa                          | 1                  |              | Fouladou                        | 2                  |                                      |

**Table 2: # of Uncertainty Estimates by Polity**

| Polity (By State System) | # Estimates | Notes                                | Polity (By State System) | # Estimates | Notes                                |
|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|
| Fouta Djallon            | 4           |                                      | Kotoko                   | 2           |                                      |
| Fouta Toro               | 5           |                                      | Kotokoli                 | 1           |                                      |
| Funj                     | 2           |                                      | Kuba                     | 3           |                                      |
| Fur                      | 1           |                                      | Kwena                    | 1           |                                      |
| Gadaaja                  | 2           |                                      | Leqa Naqamte             | 2           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> |
| Garsoogaue               | 1           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> | Leqa Qellam              | 2           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> |
| Gaza                     | 4           |                                      | Lete                     | 2           |                                      |
| Geledi                   | 2           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> | Limmu-Ennarea            | 2           |                                      |
| Gera                     | 2           |                                      | Liptako                  | 2           |                                      |
| Gobir                    | 2           |                                      | Loango                   | 1           |                                      |
| Gomma                    | 2           |                                      | Luba                     | 5           |                                      |
| Gonja                    | 3           |                                      | Lunda                    | 2           |                                      |
| Gumma                    | 2           |                                      | Lundu                    | 2           |                                      |
| Harar                    | 2           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> | Macina                   | 7           |                                      |
| Hehe                     | 3           |                                      | Majeerteen               | 2           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> |
| Hobyo                    | 2           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> | Mandara                  | 1           |                                      |
| Idenie                   | 2           |                                      | Manica                   | 1           |                                      |
| Igala                    | 1           |                                      | Mankon                   | 1           |                                      |
| Janjero                  | 2           |                                      | Maradi                   | 2           |                                      |
| Jarra                    | 2           |                                      | Merina                   | 4           |                                      |
| Jiddu                    | 2           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> | Mirambo                  | 4           |                                      |
| Jimma                    | 2           |                                      | Morounou                 | 1           |                                      |
| Jokadu                   | 1           |                                      | <i>Mossi States</i>      |             |                                      |
| Kaabu                    | 2           |                                      | Boulsa                   | 1           |                                      |
| Kaarta                   | 1           |                                      | Boussouma                | 1           |                                      |
| Kabadougou               | 1           |                                      | Busu                     | 1           |                                      |
| Kaffa                    | 3           |                                      | Darigma                  | 1           |                                      |
| Kalongo                  | 2           | <i>Maravi</i>                        | Gourma                   | 3           |                                      |
| Kantora                  | 1           |                                      | Kayao                    | 1           |                                      |
| Karagwe                  | 1           |                                      | Konkistenga              | 1           |                                      |
| Kasanje                  | 3           |                                      | Koupela                  | 1           |                                      |
| Kenedoguou               | 3           |                                      | Mane                     | 1           |                                      |
| Kgatla                   | 2           |                                      | Nyesga                   | 1           |                                      |
| Khasso                   | 1           |                                      | Ouagadougou              | 3           |                                      |
| Kiang                    | 2           |                                      | Ratenga                  | 1           |                                      |
| Kilindi                  | 2           | <i>no known maps; estimates used</i> | Riziam                   | 2           |                                      |
| Kom                      | 3           |                                      | Tema                     | 1           |                                      |
| Komba                    | 2           |                                      | Tenkadogo                | 2           |                                      |
| Kong                     | 1           |                                      | Yako                     | 1           |                                      |
| Konta                    | 1           |                                      | Yatenga                  | 3           |                                      |
|                          |             |                                      | Zitenga                  | 1           |                                      |
|                          |             |                                      | Moundang                 | 2           |                                      |



**Table 2: # of Uncertainty Estimates by Polity**

| Polity (By State System) | # Estimates | Notes                         | Polity (By State System)     | # Estimates | Notes                         |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|
| Nafana                   | 2           | no known maps; estimates used | Kazaure                      | 1           |                               |
| Ndebele                  | 7           |                               | Kebbi                        | 2           |                               |
| Ngonde                   | 1           |                               | Kontagora                    | 1           |                               |
| Ngoyo                    | 1           |                               | Missau                       | 1           |                               |
| Ngwaketse                | 1           |                               | Muri                         | 1           |                               |
| Ngwato                   | 3           |                               | Nupe                         | 1           |                               |
| Niamina                  | 2           |                               | Rano                         | 2           |                               |
| Niani                    | 2           |                               | Sokoto                       | 2           |                               |
| Niumi                    | 3           |                               | Yauri                        | 1           |                               |
| Nkomi                    | 2           |                               | Zaria                        | 1           |                               |
| Nkore                    | 4           |                               | Solima Yalunka               | 2           |                               |
| Nso                      | 2           |                               | Swahili States               | 2           |                               |
| Nyungu-ya-Mawe           | 2           |                               | Swazi                        | 2           |                               |
| Orungu                   | 1           |                               | Taqali                       | 1           |                               |
| Ouadaï                   | 4           |                               | Tawana                       | 2           |                               |
| Oualo                    | 7           |                               | Tomani                       | 2           |                               |
| Ouli                     | 4           |                               | Toro                         | 3           |                               |
| Ovambo                   | 2           |                               | Tyo                          | 3           |                               |
| Ovimbundu                | 5           |                               | Ugwenô                       | 2           | no known maps; estimates used |
| Porto Novo               | 2           |                               | Umarian (El Hadji Umar Tall) | 6           |                               |
| Quiteve                  | 2           |                               | Undi                         | 2           | Maravi                        |
| Rip-Pakala               | 1           |                               | Urundu (Burundi)             | 4           |                               |
| Rwanda                   | 4           |                               | Warsangali                   | 2           | no known maps; estimates used |
| Sakalava                 | 1           |                               | Wolayta                      | 1           |                               |
| Saloum                   | 3           |                               | Yagha                        | 2           |                               |
| Samory                   | 5           |                               | Yeke                         | 1           |                               |
| Sanwi                    | 2           |                               | Yoruba                       |             |                               |
| Segou                    | 3           |                               | Egba                         | 3           |                               |
| Shilluk                  | 2           |                               | Egbado                       | 3           |                               |
| Shoa                     | 3           |                               | Ekiti                        | 1           |                               |
| Sine                     | 4           |                               | Ife                          | 1           |                               |
| Sokoto Emirates          |             |                               | Igbomina                     | 1           |                               |
| Agaie                    | 1           |                               | Ijebu                        | 3           |                               |
| Bauchi                   | 3           |                               | Ijesha                       | 1           |                               |
| Daura                    | 1           |                               | Ketu                         | 2           |                               |
| Gombe                    | 1           |                               | Ondo                         | 2           |                               |
| Gwandu                   | 1           |                               | Owo                          | 1           |                               |
| Hadejia                  | 2           |                               | Owu                          | 1           |                               |
| Jam'are                  | 1           |                               | Oyo                          | 2           |                               |
| Kano                     | 2           |                               | Sabe                         | 1           |                               |
| Katagum                  | 2           |                               | Zulu                         | 5           |                               |
| Katsina                  | 2           |                               |                              |             |                               |

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## 4 Polity Specific Coding

### 4.1 Aboh, c.1700-1900

#### Overview

Igbo kingdom that was strategically located on the Niger river at the head of the delta. Aboh town itself was perhaps the busiest port in the lower Niger valley. Unlike other Igbo groups, Aboh developed a centralized political system under the *obi*, with a hierarchy descending from the *obi*'s palace to town chiefs (Nwachukwu-Ogedengbe, 1977, 142, 135). The *Obi* ruled with titleholders from the upper class, with his power dependant on his personality and the wealth he had to distribute patronage. The *Obi* was obliged to consult with his council of title-holders on major issues (Ogedengbe, 1971, 138). Although Aboh profited enormously from the slave trade and, from the 1830s onwards, the palm oil trade (Nwaubani, 1999), it was declining in second half of 1800s following the establishment of a European factory system that eroded Aboh's trade monopoly (Ogedengbe, 1971, Chpt 7).

#### Social Segmentation

Aboh society was divided into three classes: nobles, or sons of the soil (*umudei*), who dominated political and economic life, clients or commoners, and slaves. The *umudei* were traditionally considered to be the descendants of Esumei, Aboh's founder who migrated from Benin (Nwachukwu-Ogedengbe, 1977, 135-6).

#### Surplus Extraction

Territorial chiefs provided tribute in the form of foodstuffs and slaves and were expected to contribute warriors and canoes during war (Ogedengbe, 1971, 269). Citizens of client status were expected to work their patron's farm one out of four days (Nwachukwu-Ogedengbe, 1977, 137), though most agricultural work done by slaves. Aboh profited considerably from trade, with the *Obi*, his sons and trusted chiefs having the right to trade before all others (Nwaubani, 1999, 106).

#### Local Representation

The compound was the key social unit, with compound elders allocating land, dominating commercial activities and ensuring the performance of rituals (Nwachukwu-Ogedengbe, 1977, 136). Each town was headed by a headsmen, responsible to the *Obi*, with a local judge present as well (Ogedengbe, 1971, 269). *Obi* often used marriage as a means to build alliances with village headmen in area (Nwaubani, 1999, 106). Ogedengbe (1971, 269) suggests we think of the *Obi*'s territorial power as 'spheres of influence,' with direct supervision only in areas immediately proximate to the capital, with areas further afield limited to annual tribute and occasional visits.

## Method of Succession

The *Obi* was selected from amongst candidates, who had to come from the *umudei* populations of Aboh town's four wards (Nwachukwu-Ogedengbe, 1977, 135). Succession disputes were common and often protracted (Ogedengbe, 1971, 136).

## State Ideology

Commerce. Ogedengbe (1977, 137) does note that the *Obi* had a divine nature, but ultimately concludes that his image transformed from a sacred one to that of a wealthy, powerful merchant prince in the 1800s as his power came to rest on economic power.

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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URL: <https://www.proquest.com/pqdtglobal/docview/302646798/citation/494664488574830PQ/5>

## 4.2 Abbron/Gyaman, 1690-1895

### Overview

Abbron state along the Ghana-Cote d'Ivoire border, though (Terray, 1987, 28) characterizes it as a member of a larger family of Akan states and Abbron was a vassal of Ashanti on and off, gaining full independence in the late 1800s only to be conquered by Samory in 1895 and, shortly thereafter, the French (1897). Abbron was a monarchy, with a king ruling with a council (e.g (Handloff, 1982, 100), though the aristocracy was above all a military aristocracy, and each province corresponded to an army subdivision (Terray and Bailey, 2013, 128). Abbron traded in gold and kola, and controlled some of the richest gold mines in the area (Handloff, 1982, 84-5).

### Social Segmentation

The royal family and notables assure the elite. Caste and slavery present in the kingdom. Terray (1974) describes slavery as integral to Abbron's economy and the reproduction of society. Dyula merchants in many ways occupy a parallel system, not involved in politics but active in trade.

## **Surplus Extraction**

Taxes were paid on gold extraction and tribute and pelts were given in addition to yams at the yearly yam festival. Military duty was also expected (Terray and Bailey, 2013, 115, 128).

## **Local Representation**

The village was the base political unit and was run by a chief and the 'master of the soil,' who could be the same person. The chief adjudicates issues locally, but because villages were nested under Abron chiefs, the latter would hear appeals. Abron chiefs alone had the power to declare war and their provinces were large and highly autonomous (Terray and Bailey, 2013, 115, 130). The state was divided into five discontinuous and entangled 'commandments,' the largest of which was the royal domain under the royal family. Genealogy was critical for determining access to power, as new offices and rights became hereditary within a lineage (Terray, 1987, 29).

## **Method of Succession**

Succession rotated between multiple levels of the royal matrilineage, resulting in a large number of eligible individuals. An electoral college decided amongst candidates, weighing factors such as the candidate's father, and their personal qualities. The electoral college always included the queen mother (Terray, 1987, 28, Terray and Bailey, 2013, 130).

## **State Ideology**

Hereditary Monarchy

## **Elite Structure Typology**

Regal

## **Sources**

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### 4.3 Abyssinia (Ethiopia), 1270-1974

#### Overview

Amharic kingdom ruled by the Solomonic dynasty. Abyssinia had unusual cohesion due to its common allegiance to the sovereign and the creation of a common culture around the Orthodox Christian church (Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, 2). Abyssinia was beset by internal conflict during the 'Era of Princes' (1769-1855), with Princes in the kingdom's numerous sub-regions asserting more autonomy (Tiruneh, 2015, 85). Power was centralized under Tewodros II in the middle of the century, with the state's power rapidly expanding afterward. Menelik, who had expanded his power to the south and west, assumed the throne in 1889, and continued expanding and consolidating the Ethiopian state (Zewde, 1991, 13).

Abyssinia is thus coded at two moments: the early empire under Tewodros and Yohannes, and the late empire, which includes Menelik's home sub-kingdom of Shoa and the territory he conquered in the late 1800s.

#### Social Segmentation

Abyssinia's regional nobility consolidated in the 16th century. This included title-holders, who were usually associated with court offices, and territorial administration, e.g. gentry, ecclesiastical magnates and local office holders (Tegenu, 1996, 71-72). The peasantry largely farmed on nobility-owned lands and the nobility and church elite largely reciprocated each other's authority; many nobles founded and endowed churches as a vehicle for reputé, for example (Crummey, 2000, 2, 153).

#### Surplus Extraction

Taxes were collected locally by specific officials, from peasants who were also obliged to provide labor, with these officials in turn paying taxes to their overlord (Pankhurst, 1967, 39-40). Pankhurst further describes a tax farming system on trade taxes, with tax collectors collecting fees at markets and overseeing trade (Pankhurst, 1968, 22). Duties were collected on merchants when they arrived to a market and buyers when they left as well as transit taxes at customs posts. Craftsmen were also taxed (Tegenu, 1996, 127-30). Church officials were exempt from taxation, and peasants bore the brunt of the tax burden, with agricultural taxes bound up in land tenure system (Pankhurst, 1967, 37). The tax system was standardized over time (e.g. Menelik ordered cadastral surveys in the late 1800s) (Tegenu, 1996, Chpts 2-4). Taxation and the tribute system, known as *gult*, a land tenure institution, has often been described as key to understanding the Ethiopian state (Crummey, 2000, 5).

#### Local Representation

Governors were appointed to rural areas, the most important of which obtained the title of *Dejazmatch*. Governors were responsible for law and order, collecting taxes and supplying troops. In prin-

ciple, the church could protect people from the Governor's authority. In the 17th and 18th centuries, regional aristocratic houses became the basis for militarized territorial units, the *nagarit*, which often became hereditary. These titles fused judicial, military and administrative functions within the same person, family or office. Wealth and power of regional houses existed independent of the king, but served as core for the pyramidal structure of authority and patron-client ties of the state, through the era of princes, after which Tewodros I consolidated power around the Emperor and, under Yohannes and Menelik, the Emperor began appointing officials more independently (Abir, 1968, 27-29, Tegenu, 1996, 71-72).

### **Method of Succession**

Succession was traditionally within the Solomonic dynasty, with the myth of descent from Solomon and the Queen of Sheeba legitimizing the monarchy (Rubenson, 1966, 48). Tewodros II was not actually a descendent, however, but a son-in-law of Ras Ali of Begmadir who crowned himself at the end of the era of the princes. Under Yohannes IV, the crown returned to the Solomonic dynasty. Among eligible members of the Solomonic line, however, there was fierce competition between princes and royals for the throne (Tiruneh, 2015, 86-88).

### **State Ideology**

Hereditary Monarchy

### **Elite Structure Typology**

Despotic

### **Sources**

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## 4.4 Adamawa Emirates, 1809-1909

*Agorma, Bame, Banyo, Bassewo, Be, Beka, Bibemi, Bindir, Bogo, Boumi, Bourha, Dembo, Figuil, Gamsargou, Garoua, Gawar, Gazawa, Golombe, Gounna, Guebake, Guidar, Khalfou, Lagdo, Loubouki, Maya Louwe, Mbengui, Mbongui, Mindif, Miskine, Muri, Naari, Ngouandere, Ray Bouba, Tchamba, Tibati, Tignere, Tourwa, Woubawo, Yola*

### Overview

Fulani emirates established in Northern Cameroon as part of the broader Fulani jihads in the region. The oldest is Ray Bouba, founded in 1798, while others were founded in the early 1800s, as Fulani expand more into the southeastward. As with [Sokoto](#), individual emirates both owe allegiance to the *Lamiido*, based at Yola from 1841 onward, but also retain effective autonomy as long as they pay tribute and obey Sultan's orders when issued. The Emirates rarely acted as a unified polity, with significant competition between Lamidats, which frequently fought each other over territory. Although some consider Adamawa as part of Sokoto because Yola paid tribute, Adamawa Emirates seek their flag (the right to wage jihad and found an emirate) in Yola, not Sokoto. As Njeuma (1973, 14) describes it, Yola's officials were not seen as part of Sokoto's administration and Yola ran its own affairs autonomously.

Internally, each Emirate was headed by an Emir, or ardo, from the founding lineage of each Emirate, who ruled in consultation with notables. In Yola, for example, titled official included palace-based officials, under the *Sarkin Faada*, or the Emir's chief slave, and public officials. Palace officials were generally not Fulbe, and ran internal palace matters and often served as bodyguards. Public officials were non-hereditary positions, including the *Waziri* (chief councilor), *Gal-adima* (akin to prime minister, charged with Yola's internal administration), *Alkali* (administered justice), *Agia* (treasurer) and *Sarkin Yaki/Madawaki* (commander of armed forces) (Njeuma, 1973, 6-9). There is great disparity between the emirates, with some, such as Ngaoundere, being quite wealthy and large, while others are extremely small (DeLancey et al., 2010, 278). In general, emirates become smaller over time as Yola finds it politically useful to grant new flags as part of a divide-and-rule strategy to broaden the *lamiido's* political authority (Njeuma, 1973, 11).



## Social Segmentation

Emirates were founded by three main Fulani clans, the *Worlarbe*, *Yillaga* and *Mbewe*. Muslim Fulani had the highest social status, followed by non-Fulbe and non-Muslim (Njeuma, 1973). At the bottom were slaves, estimated to be approximately 50% of the population was estimated to be enslaved, similar to Sokoto (VerEecke, 1994).

## Surplus Extraction

Individual Emir's collected tribute, some of which they in turn paid to the *Lamiido* of Yola annually; Maroua, Bogo, Minidif and other northern districts sent horses, salt, potassium and honey, while Ray, Garou, Tcheboa and other rich agricultural regions sent farm produce and poultry. Cattle was sent from cattle-producing regions, such as Ngouandere, Tibati and Banyo. Slaves were sent from all sub-emirates. All Emirs were expected to send tribute on a yearly basis, but it was occasionally withheld to signal dissatisfaction (Njeuma, 1973, 11).

## Local Representation

The village is the base socio-political unit, and Emir's were generally represented down to this level. For example, in Garoua this is the *siimaajo*, a dignitary in charge of representing one or a number of villages before the state, but village level state structures existed as well (Mohammadou and Bassoro, 1977, 69). The *Lamiido* in Yola appointed *Qadi*'s to each emirate, with the court at Yola - headed by the *akali* - serving as an effective appeals court (Abubakar, 1977, 99). The emirates thus had three levels of administration: villages, subdistricts and the capital of the emirate (Njeuma, 1973, 4).

Because Emirates were founded by Fulani, who moved into the territory of autochthonous groups, all emirates have to negotiate relationship with autochthons. Many *Ardo* put family or close associates in place as territorial administrators; the *ardo* of Bogo thus placed family at the frontiers to guard against attacks and insure the security necessary for Fulani pastoralists to settle in the area (Mohammadou, 1988, 138). This pattern was common across the emirates. The *ardo* or Emir would send royal, Fulani representatives, though over time this becomes more incorporative. For example, in Ray Bouba, Bouba Ndjidda removed many Fulani officials in the mid-1800s and replaced them with 'new Fulani' – individuals who are of mixed Fulani-indigenous roots - in restive autochthonous provinces in an effort at assimilation (Hamadjoda and Mohammadou, 1972, 27).

## Method of Succession

*Lamiido* and *ardo* were elected from within the royal lineage. Often, this passed to the eldest male family member (including among the *ardo*'s brothers), as was the case in Ray Bouba (Hamadjoda and Mohammadou, 1972, 271) or in Garoua, where the *ardo* was chosen from among the descendants of Moddibo Hamman Ngoundi (Mohammadou and Bassoro, 1977, 73). In all Emirates, successor was chosen from among eligible family members by a within-emirate council of electors (Njeuma, 1973, 12); e.g. in Bogo, a council of elders elect the someone from the royal line (Mohammadou, 1988, 135). Traditionally, Yola accepted whoever was elected locally, though successor had to pledge loyalty to *lamiido*.

## State Ideology

Islamic theocracy

## Elite Structure Typology

Composite Emirates: Regal Adamawa Caliphate as unified whole: Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.5 Adar, 1685-1901

### Overview

Traditionally Hausa state ruled by a sultan with traditional title-holders for most of the 19th century (Hamani, 2006, 109-10). Initially a vassal of Agadez, Usman dan Fodio waged Jihad on Adar in the early 1800s, after which Adar stabilized and regained independence after the battle of Gawakuke in 1836 (Last, 1967, 108-110). The second half of the 19th century sees the growing encroachment of Tuareg from north, who come to have great influence on polity's north-western territories and become key figures in the aristocracy, even as the Sultanate - with its waning influence - remains within the ruling lineage (Hamani, 2006, 223).

### Social Segmentation

Social structure was highly hierarchical, with Sultan, *Sarkin Adar*, at the top where he ruled with close relatives and court officials (Hamani, 2006, 133-35). Slavery becomes more important throughout 19th century (Rossi, 2016, 58-59).

### Surplus Extraction

The Sultan retains fees from settling court cases and part of yearly tribute collected goes to him. Local notables also have rights to extract surplus (Hamani, 2006, 116,119).

## Local Representation

Sultan linked to village chiefs through provincial rulers, or *sarki* (Hamani, 2006, 105). Hamani describe regional chiefs as traditionally having substantial autonomy in their territory, though the Sultan does rule over them. Yearly tours to some subset of regions facilitates Sultan's judicial and political intervention (Hamani, 2006, 116). Regional titleholders largely originate in dynasties that were integrated into the polity, though this changes over time as the Tuareg come to dominate the aristocracy (Hamani, 2006, 119).

## Method of Succession

Sultan elected from potential candidates within masculine lineage of Agabba, the founder of the kingdom, who came from Agadez (Hamani, 2006, 111).

## State Ideology

Commerce

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.6 Afar Sultanate, 1577-1936

### Overview

A number of ethnically Afar sultanates, including Awsa, Baylul, Rahaita and Tadjourah, that profited from the coastal trade, e.g. Tadjourah was a terminus for the slave trade to the coast (Dubois, 1997, 19). The sultanates were defined by a strong hierarchy, with a number of sub-chiefs or tribes falling under a given sultan and power was delegated to authorities for specific territory (Morin, 2004, 17). While some of the sultanates, such as Tadjourah, were quite strong in the late 18th century, others were much weaker. In the late 1800s, the Modayta dynasty based in Awsa claimed much of the Afar sultanate's territory, though it's not clear they ever fully exercised hegemony over the other sultanates. In Tadjourah, the sultan, *dardar*, ruled with a *vizir* and tax collectors (Morin, 2004, 254).

### Social Segmentation

Political divisions among Afar between 'red' aristocratic clans and 'white' commoner clans (Connell, 2019, 40, see also Pankhurst, 1982, 392 on Awsa case).

### Surplus Extraction

Taxes on caravans paid at coastal ports monopolized by sultanates (Dubois, 1997, 19).

## Local Representation

Chiefs and lineage heads administer local units, or *bado*, as do *Fi'ma*, or age-sets that crossed tribal boundaries, assumed key local functions, including defense, and other regulatory functions (Morin, 2004, 17).

## Method of Succession

Within male patrilineage, e.g. in Awsa, the first Afar Sultan established an on-going dynasty that was in the male lineage (Pankhurst, 1982, 391). In Rahaita and Tadjourah, there emerges an alternation with Sultan's brother's children, thus that in Tadjourah, the sultan came from one faction and the *vizier* the other, with the *vizier* succeeding the sultan upon his death (Morin, 2004, 231, 255).

## State Ideology

Commerce

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic, e.g. Morin (2004, 65) describes the Sultan of Awsa in the late 1800s as "a true autocrat."

## Sources

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## 4.7 Agadez (Ayar) Sultanate, 1449-1900

### Overview

Significant city-state and surrounding dependencies in Niger, Agadez is ruled by a Sultan, who rules with ministers, including the *Serki n turawa*, or the Arabs Chief who manages commerce and caravan trade, and the *galadima*, who manages palace affairs (Bernus, 1981, 82). Although briefly under Ottoman rule in 18th century, Agadez regains authority in the 19th century. The Sultan is tasked with assembling surrounding Tuareg tribes to defend the city and surrounding territory as well as ensuring peace and security more generally (Hamani, 2006b, 245). These ties are also maintained by the practice of the Sultan marrying daughters from the great tribes (Bernus, 1981, 82).

### Social Segmentation

Tuareg royal lineages assure political and economic power. Indigenous farmers, such as the Bouzou, described as serfs who farm for Tuareg (Bernus, 1981). Tuareg society is hierarchical, with caste structures (Hamani, 2006b, 133-5 Bernus, 1981, 73).

## Surplus Extraction

Sultan taxes markets and livestock. City-state sits along Saharan trade networks and is a major trading port between the central Sudan and North Africa (Idrissa, 2020, 34).

## Local Representation

Designated officials administered political order in urban core. Sultan had distinct relationships with surrounding nomadic tribes; the latter had a high degree of autonomy from urban core but had the right to contest the Sultan in cases of disagreement (Hamani, 2006b, 244-5).

## Method of Succession

Confederation elects new sultan from within founding lineage (Hamani, 2006b, 245), but only daughters of the sultan and a concubine of servant origin are eligible to prevent the grand tribes from jockeying for power (Bernus, 1981, 82).

## State Ideology

Commerce

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation

## Sources

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## 4.8 Akwapim, 1773-1874

### Overview

Akan monarchy led by the *Okuapenhene* that profited from gold and slave trade along the coast with Europeans (Gilbert, 1997, 504). The *Okuapenhene* ruled with numerous officers, or stools, including a territorial administration and officers who served the *Okuapenhene* directly, such as the royal horn-blowers or public spokesmen (Brokensha, 1972, 104). Akwapim was weak and declining in the 19th century after growing fragmentation between the autochthonous Guan and Akan people. Because of the state's small size and proximity to the coast, Europeans were heavily involved in Akwapim's politics in the 19th century, with missionaries active from the 1840s onward. Akwapim agrees to become a British protectorate in 1850, but is only formally colonized in 1874 (Brokensha, 1972, 50-1).

## Social Segmentation

Matriclan of the *Okuapenhene* disproportionately controls political office (Kwamena-Poh, 1973, 55-58).

## Surplus Extraction

Polity earns revenue from land, which grants him specific rights, including a third of all gold and tax on grain and other food crops. Akwampim makes less off of land and trade than its neighbors, but derives other income from war booty and through sale of war captives (Kwamena-Poh, 1973, 68-71).

## Local Representation

Underneath the paramount chief, or *Okuapenhene*, were four divisional heads who administered subordinate towns with an entourage largely replicating that of the *Okuapenhene* down to the village or town level, the most important social and political unit (Brokensha, 1972, 103-5, 111). Divisions were largely based on ethnic and linguistic demography and many stools were based on pre-existing positions, while others were created to reward loyalty or to co-opt an individual with a large following. Overtime, indigenous populations, notably the Guan, adapted to Akan institutions. Thus while most new offices were rewarded to members of the *Okuapenhene*'s clan, most divisional officers built on existing leadership structures (Kwamena-Poh, 1973, 55-58). *Okuapenhene* was the highest judicial figure in the polity and, with the queen mother helping adjudicate disputes, including those pertaining to marriage and commerce (Ayesu, 2013, 95-98).

## Method of Succession

Within the matriclan. The queen mother plays an important role in selecting a new *Okuapenhene*, but the candidate must be popular and is ultimately approved by the population (Brokensha, 1972, 104).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship. Once enstooled, the *Okuapenhene* is considered sacred (Brokensha, 1972, 105).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

Ayesu, E. (2013). From independent communities to state: Chieftaincy and the making of the Akuapem state, 1730s-1900, *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* (15): 91–113.

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## 4.9 Akwamu, 1731-1886

### Overview

New Akwamu is founded in the Volta River Gorge in 1731 as a successor state to the much older and influential Akwamu, which is conquered the year before by the emerging state of Akwapim (Wilks, 1959, 111). The royal lineage is eventually reinstated, and the polity reemerges, though much smaller than it was prior. Akwamu becomes an on and off vassal of Ashante in 1750, which helps shore up the young polity (Wilks, 1959, 140-42, Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 29).

### Social Segmentation

Ruling clan along with ruling class of military and merchants dominate (e.g. Kea, 1969, 372).

### Surplus Extraction

Both New and Old Akwamu profited from their middleman position in the coastal trade. The polity maintained diplomatic and trade with Dutch and Danish traders, extracting rents from their presence, as well as extracting tribute from subjects, including in-kind production from peasants and tribute in ivory and slaves from dependencies. Ashanti later pays fees to chiefs for protection as trade routed through Akwamu (Kea, 1969, 36, Wilks, 1959, 73-75, 126, 141).

### Local Representation

In New Akwamu, resident officials were appointed locally as were roving 'ambassadors' throughout the polity. New Akwamu also continues practice of deploying military expeditions to maintain authority, brokering with tributary chiefs (Kea, 1969, 372).

### Method of Succession

King chosen within royal matrilineage – preference for sister's sons – by kingmakers (Wilks, 1959, 61, 91).

### State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

### Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

### Sources

Kea, R. A. (1969). Akwamu-Anlo Relations, c. 1750-1813, *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 10: 29–63.

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## 4.10 Akyem, 17thc-1874

### Overview

Akan polity that was divided into three sub-states Akyem Abuakwa, Akyem Bosome, and Akyem Kotoku (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 30) (Bosome was founded later, in the 18th century). Akyem spent much of the 1700s resisting

and ultimately falling to Ashante vassalage. A formal treaty assured Akyem's independence in 1831, though they soon fell under increasing pressure from British interests on the coast following the Danish departure in 1850 (Affrifah, 2000, i). Akyem was an important producer of gold and palm oil (Affrifah, 2000, 139-40). Like the Ashanti, Akyem was a federation, with the *Kotokuhene* heading Kotoku, the *Okyenhene* heading the Abuaka and *Bosomehene* heading Bosom. Conflict was relatively common between them, but they did coordinate around common objectives, including resisting incorporation into Ashante and kinship ties between them produced mutual assistance, e.g. Bosome hosts Kotoku (Rathbone, 1996, 508). Each ruled with a council, which featured senior clan leaders, and the queen mother also played an important role (e.g. see Affrifah, 2000, 157, Rathbone, 1996, 510).

## **Social Segmentation**

Stratified society with notables above commoners and a fair degree of reliance on slaves (Rathbone, 1996, 501). Slave labor was used in gold mining (Affrifah, 2000, 140). Rathbone (1996, 510) notes that by the end of the 19th century, many commoners had become wealthy as the nobility's control over the economy weakened in the face of growing British involvement in the economy.

## **Surplus Extraction**

Evidence that population was taxed and early on Europeans paid for the right to trade, but by 1852, Akyem agreed to a British poll tax (Affrifah, 2000, 54).

## **Local Representation**

Each polity was headed by a paramount chief as described above, Akyem adopts a system of indirect rule to conquered territory from Akwamu in the 18th century, with non-resident governors (Affrifah, 2000, 59).

## **Method of Succession**

Royal house based in matrilineal and some rare female regents (Rathbone, 1996, 509). Enstooled by council.

## **State Ideology**

Divine Kingship

## **Elite Structure Typology**

Federation

## **Sources**

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## 4.11 Anfillo, late 16th c-1882/3

### Overview

Small polity ruled by a monarch, or *taro*. The royal family was related to the monarchy of Kaffa. Conquered by Jote Tulla c. 1882/83 and incorporated into [Leqa Qellem](#).

### Social Segmentation

Power held by elite Busase (Bushasho) clan, with subaltern groups such as the Mao, incorporated into the polity. Many Mao families were traditionally connected to Anfillo nobles as serfs or slaves, with the Anfillo guaranteeing their protection against raids ([González-Ruibal, 2024, 76](#)).

### Surplus Extraction

Tribute collected from surrounding areas ([Smidt, 2003, 263](#)) in addition to serf-like labor from Mao.

### Local Representation

Indigenous groups retained through traditional clan heads. Like many frontier societies, a ‘stranger kingdom’ whereby Oromo arrived and established themselves, largely through intermarriage. This creates a stratum of outsider elites who rely on autochthons to administer things locally, including local spiritual matters. This resulted in a hierarchy of chiefs; thus the Mao retained their paramount chiefs, under whom fell clan chiefs, while the Busase were led by abeto, but all were subject to the taro ([González-Ruibal, 2024, 78, 75](#)).

### Method of Succession

Power hereditary, but succession to the throne depended on approval by assembly that assessed which son was most fit to rule. In Anfillo, this assembly was comprised of representatives of each of the polity’s seven clans ([González-Ruibal, 2024, 77](#)).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. Monarchs had ritual functions and Busase aristocracy associated with superior origins and powers ([González-Ruibal, 2024, 76](#)).

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.12 Anoufou (Chakossi), 17th c-1888

### Overview

Polity formed in the Oti bassin following the arrival of ethnically Anoufou invaders. The Anoufou were led by a king, *feme*, who came from the founding lineage and who ruled in consultation with other notable lineage heads (Tcham, 2007, 154).

### Social Segmentation

Anoufou society had three hereditary social classes: the nobility, *donzom*, commoners, *ngyem*, and *karamom*, or clergy. Both the nobility and clergy held social and political power (Tcham, 2007, 142). Tcham (2007) further mentions castes.

### Surplus Extraction

Yearly tribute was collected from commoners and varied in nature based on where it was geographically coming from. Caravans had to pay for the right of passage to local chiefs (Tcham, 2007, 173, 213).

### Local Representation

Political organization was based around the *donzom* lineages that had conquered the area, with these lineages coming to form the social and territorial basis for political administration. Lineage heads and lineage alliances thus commanded substantial authority locally and the Anoufou never constructed a robust administration due to the rivalries between lineages (Tcham, 2007, 164-8).

### Method of Succession

Kingship most often passed to younger brother of the deceased king although the kingship at times alternated among descendants within the Biema or Soma lineages. A group of wise men/council of different lineage heads would meet after the death of a king and decide on a candidate (Tcham, 2007, 153-5).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. The *feme* had ritual enthronization, such as a ritual bath before acquiring access to sacred canes (Tcham, 2007, 155-7).

### Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

### Sources

Tcham, B. (2007). *Le royaume anoufo de Sansanné-Mango: de 1800 à 1897*, Presses de l'UL, Lomé.

## 4.13 Arewa, 17th c-1901

### Overview

Mawri animist state ruled by a *Sarkin*, or king, who is based in Matankari for much of the 19th century. The *Sarkin* ruled with a twelve-member council, nine of whom were indigenous religious figures (Fuglestad, 1978, 325). While the *Sarkin* comes from male dynastic lineage of the Arewa who first centralized power, a second, religious basis of power in the polity is based in Lougou, where the *Sarrounia*, a female priestess, represents the polity's spiritual authority (Idrissa and

Decalo, 2012, 66). Arewa's spiritual power is associated with the autochthonous gubawa clans (Moulin and Tatali, 2007, 50-51), and (Fuglestad, 1978) describes this as an example of a 'dual institutional structure', whereby the newly arrived Arewa assured political power while indigenous authorities retain religious authority. Arewa is well-known for resisting Fulani jihad from Nigeria in the south as well as resisting French conquest at the Battle of Lougou.

### **Social Segmentation**

Gubawa society is non-hierarchical, but Arewa society did have a clear hierarchy, with four eligible royal lineages assuring political authority (Moulin and Tatali, 2007, 51).

### **Surplus Extraction**

Evidence of tribute and gift-giving to Sarkin in Piault (1970).

### **Local Representation**

Descendants of Baura, the mythical founding mother of the polity, administer territory and are present in the court (Moulin and Tatali, 2007, 50). Later, in-fighting among royal lineage leads many failed-aspirants to found their own chiefdoms in the south, but these are largely independent and have weak if any connections to *Sarkin* Arewa.

### **Method of Succession**

Eligible successors come from four royal lineages, who seem to be holding the position of *Sarkin* Arewa in turn in early 19th century (Piault, 1970, 129). *Sarkin* Arewa is invested by assembly of Azna priests, reflecting the authority of gubawa clans in state matters (Piault, 1970, 174).

### **State Ideology**

Divine Kingship, though a less clear form. *Sarkin* Arewa responsible for maintaining social order and this must be done by legitimating oneself with Azna priests. This means that the *Sarkin* himself is not divine, but his power rests on ability to legitimate himself through evidence of divine sanction, e.g. the absence of natural disturbances (Piault, 1970, 173).

### **Elite Structure Typology**

Regal

### **Sources**

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## 4.14 Ashanti, 1690-1896

### Overview

Akan confederacy with a king – *Asantahene* - who ruled with a council, *Asantemanhyiamu*, a territorial assembly of nearly two hundred men as well as an inner council of eighteen notables that regulated government affairs. The queen mother was also extremely influential (Edgerton, 2010, 32). The council met once a year during the yam festival when subordinate rulers came to the capital, Kumasi, to reaffirm their allegiance. The council served as a meaningful check on the king, but focused on the 'true' Ashanti chiefdoms around Kumasi (Wilks, 1975, 387-413). Ashanti had an elaborate bureaucracy with specialized functions, e.g. treasury and foreign affairs, and many officials were appointed via meritocracy. This bureaucracy enabled Ashanti to rule and incorporate conquered provinces. The political structure balanced power between the king and the oligarchy as they attempted to appease rebellious kingdoms and competition among upper classes. Among Ashanti's impressive accomplishments was the creation of an Ashante identity and patriotism (Edgerton, 2010, 12).

### Social Segmentation

Only a few clans were eligible to fill the position of *Asantahene*, one of them being the Oyoko (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 42-42). Locally within chiefdoms, ruling lineages command considerable authority, maintaining their own militaries. The state tried to restrict the growth of a merchant class, which were recognized as a threat to the leadership and slavery was present in the kingdom (Wilks, 1967, 230).

### Surplus Extraction

Ashanti collected tribute from all allied kingdoms (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 84). Wilks describes Ashanti's tribute system as a highly complex one, with a special court in Kumasi tasked with hearing pleas for adjusting tribute amounts. Each territory had a quota in proportion to ability to pay. Tribute was paid in gold and ivory, but areas without gold paid in people, livestock, cotton, etc. There is further evidence that a head tax system was developing in the 19th century that was required of all married males (1975, 65-70).

### Local Representation

As a confederacy, each region administered itself, though districts paid tribute to the Ashanti royalty (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 42). The core Ashanti chiefdoms were largely autonomous. Lineage heads within villages served as a councilor to the chief, with chiefs themselves elected by a council of elders. Much like the monarch, chiefs consulted the council on major matters and had religious powers, serving as an intermediary between villagers and ancestors (Edgerton, 2010, 40-41). Ashanti's well-maintained road system and local apparatus meant that Kumasi was felt locally, however, especially in the metropolitan core where power was well established. In contrast, rebellion and resistance were common in outer provinces, where Ashanti's power was more variable (Wilks, 1975, Chpt 2).

### Method of Succession

Through the matriline. Male children of eligible senior women could lay claim to the throne (Wilks, 1975, 353). The Queen Mother chose a successor from among those eligible in consultation with councilors who was then presented for approval (Yamoah, 1997, 11). Conflict emerged between different factions of the royal family in the 19th century.

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. King holds golden stool as a ritual symbol of political authority.

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation, though Wilks notes that the *Asantahene* became increasingly authoritarian as the 19th century went on, but that the council remained an important check on his power (Wilks, 1967, 229-32).

## Sources

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## 4.15 Azande, 1750-1890

### Overview

Azande was effectively multiple kingdoms (Lloyd, 1978, 73) as the Voungara and Bandia dynasties expanded and consolidated around Nzakara and Zande respectively. The Voungara and Bandia were independent of, but not in opposition, to each other (Grootaers, 1996, 36) and were dispersed, with a fair amount of space between them. Lloyd describes the Azande as only achieving a low degree of centralization with personalized allegiances remaining highly localized (1978, 887).

### Social Segmentation

Political competition between aristocracy relies on commoners; commoners who serve various aristocrats were unable to establish their own basis of authority and their status in these positions was contingent on their association with the aristocracy (Lloyd, 1978, 75).

### Surplus Extraction

Peasants provided tribute in-kind, including in palm oil, beer, spears, meat, elephant tusks, maize, etc. Villagers were also required to labor in royal fields. Young men – especially from newly conquered territories - lived for several years at king's court where they were socialized into Zande language and acted as military units during war, labor during peaceful eras (Grootaers, 1996, 31).

## Local Representation

The Zande kingdoms were divided into provinces, under which were districts. The sovereign ruled the central province himself, but appointed governors - often his elder sons, but at times commoners, to other provinces. Provincial governors retained independence, but the Zande's intricate tribute networks kept them tied to central sovereign (Grootaers, 1996, 30-31). District representatives were responsible for local justice and peace, maintaining communication and travel infrastructure, providing armed support and for collecting and passing on tribute (Lloyd, 1978, 74).

## Method of Succession

In principle, the son inherited his father's central province, while younger brothers received smaller kingdoms that were in loose alliance. Frequent succession struggles meant that younger sons often left to found new provinces or sub-kingdoms, which created considerable fragmentation, but did produce state expansion; this process amplified in late 1800s (Grootaers, 1996, 40). The availability of land meant that the frontier acted as a 'relief valve', but intensifying pressures between brothers in late 1800s were exploited by Arab slavers, leading kings to increase their demands on commoners and intermediaries (Lloyd, 1978, 76-9).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. Chieftainship and political power associated with sacred qualities.

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.16 Bafut, c.1750-1901

### Overview

Often described as the most centralized of the grassfield kingdoms, Bafut was headed by a *fon* or king, who ruled with the assistance of councilors (*bukum*, s. *nkum*), notably an innermost circle of a dozen or so men who were responsible for executing the *Fon's* orders and enstooling his successor. Regulatory societies also held authority – especially in military and police functions – that expanded as trade grew in the area. This especially sees inclusion of non-king as shifts to territorially based kingdom from kin-based confederation (Engard, 1988, 69-71).

## Social Segmentation

Royals and regulatory society elites, including the *nda-kwifor* and *nda-chung*, which was explicitly for royals to defend their interests (Aletum Tabuwé, 1974, 63-71).

## Surplus Extraction

State collects fees from various sources, including judicial disputants, secret society memberships, and from local chiefdom offices. The slave trade was regulated through 'licenses'.

## Local Representation

Bafut was divided into sub-chiefdoms, under which are villages. Many sub-chiefdoms were weakened during the course of centralization, as the *fon* began appointing more outsiders as a means to gain political independence. This leads to a rise in regulatory societies as the *fon* centralizes power (Engard, 1988, 71). Subchiefdoms did retain authority, however, as did villages and lineage heads, quarterheads and princes were important figures locally (Aletum Tabuwé, 1974, 52-55). Overtime, as state expanded and centralized, Bafut increasing developed 'regulatory' social functions, such as ensuring security and regulating trade. Police and military expanded accordingly as did the emergence of market regulators (Engard, 1988, 69-70). For example, Bafut developed a society responsible for 'locking' roads against hostile influence in May and December and during epidemics (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 74). Family matters were adjudicated locally, while the *fon* and *kwifo* dealt with serious cases related to murder, witchcraft and property crimes (Ngwa, 2017, 53).

## Method of Succession

Royal heir was chosen by council of notables within patrilineage (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 73).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. *Fon* also serves as the chief priest of takumbang society, which had local lodges with meeting houses and a signal gong (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 74).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.17 Bagirmi, 15th c-1893

### Overview

Barma polity with a diverse subject population that included Sara, Massa, Kenga along with Arab and Peulh nomads among others. Bagirmi was led by an *mbang*, who was aided by a royal court comprised of his sons, grand dignitaries and royal wives. Four of the grand dignitaries were of noble birth and four were of slave birth. Each was tasked with specific responsibilities: some watch over royal sons and assisted with enthronement, others aided in the collection of tribute or watched over the royal wives. Bagirmi was extremely hierarchical and generally structured around ability to wage war (Pâques, 1977, Chpt 2). Thus for Reyna, the state's legitimacy rested on its ability to wage violence, in particular in raiding less centralized communities in the vicinity for booty.

### Social Segmentation

Royal lineage and other elite dominate economic and political spheres. Association with the center further bestowed status, thus Reyna quotes Brunache of Bagirmi's tributary provinces: "the young people belonging to better families [were sent] to ... Baigrmi's capital, where they learned the country's language as well as Arabic spoken by officials and the aristocracy. Finally, next, they converted to the Muslim religion. Then, they received one of the blue robes, signs of commandment ..." (1990, 88). Slavery exists in polity.

### Surplus Extraction

Villages paid well-specified taxes to local authorities (see Lebeuf, 1987, 18-85 for list). Market taxes existed, but they were a smaller part of the state's overall revenue compared to the tribute collected from regions. Bagirmi did not tax the slave trade, in large part because a supplier and not a middle-man (Reyna, 1990, 124).

### Local Representation

Locally, *maitres de terres* hold authority within their villages. The *Mbang* was represented within territorial units by either a central state appointee, a member of the royal family or a eunuch slave who was charged with the region. Newly conquered territory was distributed in this way to family members, dignitaries, army chiefs and palace eunuchs as patronage (Lebeuf, 1987, 189-91).

### Method of Succession

Patrilineal within Bagirmi's founding royal lineage. All of an *Mbang's* sons were eligible and could be either nominated by the king himself or, upon a king's death, by a council of dignitaries (Lebeuf, 1967, 186). Paques (1977, 25) claims only four oldest sons are eligible and that they hold specific titles to this effect.

### State Ideology

Hereditary monarchy. *Mbang* is nominally Muslim, but this is not a structuring feature of the state.

### Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

### Sources

La Rue, G. and Lovejoy, P. (2003). The Frontiers of Enslavement: Bagirmi and the Trans-Saharan Slave Routes", *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam* pp. 31–54.



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## 4.18 Bali-Nyonga, c.1820-1884

### Overview

Ethnically Chamba grassfields kingdom headed by a *Mfon*, who rules with a war council (Geary, 1988, 18) and the assistance of notables and holders of priestly offices (Chilver and Kaberry, 1970, 253). The *mfon* had a fair amount of autonomy in who he appointed, with few inherited offices, including among the ward-heads (Kaberry and Chilver, 1961, 368). Bali-Nyonga consolidated into “an effective small state with an inner ring of tributaries and a wider sphere of commercial and diplomatic influence” (Chilver and Kaberry, 1970, 251).

### Social Segmentation

Clear elite structure with royals and military elite retaining disproportionate authority, e.g. *mfon* expected non-royal families to provide daughters in marriage and sons as royal retainers (Kaberry and Chilver, 1961, 367). Slavery present in polity (Nkwi, 1995).

### Surplus Extraction

Villagers and their chiefs had to pay tribute, notably in palm wine, palm oil, firewood, male retainers and labor for royal farms and public works (Russel, 1982, 45). Although there was no established quotas for tribute, subjected leaders were obliged to bring tribute during ceremonies associated with the lela state cult and voluntarily did so for the voma cult (Kaberry and Chilver, 1961, 363).

### Local Representation

Not clear if Bali was divided into clear districts, but subject villages were represented in the capital through established intermediaries, *tadmanji*, princes or titled retainers (Kaberry and Chilver, 1961, 363). Local chiefs were tributaries and had to surrender ceremonial elephant tusks, leopard skins and battle flags upon incorporation. Local chiefs also granted the decision to wage war and the right to criminal prosecution to the *Mfon's* courts, though they could still settle civil matters. Each tributary village was represented in the *Mfon's* palace by an intermediary (Russel, 1982, 45). Unlike many neighbors, the *mfon* exercised substantial authority because he could appoint political offices (Kaberry and Chilver, 1961, 369).

## Method of Succession

*Mfon* were selected from among ruler's adult sons. Toward end of the 19th century, it was established that the successor be born after father ascended the throne and the mother had to come from lineages associated with the *lela* and *voma* spiritual colleges. Successor is not elected, but the *mfon* instead indicated his preferred choice to confidants. Princes were not allowed to serve on the military council or hold civil offices out of fear that they might amass a threatening amount of authority, but they did compete for succession (Kaberry and Chilver, 1961, 265,363).

## State Ideology

Conquest. A series of cult lodges existed across the kingdom, but *mfon* has rights in them and to their medicines, thus lodge heads were obligated to share their magical substances with ruler and could be called on to avert entry of hostile influences or confuse enemies by glamory (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 83). Still, Bali more secular than others in the area (Russel, 1982, 35), and the *mfon* was military leader first and foremost, as Bali were not autochthonous in the area and had only recently conquered the territory (Kaberry and Chilver, 1961, 366).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.19 Bamum, 17thc-1884

### Overview

Ethnically Bamum grassfields kingdom headed by the *mfon*, who ruled with titled officers (Fomine and Fomine, 2010, 112). King rules with a permanent entourage of numerous influential court officials, including queen mother (Tardits, 1980, 724). Still, councilors in Bamum have relatively less power than in neighboring Bamileke states; though they were

consulted and participated in annual rites (Tardits, 1980, 726-39). Tavits (1980, 878) argues that Bamum is an example of how many African polities were able to have both a political authority (here the *mfon*) exist compatibly with lineage-based societies.

## Social Segmentation

Access to social, political and economic power hierarchical within lineages up to apex of the state. Bamum has large population of enslaved peoples.

## Surplus Extraction

Villages pay tribute, which goes through lineage heads who are obligated to bring animals and crops to *mfon* as well as provide labor (Fomine and Fomine, 2010, 112, Tardits, 1980, 773).

## Local Representation

Territorial, lineage-based hierarchies represent *mfon* downwards in addition to *mfon*'s own intermediaries who are posted in the capital as well as frontier villages. Lineage heads retain substantial authority and administer land and justice locally, but there are clear penalties from the *mfon* if they overstep their role (Njeuma, 1973, 257, Tardits, 1980, 826-7).

## Method of Succession

*Mfon* designates successor from among his sons (brothers could succeed if no sons). Although there were king-makers early on in the polity's history, this role erodes over time as *mfon* amasses power (Njeuma, 1973, 257, Tardits, 1980, 700).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. State organized around king and his divine authority. The last king, Njoya, does convert to Islam, then Christianity and then back to Islam (Njeuma, 1973, 254-57).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

Fomine, F. L. M. and Fomine, F. L. M. (2010). The Bamum Dynasty and the Influence of Islam in Fommban, 1390-Present, *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* **19**: 110–131.

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## 4.20 Barotse (Lozi), c.1600-1900

### Overview

Lozi monarchy led by a king (*litunga*) who ruled with councilors and princes. The ‘councilors on the right’ were the most powerful, and were said to represent common people’s interests, while the ‘councilors on the left’ represented the king’s interests, acted as judges and administrators and looked after the king’s property. Princes and the husbands of princesses represented the interests of the royal family. Ngambela, the chief councilor on the right, or spokesman, was the *litunga*’s principal advisor and the council judged disputes and other matters, issued instructions, arranged royal sacrifices, etc (Gluckman, 1963, 1517-18, 1521). Lozi were all assigned a *likolo* (kinship, labor and patronage units, pl. *makolo*) at birth and each *likolo* was represented by a councilor or *induna* residing in the capital. Any member of that unit could communicate with the king and advisors through the *Likolo* head. As the state strengthened, the king gained power to create new *Makolo* and appoint leaders. He could also appoint any commoner to any council titles or the *Ngambela* (Caplan, 1968, 4). The king could call on *Likolo* for public works and each *Likolo* had specific duties; e.g. *likolo* of Njeminawa had the duty to produce salt (Mainga, 2010, 36-7). Note that Barotse was overrun by Makololo - a Sotho people - around 1840 in the wake of the Mfecane, who established themselves as overlords, but Lozi retake authority in 1864.

### Social Segmentation

All subjects were members of a *likolo*, which structured political representation. Aristocracy assures political power.

### Surplus Extraction

Subjects pay tribute (*namba*) to the king at regular intervals in the year or annually, often in-kind. Labor was also demanded by the crown (Mainga, 2010, 59-60) and the king could tax ivory tusks from hunters (Gluckman, 1941, 86).

### Local Representation

Barotse was administered through a territorial system of land units, *lilalo*, with ‘governors’ of each holding military and civil powers. *Lilalo* tended to correlate with the boundaries of *Makolo* (Mainga, 2010, 49-50). The smallest territorial unit was the village (each with a headman), unless the village belonged to a member of the royal family, in which case the prince or princess headed the village. Headmen settled minor disputes but were otherwise overseen by a *Silalanda*, which grouped a number of villages under the oldest and most influential headman. The *silalanda* was appointed by the population with the approval of the king and oversaw communal services. Above the *Silalanda* was the *Silalo*, administered by the resident *induna* who was also appointed by the king with approval of local people. *Silalo* were not necessarily from the area, but the gift of land attached to office which gave rise to a nascent bureaucratic aristocracy (Mainga, 2010, 52). Note that Barotse kept power centralized in capital and princes were not posted to distant provinces.

### Method of Succession

There was no regularized rules for succession as all male members of the royal family with paternal ancestry to its founder were eligible. This resulted in numerous succession crises and *indunas*, or councilors, came to assume the role of king-makers, though they too were beset by factionalism (Mainga, 2010, 67). Power struggles tended to remain concentrated in the capital; thus although there was substantial competition among elites, the state held together as a cohesive entity (Caplan, 1968, 4).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. The kingship had supernatural basis that was maintained with an ancestral cult and the ability to claim descent from Mboo, the founder of the Luyi dynasty (Mainga, 2010, 106, 209). Royal graves were considered oracles and were often the sites of sacrifices (Bertrand, 1899, 279).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.21 Baol, 1686-1894

### Overview

Wolof kingdom in Senegal that gains independence from Cayor in 1686, although Cayor intervenes in Baol on and off in following years. Baol was led by the *teen*, or king, who came from the Fall dynasty. The *teen* appointed dignitaries to the court and although only a small percent of the population of notables were eligible to become king, the *teen* was tasked with representing powerfully interest groups and dynasties across Baol (Martin and Becker, 1976, 35, Searing, 2002, 12-13).

### Social Segmentation

Wolof society structured by a strong caste system, with nobles, freemen, slaves and casted professions. Social, political and economic advancement heavily restricted to nobles.

## Surplus Extraction

Local title-holders collected tribute within their provinces (Searing, 2002, 12). *Sakh-Sakh* or tax collector posted to each province to collect taxes. This included in taxes on European traders along the coast (Searing 14); ships landing at Portudal were paying taxes to *Alkaati* and his assistant, an anchorage fee, a payment to the port captain and a host of small gifts to minor officials in addition to being expected to provide final parting presents. Curtin estimates that this amounted to 10-20 percent tax rate (1975, 290).

## Local Representation

Baol was divided into provinces, at the head of which sat a chief. Although provincial chiefs were named and confirmed by the *teen*, it was politically quite tricky to remove them since province titleholders either originated from the royal family or very old families in these areas (Martin and Becker, 1976, 35). Local political dynasties maintained power by distributing land and titles as rewards for noble birth or service to the state (Searing, 2002, 12-13).

## Method of Succession

The College of Grand *Diambors* nominated a member of the royal family based on the proposition of the *Diaraf Baol*, second-in-command from the *teen*. The *Diaraf* is outside of the family, but is not allowed to be casted. The five Grand *Diambors* came from five prominent families (Martin and Becker, 1976, 35).

## State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.22 Barue, 16th c-1902

### Overview

A Shona kingdom that was an offshoot of the Mwenemutapa empire. Barue was mythically founded by the monarch Kabudu Kagoro, a brave and judicious leader. When Kagoro died, he was reputed to have taken a secret medicine that made him a guardian spirit, *mhondoro*, that was a link between man, the earth and moral order (Isaacman, 1973, 396-7). Barue controlled the lucrative Sena-Manica trade system and was the principal deterrent to Portuguese inland penetration (Isaacman, 1973, 395). Portuguese encroachment increasingly unsettled the kingdom and eroded state's independence

slowly over time (van Dokkum, 2015, 104), with the Portuguese propping up Chipituro against rival claims to the throne (Isaacman, 1975, 55).

## Social Segmentation

Royal nyanguru clan held political authority, though senior councilor always came from autochthonous Tonga Tembo clan (Isaacman, 1973, 402).

## Surplus Extraction

The King collected transit fees from Portuguese travelers on their way to the *feira* in Masekesa and subjects provided labor in royal fields (van Dokkum, 2015, 103, 117).

## Local Representation

Shona politics was organized around families, villages and wards (*dunhu*) that were integrated into chiefdoms (*nyika*). Villages held *dare*, gatherings that functioned as assemblies and courts. There is some evidence that the ruling dynasty could impose chiefs top-down during times of crisis, but in general succession within local families (van Dokkum, 2015, 92, 116).

## Method of Succession

Upon the death of a king, the deceased king's senior advisor became interim ruler. At the appropriate time, the *svikiro*, or earthly guardian of *mhondoro*, came down from Mt. Guru and indicated to the senior advisor and royal councilors who the Kagoro declares as the rightful heir. The tradition was that Kagoro chose the most qualified candidate. In this way, the national guardian spirit, or senior *mhondoro*, was critical in the selection and legitimization of monarch. The transition was rarely so smooth, however, and Barue frequently saw violent turnover in kings. For example, there were six succession crises between 1811-1845. Because the 'decision' of the Kagoro was not strictly within any given lineage, this opened up competition to anyone in the Barue royal family (Isaacman, 1973, 396, 399-400).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.23 Benin, 1180-1897

### Overview

Edo/Bini kingdom ruled by an *Oba*, or King. The *Oba*'s power was determined by his ability to balance powerful groups within the state, notably among village chiefs, many of whom were independently wealthy and influential, while simultaneously drawing influential individuals to his service. One tactic to maintain this balance was found in marrying the *Oba*'s daughters to important title-holders, since the brother-in-law relation implied obligations of assistance and support (Bradbury, 2017, 42). Day-to-day administration was run by the *Oba* and senior title-holders, but a full state council would be called for important matters, such as new laws, declaring war, or the performance of rituals when faced with epidemics, etc (Bradbury, 2017, 43). Benin's economic fortunes declined and rivalries between the *Oba* and his chiefs made the 19th century a tumultuous one (Osadolor, 2001, Chpt 5). Still, Benin managed to mount a military resistance to British expansion in 1897 (Ryder, 1969, 22-23). Benin had long participated in the slave trade along the Benin river, but local commerce had always been diverse and by the late 1840s palm oil is the critical export (Ryder, 1969, 233, 239).

### Social Segmentation

Benin is ruled by an aristocratic class, competition among whom generates substantial internal strife in the 19th century (Osadolor, 2001, Chpt 5). Individual social status depended on their social position, with access to power dependent on ties to the royal family or the economic ability to purchase titles. One vehicle to gain prestige was to acquire a large number of slaves (Osadolor, 2001, 83-86). *Oba* organized a system of craft guilds (Osagie and Ikponmwosa, 2015).

### Surplus Extraction

Peasants provide regularized tribute in the form of foodstuffs twice a year at the village level. The *Oba* also had the right to request a village to provide labor. Prospective title-holders paid fees and tolls were collected at each of the the seven gates into the capital, Edo (Benin City) (Bradbury, 2017, 41). Taxes were also collected on trade, e.g. the *Iwowa* collected taxes on riverian trade, and trade was only permitted among those who had received the permission of the *Oba* or his representative (Osagie and Ikponmwosa, 2015, 12).

### Local Representation

Benin was divided into tribute units, each of which was comprised of chiefdoms, villages and wards. Each unit was under the control of a title-holder based in Benin City who served as an intermediary, thus any appeals to the *Oba*'s court or messages that the *Oba* wished to issue were made through this person. These fief-holders could be appointed councilors, hereditary nobles, the *Oba*'s mother or heir and non-titled palace retainers. These positions were non-hereditary and the *Oba* could redistribute fiefs (Bradbury, 1967, 11). The title-holder's main duty was to organize and collect the twice-yearly tribute in foodstuffs (Bradbury p. 42-43). Under the fief-holders, chiefs, or onogie, controlled one or several villages, with most chiefs descended from junior brothers of past kings. The farther onogies were from the capital, the larger their territory and the more autonomy they tended to have. Onogie power was checked from below by village council of elders and from above by the *Oba*, who they served at the *Oba*'s will (Bradbury, 1967, 9-10). Still, local power was exercised by allegiance more than force and only the kingdom's core areas were ever fully under the *Oba*'s permanent supervision, with a mix of military settlements, indigenous representatives and junior brothers who were installed as hereditary chiefs of towns were used to maintain authority, with the further afield one was from the capital, the lighter the connection to the center (Ryder, 1969, 21).



## Method of Succession

Primogeniture; the *Oba*'s senior son performs his father's mortuary rites and is installed as king (Bradbury, 2017, 40; see Egharevba, 1968, 74 on these rituals). If a king has no son, a brother may succeed him.

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. Sacred nature of the *Oba* is the focal point of the political system. It was illegal to speak of the *Oba* dying, sleeping, eating or washing. The *Oba* was credited with magical powers and spent a substantial share of his time on state rituals and controlling the cults of the hero deities that villages performed on his behalf (Bradbury, 2017, 40).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.24 Borgu, 17thc-1898

### Overview

Bariba monarchy that capitalized on trade routes between Yoruba, Dahomey, Gonja and Hausaland (Stewart, 1993, 330). Borgu was essentially an alliance between five major states: the largest, Nikki, was the politically most important, though it was losing territory in the 19th century. Bussa, the oldest, Ilo, Wawa and Kaiama were located in Nigeria (Crowder, 1973, 23). Thus, "Borgu's organization could best be described as an alliance between states whose rulers have a common tradition of origin and a political system ..." (Agboarumi, 1997, 8). In each, a monarch led with a state council composed of hereditary titled officials (Stewart, 1993, 180).

## Social Segmentation

Borgu divided into six main social groups: the ruling class, *wasangari*, freeman, or *batomba*, who could marry with the *wasangari*. Beneath this were the Fulani, who were technically servile but could demonstrate dissatisfaction with *Wasangari* masters by seeking another master's protection through exit; the true servile class, or *gando*, who were the slaves of the *Wasangari* and intermarried amongst themselves. The two remaining groups were the *dendi*, Mande or Sarkaole traders and immigrant farmers, the latter being especially prominent in Bussa. These groups accepted political authority and paid tribute. Political esteem among the *wasangari* was tied to having a number of followers as well as wealth (Crowder, 1973, 25-6).

## Surplus Extraction

Composite chiefdoms paid tribute, but some, like Illo, exchanged gifts with the rulers of Bussa to symbolize the equality of their partnership (Stewart, 1993, 400). The King of Bussa financed the state through tolls on the caravan trade, revenue from farms worked by slaves, war booty and annual tribute. Tribute was collected by royal slave-administrators (Crowder, 1973, 42). State agents were posted at major trading centers to collect taxes and upkeep market infrastructure (Stewart, 1993, 215).

## Local Representation

Decentralized monarchies that ruled over a series of chiefdoms. In Bussa, the king had enormous spiritual importance, but power was severely circumscribed as he shared power with representatives of 'owners of the land,' the autochthonous inhabitants of the area who had granted the Kisra immigrants permission to settle in the area (Crowder, 1973, 38). Although some princes ruled directly over villages in Bussa, in general local village heads acted on behalf of the king to implement orders (Stewart, 1993, 198).

## Method of Succession

Many princes were eligible to succeed after the death of a king as the kingship rotated between a number of ruling houses. The ultimate successor was chosen during specific ceremonies for adjudicating between competing claimants. At these, councilors or 'king-makers' decided who should rule (Stewart, 1993, 168); Nikki, for example, had fourteen members on the electoral council (Stewart, 1993, 275). A consequence of this was that the ever growing number of contenders led to a proliferation of chiefdoms as would-be monarchs founded their own chiefdoms. This fragmented state power, with Borgu holding together because of threats from neighboring Fulani, Nupe and Yoruba which created pressure to stay together (Stewart, 1993, 393).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship; the king was sacred (Agboarumi, 1997, 7).

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation. Borgu's "organization can at best be described as a loose defensive alliance between states whose rulers had a common tradition of origin and of political system" (Crowder, 1973, 20).

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## 4.25 Borno, late 15thc-1893

### Overview

Successor to Kanem Empire, Borno lay at the crossroads of caravan trade heading both north and east. Traditionally ruled by a Sultan from Mahumi dyanasty, Usman Dan Fodio's attacks in 1808 lead the Sultan to call Muhammad El-Kanemi, a scholar born in Libya, to aid him in his defense. El-Kanemi essentially co-opts power and, as *shehu*, centralizes power within himself and five close followers at the expense of traditional territorial title-holders (Tijani, 1983, 130-7). The *Shehu* centralized the authority to allocate and redistribute fiefdoms to officials and clients (Benisheikh, 1983a, 140, 153).

### Social Segmentation

Sultan along with aristocracy and religious leaders form elite class. Slave caste of *kachellat* important for military units.

### Surplus Extraction

Trade caravans along Saharan routes paid *kafelo* - 'a gift' - to rulers, via a representative. This was an institutionalized expectation, but there were not official rates set as elsewhere (Benisheikh, 1983b, 90-1). Local fief-holders collect taxes, e.g., on grain, and this tribute was large part of the polity's financial apparatus (Hiribarren, 2017, 25).

### Local Representation

Borno was traditionally divided into fiefs, with the ability to distribute territorial fiefs a key means of remunerating important government functionaries. Fiefs, which varied in size, were headed by territorial governors or *galadmimas* in a feudal structure. The result was a patchwork of territories and tax collecting schemes across the territory. Underneath any given fief-holder was both sedentary and semi-nomadic populations, with clans often serving as the local organizing force of political life (Hiribarren, 2017, 24-5). Under El-Kanemi, traditional *galaminas* loose much of their former political power (Benisheikh, 1983a, 140, 153).

### Method of Succession

Following El-Kanemi's accession to power, succession within his male family line, with power rotating to his brothers after his death. This is not necessarily peaceful, with eligible brothers mobilizing clients and military force (Mahamma, 1997, 103).

### State Ideology

Islamic Theocracy

### Elite Structure Typology

Despotic under El-Kanemi; Gatekeeper prior.

### Sources

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## 4.26 Bouna (Koulango), early 1600s-1897

### Overview

A Dagomba kingdom in Cote d'Ivoire, headed by the *Bouna Massa*. Bouna's capital became the first major city in Cote d'Ivoire, capitalizing on the gold and kola trade as well as the sale of slaves to the coast (Boutillier, 1993, 12, Mundt, 1995, 45). By the late 1800s, Bouna was quite weak as a result of increased Lobi immigration and, in 1897, it was overrun by Samory, from which it never recovered from (Mundt, 1995, 44-5).

### Social Segmentation

Bouna's social structure was three tiered with the Dagomba, who sold slaves and collected taxes, ruling at the top, Dyula merchants also obtaining status, and the Kulango, later largely outnumbered by Lobi in-migrant, peasants forming the majority of the population (Mundt, 1995, 45).

### Surplus Extraction

Merchants paid taxes and peasants paid tribute as well as supplying obligatory labor to aristocracy (Mundt, 1995, 45).

### Local Representation

Kingdom divided into a number of well-delimited chieftaincy. Chiefs were descendants of the royal family, often brothers or cousins of the king, though some autonomous chieftaincies were integrated into the kingdom at the margins (Boutillier, 1993, 213-4). Still, chieftaincies were generally not hereditary, which helped undermine centrifugal tendencies of provincial elites. Instead, chieftaincies appointed by Bouna, elders and nobles (Boutillier, 1969, 4-5).

## Method of Succession

The *Bouna Massa* rotated within three lineages, all of which were considered to descend from the founder, Boukani. These shared ties of descent created specific relations and comportment that prevented open hostility within the three lineages (Boutillier, 1993, 256).

## State Ideology

Commerce

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.27 Boundou, 1698-1905

### Overview

Fulbe Islamic theocracy founded by Malick Sy in 1698. By the 19th century, the *almaamy*, or king, has substantial authority and, unlike in Fouta Toro where Sy originated from, did not need to consult an advisory council or titleholders (Gomez, 2002, 101). The encroachment of the French under Faïdherbe, Umar Tall's jihad and famine undermine the state considerably, however, meaning that by the second half of the century the polity has declined in stature, though peaceful, much of the territory was depopulated (Gomez, 2002, 149).

### Social Segmentation

Social, economic and political order structured around social castes, as is true with other Fulani groups. Indigenous slavery present.

### Surplus Extraction

*Almamy* collected tribute from population and war booty, e.g. a fifth of booty went to the *almamy* while remaining 4/5ths went to the army. Taxation increases after Umar Tall and Faïdherbe depart in 1860s (Gomez, 2002, 107, 137), with customs on caravan flows heading to Atlantic markets and back, set at one-tenth of passing merchandise. Traders were further obligated to partake in ceremonial gift-giving; Curtin (1975, 286-97) estimates this rate at about 1 mithqal of gold per donkey load at the end of the 18th century.

## Local Representation

Political order a tiered system with *almamy* at the top, located in the two branches of the Sissibe family located at Boulebane and Koussan, followed by Sissibe family members appointed to govern the provinces. Underneath the Sissibe dynasty are villages, the base unit of Bundunke society, which each have a chief charged with managing local affairs and adjudicates judicial cases with village imam (Gomez, 2002, 101-3) (though only the *almamy* can adjudicate cases involving homicide (Tandjigora, 2015, 108). State maintains a standing army, but in times of war each free family had to send one man (Gomez, 2002, 104).

## Method of Succession

Within Sissibe family. Succession procedures were formalized in mid-1700s when some branches of the family were excluded from competition, concentrating power between the Koussan and Boulebane lineages who alternate control, though disputes between them the sources of conflict and civil war (Clark, 1999, 99). *almamy* passes through line of brothers, beginning with eldest, until returns to eldest son of eldest brother. Still, heir has to have backing of remaining family members or may risk forfeiture in a desire to eliminate rulers who might encourage instability. Although usually straightforward, must be sanctioned by an electoral council (Gomez, 2002, 101-2).

## State Ideology

Islamic theocracy

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.28 Buganda, 15th c-1900

### Overview

Centralized political system headed by hereditary kings known as the *Kabaka*. By mid-1800s, Buganda was divided into a number of *ssazas* (counties), each governed by a chief. Other important non-territorial chieftaincies also had substantial power, arguably at various points of the 19th century one or two chiefs had as much power as *Kabaka* (Reid, 2002, 4). Buganda was expanding throughout the 19th century, successfully gaining territory from Bunyoro to the north, though economic downturn as ivory reserves dwindle and slave trade slows, feed into growing internal political threats (Reid, 2002, 111, 254). The single most important theme of Ganda political history in the 300 years before colonization was shift of political and territorial power from regional chiefs (*bataka*) to the *kabaka* (Reid, 2002, 3).

### Social Segmentation

Social stratification was emerging in the 19th century though there remained some fluidity. Still, peasants were distinguished from anyone associated with the *Kabaka* through family ties or appointment and territorial chiefs, office-holders and religious figures all have socio-political power (Fallers et al., 1964). Slavery does exist in the kingdom (Reid, 2002, 96).

### Surplus Extraction

Peasants paid taxes (in cowry, pots, barkcloth, hoes, shields, fish and livestock as well as agricultural produce) and were required to provide labor for public works; this included the construction of a network of highways that linked the kingdom's territory together (Reid, 2002, 95, 99, 101). Taxes were collected upward, with the *kabaka* appointing tax-collectors to each district who worked with local chiefs to collect what was owed by their constituents (Roscoe, 1911, 244). *Ssaza* chiefs taxed local markets while the *Kabaka* taxed markets in capital.

### Local Representation

Power was administered through hereditary chiefs and clan leaders at the local level. The *Kabaka* had full appointment and dismissal powers of major chieftainships by the end of 18th century, and territorial chiefs were the main agents of government. At this same time, all non-clan land was could not be inherited and could be used in the gift of the king; this induced competition between chiefs to seek the *Kabaka's* favor (Reid, 2002, 3).

### Method of Succession

Father to son (?, 52). The *Kabaka* was not controlled by any one clan since the king takes the clan of his mother (Reid, 2002, 3), this renders the most powerful clan at any moment effectively that of the *Kabaka's* mother. This creates stability as clans become the means of organizing alliances and generate a sense of collective well-being (Green, 2010, 8).

### State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy.

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

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## 4.29 Bunyoro, 16thc-1894

### Overview

Bunyoro was a successor state to the much larger Bunyoro-Kitara, whose power ebbed from the 17th century onwards. Ruled by the Babito dynasty, the *Mukama*, or king, headed the state (Pirouet, 1995, 69). Bunyoro was a well-developed state with a number of office-holders and court officials assisting the *Mukama* (Dunbar et al., 1965, 41). Bunyoro's fortunes are lagging in the early 19th century, following the revolt and independence of Toro, but the state is centralizing under Kabaleega from the mid 1800s onward.



## Social Segmentation

Babito dynasty and ruling class were pastoralists while commoners were farmers (Dunbar et al., 1965, 42).

## Surplus Extraction

Tax collectors were posted at all major markets (Uzoigwe, 1972, 423). Steinhart describes a 'massive levy' on the peasantry as the basis of the military, which stages the most significant resistance to British colonization (1967, 21).

## Local Representation

Relatives and loyal servants of the *Mukama* were appointed to oversee lower levels of government, or *saza*, and far reaching areas of the kingdom (Pirouet, 1995, 70). These chieftaincies were graded, with country chiefs appointed by the *Mukama*, working with sub-chiefs, also appointed by the *Mukama*, and then village headmen (Dunbar et al., 1965, 40). Many of these chieftaincies were hereditary, creating powerful provincial families, but under Kabaleega this 'feudal' system was eliminated as Kabaleega centralized power and put his own supporters in these positions, many of whom were commoners (Doyle, 2006, 50-3) This created bonds of dependence downwards (Steinhart, 1967, 613). This system co-existed with clan heads, which were elected by clan members and approved by the *Mukama*, but their authority was limited to questions of inheritance (Dunbar et al., 1965, 41).

## Method of Succession

Succession was a weakness in Bunyoro's system as the state had to be consisted by each successor. Disputes over succession were common, especially by sons and brothers of deceased *Mukama*, who had been appointed as territorial chiefs since this granted them a power base. Ultimately, succession went to the most powerful male in the Babito dynasty (Dunbar et al., 1965, 36).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. Elaborate court rituals legitimized the monarchy, with a royal drum symbolizing their authority. The *Mukama's* councilors were important ritual authorities (Steinhart, 1967, 20) and the *mukama* represented the source of all political power (Beattie, 1959).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.30 Burundi, late 17thc-1896

### Overview

Monarchy with a king known as a *Mwami*. Similar to Rwanda, the *Mwami* was ethnically Tutsi, an ethnic minority (Eggers, 2006, 106). Burundi has a central court, as with Rwanda, but it is weaker (as is the state in general), especially in the periphery (Newbury, 2009, 311-2). The state had finally solidified power following expansion in the 1700s and early 1800s, but this expansion had stopped by 1850 and authority over outlying territory was stressed at the same time that intrigues and factions in the royal court weakened the center (Mworoha, 1987, 232-5).

### Social Segmentation

Hutu majority state, with a large ruling class minority of Tutsi, and a minority of Twa people (Dorsey, 1994, 6). Yet clan and regional identities were particularly important in structuring power; the Baganwa were descendants of the kings, for example, and the Banyaruguru were a special class of powerful Tutsis, reflecting how even within the Tutsi ruling class, socio-political authority was hierarchical (Newbury, 2009, 300-1).

### Surplus Extraction

Peasants paid tribute and faced labor obligations. The nature of tribute varied locally by economic sector, such as agriculture, livestock or artisanal goods (Mworoha, 1987, 220-1). Burundi was less involved in long-distance trade than neighbors, so trade taxes less important (Mworoha, 1987, 169-70).

### Local Representation

Burundi was a relatively decentralized polity with a four-tiered system of administration: the *mwami* controlled the area surrounding the capital, Muramvya; the region surrounding Muramvya was controlled by the sons and brothers of the king; the eastern region was controlled by indigenous Batware chiefs; and western/northwestern region was controlled by mostly Hutu chiefs. Within core areas, appointees from the royal family had substantial judicial, military and fiscal prerogative as well as the right to land administration. Each prince's territory was subdivided into smaller districts of one or two hills administered by an *ivyariho*, often a local notable. Administrative officials could come from non-aristocratic families (Mworoha, 1987, 217-18, Newbury, 2009, 307-11).

### Method of Succession

Succession was usually father to son, which created large family dynasties that generated struggles between brothers following a chief's passing as different descent lines competed for the throne. This pattern is one of the biggest impediments to the state's consolidation of power (Newbury, 2009, 285, 311).

### State Ideology

Divine Kingship. The *Mwami* had absolute power and is considered to have supernatural powers (Mworoha, 1987, 209). The accumulation of royal rituals was linked to the expansion of political space; the state develops a new religious community as it expanded that assimilated local practices (Newbury, 2009, 309-10).

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.31 Calabar, c.1650-1891

### Overview

Small Efik polity in Nigeria that controlled major trade hubs near coast. Calabar is a major slave port and, later, palm oil (Imbua, 2012, 14-16). Calabar's fortunes are waning in the late 1800s as political competition between wards threaten polity's stability (Latham, 1973, 123).

### Social Segmentation

Secret societies structured political power and had graded structure. Over time, specific 'wards' obtain more power with authority concentrated within specific lineages. Slavery existed within the polity (Latham, 1973, 33, Imbua, 2012, 19-25).

### Surplus Extraction

Surplus extracted from trade.

### Local Representation

Calabar was organized in village republics, with lineage heads playing an important role as heads of houses (*ufok*). Over time, wealth comes to replace age as the primary driver of authority within a lineage as some family 'wards' amass slaves and power (Imbua, 2012, 28-9).

### Method of Succession

Ward heads have substantial authority over lineages; here succession often within a male lineage or rotates among a set of eligible families. This could be quite contentious. Wards then compete for the positions of *Obong*, which the Europeans incorrectly identified as the king and which Latham suggests was the civil authority who worked in collaboration with other major title-holders, such as the *Eyamba* (the head of law) and the *Ndem* priest. The *Obong* was traditionally within the *Efion Ekpo* lineage, but shifts as wards begin to compete for it once they had the money and power to push for it. These positions evolves over time and increasingly becomes the subject of competition among wards (Latham, 1973, 43-4, 113).

### State Ideology

Divine Kingship. *Ekpe* (leopard) societies were widely revered and used to legitimate rule (Imbua, 2012, 19) and Efik communities were bound together under *ekpe's* supreme authority whose mysteries where only known to the initiated (Aye, 1967, 75).

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation. 'Grand council' among wards referred to by Lovejoy and Richardson (1999, 348-9) as a cartel wherein each ward lived under its own authority except what was dedicated by the *Ekpe* secret society, such as recovering debts (Imbua, 2012, 19, 24-5).

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## 4.32 Cayor, 1549-1886

### Overview

Wolof kingdom that splits off from Djoloff in 1549. *Damel* runs the polity with a council of notables. Like other Senegalese Wolof kingdoms, Cayor had defined laws and hierarchy around the monarchy and power was quite centralized with established position of prime minister, electors and other notables who held substantial power in addition to the *damel* (Diouf, 1990, 55).

### Social Segmentation

Wolof society structured by a strong caste system, with nobles, freemen, slaves and casted professions. Social, political and economic advancement heavily restricted to nobles.

### Surplus Extraction

Tribute paid upward from provinces, while Peulh pay a tribute to the fourth minister, the *Digaly Gueye* (Ba, 1976, 173). The state was entitled to approximately one-tenth of passing merchandise and traders obligated to partake in ceremonial reciprocal gift-giving. In the mid-1850s, it is estimated that the *Damel* was collecting about 5 percent off peanut exports, which was paid directly to his officials. The French resist this, and Faidherbe reduces this to 3% in 1857 as Cayor's bargaining power declines (Curtin, 1975, 286-97, 295).

### Local Representation

Cayor was divided into provinces and was a feudal system (Ba, 1976, 172). The base social unit was the village, headed by a chief (*borom dekk*), which were in turn nested in provinces, or *lamanat*. Provinces were headed by a *laman*, who was responsible for land management and judicial processes and who served under the *grand laman* who manages land conflicts. Village chiefs and *laman* are designated by local communities. Peulh populations represented by *aardo*. The central state was also represented at the province level by the *Kangam*, an administrator, under whom serves the *jaraaf* or *farba* who are responsible for a village or groups of village. Local actors have autonomy, but kept dependent on monarchy

through land relations and clientelist ties; *kangam* must be able to raise troops for example (Diouf, 1990, 65-6, Appendix C).

## Method of Succession

*Damel* is elected by a council of electors. Clear procedures existed. Following the death of a *damel*, the *Diawdien Boul*, the hereditary chief of the freemen, convoked the princes. The *Diawdien Boul* then chose the new king with other electors, including the *Tchialaw* (chief of Diambagnane province), the *Bootale* (Chief of Ndiop province) and the *Badji* (chief of Gatenge). Electors were obligated to choose someone in royal family (on both sides). The new king then provides a gift to electors (Ba, 1976, 171).

## State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy. As with other Wolof monarchy in Senegal, power was 'temporal' rather than religious; even if there is some sacredness around foundation of kingdom, no ritual duties of kings as most religious functions subsumed under Islam. Power thus vested in lineage of monarchy and the stakes large families had in grand electors (Diouf, 1990, 60-1).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.33 Dagomba, 16th c-1888

### Overview

Mole-Dagbani kingdom that was nominally Muslim. Dagomba formed in the 16th century, and from the 1740s-1874 was a vassal of Ashanti (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 84). Dagomba profited from the transit of slaves from neighboring kingdoms to the south, much of it passing through Ashante, and was often in competition with neighboring Gonja over these trade routes (MacGaffey, 2013, 18, 21). In its early years, Dagomba was akin to a confederacy, with state power held together by marriage alliances and force as the possibility of becoming the king, or Ya Na, keep aristocracy together. Over time, power consolidated around the Ya Na, though dynastic disputes continued. The Ya Na was assisted

by court elders and ritual authorities (MacGaffey, 2013, 22-3). Dagomba entered a protectorate with Germany in 1888 and was quite weak at this time.

## **Social Segmentation**

Royal lineages forms an aristocracy, even though individual royal titles were often of minimal importance. Other office-holders also had political authority (MacGaffey, 2013, 22). Within the aristocracy, power is hierarchical downwards from the *Ya Na*, who distributes patronage down to the village level. Dagbon society further divided into social classes, including the nobility and rulers, warriors, fetish priests, commoners, caste occupational groups like butchers and blacksmiths, and captives (Mahama, 2004, 17-26). Commoners could hold local chieftaincies and some titled positions (MacGaffey, 2013, 22).

## **Surplus Extraction**

Subordinate chiefs traditionally endowed the *Ya Na* with gifts in addition to payments made at the time of their appointment. The *Ya Na* also collected fines for criminal cases he heard as well as market and customs duties (Mahama, 2004, 67-8). Note that Dagbon also paid tribute to Ashanti when they were a vassal (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 84).

## **Local Representation**

Dagomba was divided into four provinces, each of which maintained considerable authority. Provinces were headed by a sub-chiefs appointed by the *Ya Na*, with the exception of Yendi province that the *Ya Na* oversaw directly (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 83).

## **Method of Succession**

Father to son (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 83). To be a candidate for the *Ya Na*, a prince had to occupy one of three chieftaincies: Karaga, Savelugu or Mion. Selection to these chieftaincies was limited to sons of previous kings (MacGaffey, 2013, 22).

## **State Ideology**

Hereditary monarchy

## **Elite Structure Typology**

Regal

## **Sources**

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## 4.34 Dahomey, c.1680s-1892

### Overview

Monarchy with a powerful king, *fon*, who was aided by state-appointed ministers tasked with duties, such as religious affairs or military matters. The military played a central role in centralizing power and was a defining feature of the state (Monroe, 2007, 352-5). Although the king was powerful, his power was not absolute, and yearly festivals ensured representation from different regions (Yoder, 1974, 419). Dahomey had a significant Yoruba minority, and Lombard (1967, 75) notes that groups that were dynastically or ethnically related to the Fon were assimilated into the kingdom. This was especially true in the regions between the capital and the coast. Dahomey faced pressure from the Yoruba to the east and increasingly European powers in the 19th century.

### Social Segmentation

Society was highly stratified, with hierarchical ranking from royals, officials, free commoners and slaves (Lombard, 1967, 73-4).

### Surplus Extraction

Dahomey collected numerous taxes. Tribute came from out-lying areas, which could include slaves (Diamond, 1996, 151). Roads and trails had toll houses stationed on them that went to state coffers and there were similarly military levies (Ross, 1987, 160). The king taxed palm oil production and implemented market taxes and import duties. Goods sold by Europeans were taxed by royal officials stationed at gates of factories (Lombard, 1967, 89-90).

### Local Representation

The early Dahomean state was based on regional elites, but by the 1800s, the state had well-defined bureaucracy and entrenched spatial reach. Officials from Abomey were posted in towns throughout the kingdom and major centers were administered down to the quarter level. These local officials administered justice, though major cases were deferred to the court in Abomey and the death penalty remained a royal prerogative (Monroe, 2007, 355). Dahomey was divided into provinces; there were seven provinces at the end of the 19th century with Abomey (central province under the king), Whydah and Allada the three most important. Zagnanado bordered the Yoruba chiefdoms and was mainly a military zone, Mahi lay in the north, Atakpame in west (toward Togo) and Adja to the southwest, which was more autonomous and less clearly defined boundaries (Lombard, 1967, 76). Provincial governors responsible for maintaining national highways, collecting taxes, public order, meeting military quotas, etc. The Yoruba to the north were incorporated by allowing their indigenous chiefs to remain in power, but their power was restricted and they were 'doubled' by Dahomean officials. Village chiefs under governors were hereditary and were responsible for inhabitants (Lombard, 1967, 75-7).

### Method of Succession

Following the death of the king, councilors chose a new crown prince and managed the ensuing challenges from other eligible sons/heirs. The heir was not necessarily from same lineage, but he had to be from royal clan (Ross, 1987, 199), but Lombard suggests that it was effectively primogeniture (1967, 78).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. The kingship had sacred attributes that legitimated the state in collaboration with two religious cults: that associated with the mythical founder of the Abomey dynasty and one for royal ancestors (Lombard, 1967, 84).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

### Sources

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## 4.35 Damagaram, 1740-1899

### Overview

Hausa polity in Niger led by a *Sarki*, or Sultan, who ruled with an established set of royal titleholders and officers. Polity emerged along Sahelian caravan trade routes. An independent province of [Bornu](#) in early 1800s, but powerful in its own right and operated like an independent polity before gaining effective independence mid-century, as shifting caravan trades eastward strengthened the state (see [Dunbar, 1970](#), Chpt 1).

### Social Segmentation

Clear social hierarchy of royal persons, free persons, *karda* (autochthons) and slaves; evidence of occupational castes, like blacksmiths and griots ([Dunbar, 1970](#), 129).

### Surplus Extraction

Elaborate taxation system by occupation. Peasants pay yearly personal tax three times a year as well as on inheritance and head taxes in cowries and grain on professional classes. Caravan trade tolls also an important source of revenue (see [Dunbar, 1970](#), Chpt 6).

### Local Representation

At peak, eighteen vassal chieftaincies paid to Damagaram with title holders paying fees to *Sarki*. Over time, the purchasing titles became fiercely competitive ([Dunbar, 1970](#), 132). Several titles had distinct administrative duties and were responsible for specific zones, e.g. the *Hakini* managed the area of Tirmini ([Dunbar, 1970](#), 143). Locally intermediaries collect taxes on caravans and tribute ([Hamani, 2007](#), 390). Many local rulers were allowed to remain in their capitals and handle disputes, but *Sarki* retained firm control and would call anyone who was becoming too popular or who was acting too independently to Zinder ([Dunbar, 1970](#), 51). Local titles were often hereditary, but the *Sarki* had ultimate right to



decide who got the title next and could dismiss any individual. In this way, the system was similar to Bornu (Dunbar, 1970, 129-30).

### Method of Succession

Within male lineage (Hamani, 2007, 389) among brothers of deceased *Sarki*. Prior to Ahmadu Babba, *Sarki* often named his successor in consultation with notables (Dunbar, 1970, 133).

### State Ideology

Commerce. Although Islam is spreading in late 19th century and religious authorities grow in prominence, not clear that this is a legitimating

### Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

### Sources

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## 4.36 Dawro, 17thc-1889

### Overview

Dawro is a small kingdom in Ethiopia that began consolidating power in the 17th century. Konta was integrated into Dawro on and off during this time, but gained independence for most of the 1800s. Like neighboring Wolayta, Dawro and Konta had defensive borders that used rivers, stone walls and ditches.

### Social Segmentation

Kauka dynasty rules Dawro. Kingdom has specific lineages who assure political office as well as social castes, e.g. advisors could only come from higher caste (Ahmed, 2019, 60).

### Surplus Extraction

District governors collect tribute. Citizens were also required to provide communal labor.

### Local Representation

Dawro was divided into seven regions, each with sub-regions that were the basis for political organization. For instance, the king could mobilize the population by region for collective projects, like building and maintaining defensive walls (Abebe, 2014, 25).

## Method of Succession

Eligibility for kingship depended on the clan. Last dynasty in power is Kawka clan, and the king's successor was the eldest son of the principle wife.

## State Ideology

Divine kingship

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper (imprecise details)

## Sources

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## 4.37 Djoloff, 1200-1890

### Overview

Wolof kingdom in central Senegal that sees declining fortunes from the 1500s onwards as restive provinces like [Cayor](#) and [Baol](#) break off into independent polities, largely in response to growing economic opportunity on the Atlantic coast. The Djoloff was headed by a *Bourba*, who came from the Ndiaye family. Bourba rules with assistance of a number of titled individuals, most prominently the *Grand Dyaraf*, who hears complaints and brings them to the *bourba* as well as the council of seven who are consulted on important matters. Other central dignitaries are the 12 *dyambu* or provincial title holders, the presumed heir to the throne and a handful of canton leaders.

### Social Segmentation

Wolof society structured by a strong caste system, with nobles, freemen, slaves and casted professions. Social, political and economic advancement heavily restricted to nobles. The Djoloff had a large Peulh and a smaller Maure minority, both of which also had caste. Ethnic minorities and castes had distinct representatives, but political, economic and social advancement was more limited ([Charles, 1977](#), 11).

### Surplus Extraction

Bourba collects tribute. Peasants paid *assaka*, or one-tenth of their harvest in kind. Casted individuals paid in goods and ethnic minorities, such as the Fulbe, sent cattle upon the election of a new *Bourba* or when a new *Aardo* was elected as a

means to recognition. Traders and visitors expected to give gifts to *Bourba* as was anyone looking for a favor (Charles, 1977, 12).

### Local Representation

Kingdom divided into known provinces, at the head of which sat a provincial chief (*diambour*). Titles and corresponding territorial rights were allotted over time by *bourbas* to specific individuals for their service, most of which became hereditary and tended to concentrate in the Ndiaye lineage (Charles, 1977, 9). Justice was then administered locally, but could be appealed upward, with the final court being the *bourba* himself (Charles, 1977, 11). Peulhs, Maures, Laobe and other ethnic minorities were represented by a specific *Farba* (Leyti, 1981, 19).

### Method of Succession

*Bourba* were elected by a general assembly of electors (les *diarafs-Diambour*) in a meeting ceremonially held at Dediguje. The *Bourba* had to come from the Ndiaye family, with prominent eligible members including: the *Boumi*, *Bargam* and the 12 *Diambour* (province chiefs) (Leyti, 1981, 17).

### State Ideology

Hereditary monarchy

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.38 Dosso, mid-19th c-1898

### Overview

Zarma polity ruled by a *Zarmakoy*, or king. Although some, such as Robinson (1975), suggest that the polity emerged in the mid-18th century, Streicker (1980) and others describe the area as one of 'local autarky' with little unifying order. Following the failed Fulani jihad and pressure from Tuareg from the north in the early 1800s, however, power consolidates around Issa Korombe and we can speak of a centralized polity emerging.

### Social Segmentation

Descendants of Bukar, within six lineages, hold political power and kinship ties become a major source of appointment, thus that many councilors and other power holders at the center originate in royal family.

## Surplus Extraction

Peasants pay a yearly land tax and an inheritance tax and kingdom collects war booty as revenue (Idrissa and Decalo, 2012, 189). *Zarmakoy* or king uses these taxes/war booty to bolster his position (Streiker, 1980, 378-9).

## Local Representation

*Labu-koy*, or regional representatives, were elected by village chiefs and approved by king. *Labu-koy* ensured local judicial order and collected taxes. Although the *Zarmakoy* could appoint officials, this was largely limited to the royal court and the *Zarmakoy* did not have the authority to appoint the *Sendi*, or priest, or most lower officials who largely arose from autochthonous populations (Robinson, 1975, 79, Streiker, 1980, 375).

## Method of Succession

Rotated within six lineages who claimed descent from Boukar and his son Bouyaki (Rothiot, 1988, 14), most of whom reside in their own ward within Dosso, though one outside the capital. There was no clear established order of succession, but an established pattern of shifting between lineages thus that no lineage held the position back to back. Robinson (1975, 80) suggests that this is because no one lineage could consolidate power.

## State Ideology

Conquest. Although the population is converting to Islam at this time, repulsion of Fulani jihad indicates not an Islamic theocracy. And while the *Zarmakoy* had a spiritual role, the legitimating ideology of the state lay in its ability to coordinate defense following the devastation of the first half of the century (see Streiker, 1980, 387).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.39 Fouladou, 1867-1903

### Overview

Fulani kingdom founded by Molo Eggue (renamed Alfa Molo), who came from Fouta Djallon in the territory of Kaabu. Under Molo Eggue's son, Musa Molo, Fouladou centralized into a territorial hierarchy whereby Molo begins appoints district administrators. Although Molo was tyrannical as described by Glovsky (2020), Fouladou remained heavily de-centralized, as Molo relied on autochthonous clans to rule much of the territory.

## Social Segmentation

Fulani society hierarchical and Fouladou founded out of a sense of Fulani mistreatment under Kaabu's Mandingue elite.

## Surplus Extraction

Tax collectors gathered taxes from village chiefs (Quinn, 1971, 433). Glovsky describes tax burden as high which, combined with arbitrary legal judgments, led to substantial out-migration (2020, 89).

## Local Representation

Fouladou divided into 30 districts administered by Musa's followers. Divisional chiefs were responsible for recruiting soldiers and collecting taxes and offices could be inherited. Villages, which chiefs appointed by councils, populated each district (Quinn, 1971, 432-3). In general, power was quite decentralized given significant limits to communication and transportation and Glovsky (2020, 82) notes that some regions only associated themselves with Musa when they needed military assistance. Ngaide (2012, 106-7) describes a limited capacity for central power to do what it wanted in provinces because it relied on local rulers. Cumulatively this meant that there was little sentiment of belonging to a shared territorial or ethnicity due to internal conflicts and weak connections across space.

## Method of Succession

Father to son, but because the state ends with Musa Molo this was never institutionalized. Hawkins (1980, 212) notes that traditionally, Bakary Demba, Alpha Bolo's brother born of the same mother, should have been successor given Fulbe tradition, but Alpha Molo had declared Musa Molo his successor before his death. This sparked a conflict between Musa Molo and Bakary, with Bakary taking over for a short time, until he began abrogating the agreement he had with Musa and Musa forcibly took over.

## State Ideology

Conquest

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.40 Fouta Djallon, 1725-1896

### Overview

Fulani kingdom in the Guinean highlands run by an *Almamy*, or king. Fouta Djallon practiced bicameralism, electing two kings for each reign who alternated power to balance political and religious interests. This created a check on any given *almamy's* authority, though this was at times tested (Diallo, 1972, 37-42). Fouta Djallon controlled key regional trade routes, with towns like Boké and Labé serving as important hubs on the trade from the interior to the coast (Harris, 1965, 12-14). Fouta Djallon was quite stable in the 19th century, though some dissident movements emerged in the late century on the kingdom's periphery.

### Social Segmentation

Fulani society is based around caste hierarchies, with notables controlling economic and political opportunity and exclusively serving as electors and as *almamy*. Over time, power concentrates in royals residing in the capital, Timba, and religious elites based in Fugumba, further narrowing political influence. Estimated that half of population was enslaved.

### Surplus Extraction

Taxes were collected from the population, with the payment of taxes associated with one's religious duty. The French paid taxes to trade with the kingdom (Diallo, 1972, 167).

### Local Representation

Fouta Djallon was built on nine provinces, each of which was run by a royal family that also held religious titles (i.e. *alfa* or *cermo*). Provincial capitals had one or two delegates or messengers who served as a diplomatic liaison between provincial leaders and the *Almamy*. Provincial chiefs were in charge of military contingencies, overseeing village chiefs, raising taxes, and administering a local justice system (Diallo, 1972, 161-7). Although considerable autonomy was granted to provincial heads, all provincial leaders were expected to represent the central state, contribute to collective efforts, such as military service, and follow the Quran (Bah, 2008, 58).

### Method of Succession

The *almamy* was elected by a federal assembly of members from the two branches of the Sediyaabe family. These electors represented their provinces (Diallo, 1972, 119-20).

### State Ideology

Islamic Theocracy

### Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.41 Fouta Toro, 1776-1891

### Overview

Fulani polity that emerged along the Senegal river in the late 1700s in the territory of the Denake kingdom. Fouta Toro was run by an elected council of territorial or province chiefs that collectively exercised authority within their own sub-units ([Oloruntimehin, 1972](#), 7 goes so far as to call these 'principalities'). The council was headed by an *Almamy* (imam), in whose name the council governed, but the *almamy* was a constrained position that was obligated to consult with council. In this way, Fouta Toro was significantly more decentralized than other Fulani polities in the region, such as [Fouta Djallon](#) or [Boundou](#), because the electors explicitly worked to prevent a royal dynasty from emerging. The *almamy* thus exercised little control over the polity's lineage-based territorial title-holders and most offices and chieftaincies were held by clans or lineages ([Robinson, 1975](#), 10, 19-22, 27). This facilitated a high degree of competition among clans, with some *almamies* (e.g. Yusuf) serving numerous short terms as political factions change.

### Social Segmentation

Fulani society is based around caste hierarchies, with notables controlling economic and political opportunity and exclusively serving as electors and as *alamamy*. Slavery existed in polity. ([Oloruntimehin, 1972](#), 10-11, [Barry, 1998](#)).

### Surplus Extraction

Land owners collect 1/10 of peasants' annual harvest and are obliged to share revenue with royal tax collector ([Robinson, 1975](#), 4). Customs duties were collected on traders at river forts; e.g. *Alcaty* at Mbolo Birane collects taxes on goods coming into port at Dirmbodya ([Robinson, 1975](#), 188). Unlike many African states, control over land is very important in Fouta, with strict land rights stipulated by caste.

### Local Representation

Polity is divided into province. The base political unit is the village, which is headed by a chief who, along with the village Imam, administers justice and village governance. Villages themselves are administered by land-owning families or patrons, who can mobilize men for armies and collect local taxes, and who are nested within the province level. Still, there exist uneven loyalties to a single provincial leader; rather most political loyal is toward a prominent lineage who engages in provincial-level politics, with enslaved and many casted populations serving as clients to a given lineage ([Kane, 1987](#), 36-7).

### Method of Succession

*Almamy* is chosen by electors, who are lineage heads. Because lineage heads and hence the status of elector is not chosen by the *almamy*, the *almamy* is relatively weak vis-a-vis clan heads ([Oloruntimehin, 1972](#), 11).

## State Ideology

Islamic theocracy. Islam is the dominant religion, but system of governance heavily federated, with electors coordinating on *almamy* as a symbol of their shared ethnicity (Toucouleur) and religious faith as focal point (Saint-Martin, 1970, 13).

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation

## Sources

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## 4.42 Funj (Sennar), 1500-1821

### Overview

Funj was a Nubian Sultanate, that was declining throughout the late 18th and early 19th century; beset by feuds between royal princes, Funj lost substantial territory in the 18th century. The Sultan made decisions with a council and following the introduction of written Arabic in the 18th century, state documents were signed by court officials after decisions were taken. The court was clearly structured, with ranked officials, chief among whom was the *amin*, or chief minister. Slave officials played important roles in the court as well (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 43-5). Although Funj ultimately falls to the Ottoman invasion in 1821, earlier stresses on the kingdom included the rise of a merchant class and the spread of Islam, both of which seeded alternative sources of authority that challenged the Sultan's authority, e.g. pressure for the Sultan to adopt Islamic customs slowly undermined the system of marriage alliances that had long bolstered regional allegiance to the Sultan. Although Crawford argues that the Funj Chronicles should be read as indicating that by 1802 there was no effective central administration, rendering Funj a confederation of principalities (1951, 260), the northern provinces, e.g. Dongola, fared better during this period, however, and territorial kings were able to maintain their authority here (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, Chpt 6).

### Social Segmentation

Aristocracy assumes socio-political power over the peasantry and slavery creates distinctions between freemen and slaves, though slave officials are important in the court. One factor that accelerates Funj's decline is the rise of a merchant elite,



who were less likely to perceive their interests as aligning with those of the king (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 44-5, 79, 82-5).

## Surplus Extraction

Provincial kings receive a variety of taxes, including annual levies on crops in addition to various other taxes, e.g., any water wheels for irrigation were taxed and weavers had to provide part of their annual production, in addition to having the right to unpaid labor (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 50-1). The Sultan was central to long-distance commerce in luxury or strategic items, meaning that all gold mined in Funj belonged to the government (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 55-6). At Funj's apex, the Sultan had exclusive right to sponsor caravans, but by the 1700s penetration of coin currencies and density of foreign merchants had undermined this (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 70).

## Local Representation

Funj was divided into provinces, each of which was ruled by a *manjil* or king. Some provinces were further subdivided into vassals, ruled by *makk*. Provincial kings were obliged to appear at the royal court every year in order to pay tribute. Central oversight was significant. Members of the royal clan were appointed to accompany lower level officials, with administration of the provinces delegated to free-born sons and sometimes daughters of kings, all of which were assigned states. In addition, the royal cavalry roved across the territory to ensure obedience and villages were all placed under the supervision of a trusted and experienced slave, who was authorized to punish even minor infractions. Vassal kings also took a wife from the royal clan, effectively making every vassal king a son-in-law (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 47-50).

## Method of Succession

Father to son, though Sultan's maternal uncle is a key player as succession is matrilineal. The court assembled upon the death of the king to choose a successor. This could be as simple as agreeing on the heir apparent, the first-born son of late sultan whose mother had been 'rusticated,' e.g., had no more sons to avoid rivalry between potential heirs. If the Sultan had no heir apparent, the court could select the next king from among other sons (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 46).

## State Ideology

Hereditary monarchy. Funj was nominally Islamic, with wider adoption beginning in the 18th century (Loimeier, 2013, 141).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

Cailliaud, F. (1826). *Voyage a Méroé*, Paris: l'Imprimerie royale.

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## 4.43 Fur Sultanate, mid-17thc-1874, 1898-1916

### Overview

Fur Sultanate with Sultan originating from Keira dynasty. The Sultan rules with a complex hierarchy of titled officials and office-holders, including older territorial chiefs, many of whom were integrated into the polity through inter-marriage, and an emerging class of slave administrators (including the chief eunuch) and others who gained prominence as the state centralized (O'Fahey, 1980, 41). Elites, holy men, merchants and the aristocracy are thus granted estates by the Sultan in a system of patronage. Trade, particularly in gum arabic and slaves, facilitate state consolidation from the 1700s onward, with Egypt as a major trading partner in Egypt (O'Fahey, 1980, Chpt 8). Fur is quite strong at the start of the 19th century, but the loss of Korodofan as a satellite in 1821 and warfare between 1870-1898 mean its diminished in stature on the eve of colonization.

### Social Segmentation

Aristocracy, military and powerful merchants hold considerable socio-political and economic power. These groups rely on slavery and preferential access to land and labor through the *hakura* system (see La Rue, 1984).

### Surplus Extraction

Sultan collects Islamic taxes - households paid a poll tax at the end of Ramadan, *zakat* and *takkiya*, essentially a household land tax or communal levy - along with numerous local taxes. Royal estates and domains generated revenues exclusively for *fashir*, individuals integrated into the patron-client relations that helped maintain Fur's elite in addition to various forms of tribute that flowed to sultan, including in slaves and captives. Market taxes collected locally (O'Fahey, 1980, 101-5).

### Local Representation

Central state hierarchy included governors of four traditional provinces - Dar Aba Diima in southwest, Dar Abbo Umo in southeast, Dar Dali in the east and Dar Al-takanawi in north - and other titled elites whose authority was based upon a territorial command (O'Fahey, 1980, 31). Each province was divided into district chiefdoms, under which sat local chiefs, administered by a local authority. District chiefs, or *shartay*, serves as sultan's representative to the population, with the village serving as the district tax center as well as the site where military levies and justice were administered (O'Fahey, 1980, 70-79). Note that male members of the royal family were rarely given official appointments beyond the granting of an estate (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 150).

These relations centralized over time. As new groups were integrated into the state, Sultans relied on local chiefs until Fur was powerful enough to impose central state officials that sat on top of existing territorial administration (O'Fahey, 1980, 69). La Rue (1984, 132, 139) documents how Sultans consolidated power over land and estates from local elites and used them as patronage goods for favored nobility and family, merchants, religious leaders and other officials. The desire of the state to control land reinforced the development of a centralized judiciary and bureaucracy as there were growing debates over inheritance and ownership. As a consequence, Fur's administrative framework, which had relied on the incorporation of indigenous political systems, began to be undercut by the *hakura* system as well as the *maqdummye*, commissioners appointed by the Sultan, which both rose at the expense of the territorial-based leaders; both of these systems formed a class of title-holders appointed directly from the Sultan (O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1974, 157).

## Method of Succession

Patrilineal; all sons of a sultan were in principle eligible to succeed him, but ultimate selection was influenced by personality, favor, mother's kin, etc. Once the capital, al-Fashir, is established, however, it concentrates political power at the expense of territorial potentates and warlords in the choice of the next sultan by privileging those who were active in the court. After this, it became easier for a Sultan to nominate a specific son as a successor, though this was far from assured (O'Fahey, 1980, 15-18).

## State Ideology

Islamic Theocracy. Though La Rue (1984, 128) notes that Islam was not monolithic even with state support, but instead faced numerous rival ideologies.

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

Arkell, A. (1952). The history of Darfur: 1200-1700 ad, *Sudan Notes and Records* .

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## 4.44 Galam/Gajaaga, 14thc-1890

### Overview

Soninke polity on the Falame river, traditionally divided between northern sector (Gouy – north of Faleme) and southern sector (Kamera – south of Faleme). Following civil war that begins in the 1830s, these effectively operate as independent states (Flize, 1857, 393). *Tunka* rules over a warrior class and along with merchant class enrich themselves off riverian trade in cattle, land and slaves (Gomez, 2002, 19). Given rivalries among royal lineages, decision making rests with a royal assembly of all principle chiefs, houses and branches of the ruling Bacili clan, that meets on neutral ground (a maraboutic village) after harvest. At this meeting, matters of state and division of tribute decided (Bathily, 1989, 197). Traoré (2023, 51) observes that merchants were regularly consulted in state decision-making.

## Social Segmentation

Polity hosts a strong social hierarchy, with four groups of leaders above population: *tunkalemmu* (royals), *nyinya-gumu* (land owners), *mangu* (military class) and *moodinu* (marabouts) (Bathily, 1989, 189-90). Under this falls individuals of artisanal caste and enslaved persons (Traoré, 2023, 72).

## Surplus Extraction

A set tax was collected on harvests; *jakka* and *tunkas* likewise collect payments from French for right to do business along Senegal river (Chastanet, 1987, 95-9).

## Local Representation

Polity based around a number of sizable commercial towns and smaller political centers. Towns have a high degree of autonomy, with the *tunka* recognizing their nominated chief and doing little to intervene in economy until deals with European traders impinge on this. Bacili clan's power still felt, however, through exacting demands for tribute via regional representatives (Chastanet, 1987, 95) and provinces were obliged to defend one another if attached (Traoré and Traoré, 1998, 83).

## Method of Succession

Initially, any male in Bacili clan descending from Manga, who was said to have been the first to arrive in the area and clear the land, had an equal right to rule. By 1800s, age has become the criteria by which eligibility was decided (bar physical or mental infirmities), effectively producing a rotation between different houses and branches of the clan because most *tunka* only stay in power a short time due to their age. Ultimately, the *tunka* is less important than the clan, which was the real mechanism of power (Bathily, 1989, 191-3).

## State Ideology

Commerce. A trading states; *Tunka* has no religious or magical power but Bacili clan invested with authority to rule (power in clans not kings).

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation

## Sources

Bathily, A. (1989). *Les portes de l'or: le royaume de Galam*, Harmattan.

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## 4.45 Gambian Mandinka Monarchies, late 17th c-1892

*Baddibu, Djimara, Eropina, Jaara, Jokadu, Kantora, Kiang, Kombo, Niamina, Niani, Niumi, Rip-Pakala, Tomani, Wuli*

### Overview

A series of small, Mandinka polities that obtain independence from Kaabu in the 17th and 18th century (Niane, 1989, 170). At the head of each was a king, or *Mansa*, who ruled with a circle of advisors, including Muslim clerics, army and hunters. The *mansa's* power was thus limited as he was expected to follow the advice offered by his council as well as the opinions of principal lineages and villages (Sarr, 2014, 105). Many of these kingdoms were in decline in the second half of the 19th century, beset by Ma Ba's jihad (Kombo, Kiang, Baddibu), civil war among rival lineages (Niani) declining trade (Wuli) or the rise of Fouladou from the south (Tomani, Jimara, Eropina, Niamina).

### Social Segmentation

Polities were defined by privileges of nobility, which were rooted in caste structure of Mandinka society. Slavery existed.

### Surplus Extraction

The nobility survived on the labor of slaves and in-migrants, all of whom paid tribute. In Niumi, for example, village heads collected 1/10th of village production (Sarr, 2014, 104). *Mansas* also taxed trade along river (Wright, 1976, 243).

### Local Representation

Each polity was composed of core villages ('royal towns') as well as smaller villages, where *mansa's* often invested local rulers with the state's authority (e.g. see Wright, 1976, 2401-1 on Niumi). The lineages that controlled royal villages were active in state affairs and highly influential, though in many cases the position of village head rotated between families. Village heads were responsible for administering justice and land disputes (Sarr, 2014, 105-6).

### Method of Succession

Within eligible lineages, with *mansa* often rotating between families, as was the case in Kombo (Sarr, 2016, 80). Only in Wuli could a single family claim the position of *mansa* (Niane, 1989, 170).

### State Ideology

Hereditary monarchies

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.46 Gaza, 1821-1895

### Overview

Nguni kingdom that ruled over conquered chiefdoms. By the second half of the 19th century, the king was ruling with a chief lieutenant and councilors or noblemen (who served as state secretaries) (Brock, 1989, 36). Important political institutions included the role of the Queen mother and age-sets (*mabutho*). Age-sets among Gaza were not tied to central barracks or houses, but each age-set had a known military commander (Liesegang, 1981, 186-8). The Nguni made little effort to create ritual bonds, instead building the state around military dominance and tribute payments. Gaza profited from trade with Portuguese along the coast and later Afrikaans in the Transvaal, with early trade dominated by ivory (Liesegang, 1981, 178-9), and later trade involving the illegal slave trade (Brock, 1989, 52-55). By the late 1800s, Gaza was in decline as subordinate chieftaincies began to resist paying tribute as the Portuguese began to collect taxes and more men migrated to South Africa to work in the mines (Brock, 1989, 109).

### Social Segmentation

Gaza society was socially stratified, with the ruling strata justifying their hold on power in terms of ethnic superiority and the quality of the military system. Society was comprised of members of the royal lineage, the *Ndwandwe* royal clan, Tsonga groups acculturated to the Nguni state, and complete outsiders under Gaza suzerainty; these were strict divisions, e.g., Tsonga men not allowed to marry Nguni women (Liesegang, 1981, 178-83). Gaza also had rigid labor extraction system.

### Surplus Extraction

A small group of warriors was activated annually during the dry season to collect tribute from Gaza's underlying chieftaincies (Liesegang, 1981, 193). State revenue was thus derived from domestic production, diverse forms of tribute, court fees, war booty, and payments by foreign traders and for services (e.g. carrying loads) (Liesegang, 1981, 196-7). Soshangane and Mzila claimed ground tusk of every elephant killed (Alpers, 1970, 38).

### Local Representation

Following traditions in the region, Sotshangane appointed his sons and brothers as administrators over certain areas of the kingdom (Liesegang, 1981, 180). There were few if any state officials, and subjected chiefdoms were affiliated with a royal or aristocratic house through whom they paid tribute and had access to the king. Royal houses often controlled noncontiguous tributary areas (Liesegang, 1981, 189-92). Local administration was therefore thin, and outlying territories

often only had a guard watching over a local chief (Liesegang, 1981, 196), though governors appeared to be in place in all regions in 1870s-1880. The territory granted to king's close relatives or to locally based chiefs gave them authority over trade, roads, hunting, etc. for taxes and tribute (Brock, 1989, 38-40).

## Method of Succession

Unclear, but Sotshangane is succeeded by his son Mzila (though civil war ensued over this).

## State Ideology

Conquest

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.47 Gibe Valley Monarchies, misc

*Gera*, 1830s-1887

*Gomma*, 1820s-1886

*Gumma*, 1820s-1902

*Janjero*, 15thc-1894

*Jimma*, 1830s-1932

*Limmu-Ennarea*, 1820s-1891

## Overview

Small monarchies that form in the Gibe Valley region of Ethiopia in the early 1800s. Gera, Gomma, Gumma, Jimma and Limmu-Ennarea dominated by Oromo. Although the Oromo largely formed egalitarian, stateless societies, these five monarchies saw the centralization of political power around early leaders, which Hassen (1983, 385) describes as 'war made the Oromo kings and the Oromo kings made war'. Monarchs had substantial autonomy and were not obliged to rule with a set council, but did often consult informal advisors (Abir, 1968, 82, Huntington, 1969, 55). Jimma considered to be the most centralized, but most of these states had well-defined administrative structures and borders, e.g. Limmu-Ennarea had several lines of defense, including palisades, ditches, rivers/swamps and gated roads manned by cavalry (Abir, 1968, 81).

Janjero is a small, Yem monarchy that is more isolated than the others, despite sharing a border with Jimma.

## Social Segmentation

Royal family and wealthy landowners; many own slaves (Hassen, 1983, 457 estimated approximately 1/3rd of population in Gibe Valley enslaved) and Oromo society has artisanal castes that are considered impure (Lewis, 2001, 53).

## Surplus Extraction

Peasantry pays yearly taxes and obligated to provide labor. Set taxes on specific goods also exist (e.g. elephant tusks or animal skills after a hunt) (Lewis, 2001, 76, 98). Trade in coffee, civet oil and slaves also generate tax opportunities and markets with appointed tax collectors (Abir, 1968, 86, Pankhurst, 1982, 315, Lewis, 2001, 94).

## Local Representation

Kingdoms divided into a number of provinces, all ruled by governors appointed by king. Gibe Valley monarchs had a fair to high amount of autonomy in appointing officials and were not dependent on hereditary chiefs or representatives of tribal or descent groups. Instead, most officials came from the monarch's family, wealthy landowners, loyal slaves or foreign mercenaries (e.g. Lewis, 2001, Chpt 4 on Jimma). Provinces further divided into districts, whose heads were appointed by governor. Couriers link district heads to average citizens (Abir, 1968, 83, Lewis, 2001, chpt 4).

Janjero: King has less authority, with clan heads holding certain powers, including input on king's successor (Huntington, 1969, 142).

## Method of Succession

In five Oromo monarchies, the reigning monarch appoints his successor from among legitimate sons (Lewis, 2001, 77), but disputes do occur (e.g. between sons after the death of Jimma Abba Jifar) or between deceased monarch's brothers and sons (Lewis, 2001, 42-3, (Huntington, 1969, 55)). Reports on Janjero are less clear, but provincial electors appear to have decided which son would succeed deceased father (Huntington, 1969, 141).

## State Ideology

Hereditary monarchies. Although all five monarchies convert to Islam in 1830s (Gera 1848), state structure does not meet criteria for a theocracy (Lewis, 2001, 74, Hassen, 1983, 440). Lewis (2001, 74) notes of Jimma that king has no spiritual powers nor is there a myth of being 'father' of people.

Janjero: Divine Kingship. Unlike neighboring Oromo monarchies, Janjero's kingship fused with spiritual powers



## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

Exception: Janjero: Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.48 Gobir, early 18thc-1900

### Overview

Hausa kingdom ruled by *sarki*, who has the ability to bestow titles over a well-structured administration. The *sarki* rules with assistance of the *Taran Gobir* ('Nine of Gobir'); nine councilors he appoints, though many of these titles are hereditary within lineages, thereby constraining his choice (Guy, 1969, 207-8, Yahaya and Mounari, 2021). The Sokoto Caliphate mimics much of this structure while consolidating power. Conflict with Sokoto leads state to retreat into Niger by early 1800s.

### Social Segmentation

Political power concentrated in the ruling class, or *Kiptawa*, and traditionally have a mark under their eye to mark their status. Thus while *Sarki* represents temporal power, two other lineages represent symbolic (royal) power and the history of Gobir (Hama, 1967, 11, 25-6). Slavery and caste present.

### Surplus Extraction

Specific taxes set for different sectors, such as manufactured goods, agriculture and herders. Merchants and vassal states likewise paid taxes (Hamani, 2012, 215).

### Local Representation

An elaborate provincial administration links the *Sarki* down to *talakka* (local representative). Provincial administrators largely reside in capital and many serve on the electoral college. Princes and princesses were regularly given fiefs (Hamani, 2012, 214).

## Method of Succession

Eligible successors had to come from the male lineage of Barabi, an early king. As with neighboring states (e.g., Sokoto emirates like Kano), an electoral college composed of nine members (the *Taran Gobir*) made the selection (Hamani, 2012, 214), though in Gobir they were assisted by the *anna*, animist leaders.

## State Ideology

Islamic Theocracy

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.49 Gonja, early 17thc-1899

### Overview

Ethnically Gonja monarchy with a king, known as a paramount chief. The ruling dynasty was divided into segments, as was the case in Dagomba, each of which controlled a territorial division. No primary dynastic segment dominated the capital, Nyanga, nor anyone but temporary representatives of the ruling estate, who went with the paramount on his appointment. Each territorial division further had two or three secondary dynastic segments (Wilks and Haight, 1986, 16 quoting Goody) Gonja emerged in the early 17th century around the gold trade (Wilks and Haight, 1986, 13) and later is heavily involved in the slave trade that fed into Ashanti system (MacGaffey, 2013, 18). In the 18th century, Gonja became a tributary of the Ashanti which weakened the state because of the significant sums it owed the Ashanti royalty, though prior to this it was growing and taking territory from Dagomba (Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995, 117).

### Social Segmentation

Gonja's society was divided into social classes – rulers, pagan commoners, the local Muslim community and slaves (Goody, 1967, 186).

### Surplus Extraction

Chiefs collect tribute, which included a quota of all captives from raids, livestock which were due at traditional festivals, and duties on transit and trading (Goody, 1967, 184, 194).

## Local Representation

Fifteen territorial chieftaincies were headed by a segment of the ruling house. These were further divided into dynastic segments and villages, each headed by its own chiefs. Divisional chiefs had substantial authority; for instance, traders and visitors were obliged to visit them and provide gifts. Most significant communication passed through divisional chiefs (Goody, 1967, 188-92). This means that few royals live in the capital and the capital was relatively small (Goody, 1967, 196).

## Method of Succession

Paramount chiefship passed between heads of major divisions of the country, though irregular (Wilks and Haight, 1986, 17 quoting Goody). Eldest son temporarily takes the paramount chieftaincy until major chiefs could meet and install a successor from amongst themselves, in principle the head of the next division in line to succeed (Goody, 1967, 197).

## State Ideology

Commerce.

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation. Gonja had weak central control and was held together by a combination of force, marriage alliances between princes and the possibility of advancement to throne among aristocracy (MacGaffey, 2013, 22-3).

## Sources

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## 4.50 Harar, 1647-1887

### Overview

City-state in Ethiopia run from an Emir with assistance of administrators who help maintain law and order and security. Harar was a major trading center that linked the coast to the Ethiopian interior, notably trading in saffron, coffee, cattle, salt, khat (Ben-Dror, 2018, 18), ivory, civet and slaves (Ahmed, 2008, 211). Harar was a significant center for Islamic teaching with numerous shrines to saints and held important cultural prestige (Caulk, 1977, 372). It was declining in the years prior to Menelik's capture, as growing encroachment on Harari trading routes was paired with growing dissatisfaction with Amir Muhammed's increasingly despotic rule.

## Social Segmentation

Royal lineage holds vast power, and an Oromo elite emerges in the 1800s under Amir Muhammad (Waldron, 1984, 37). Slavery exists within the city.

## Surplus Extraction

Amir Muhammad collected a 10% tithe on farmers in Harar's vicinity and also taxed merchants as they entered and exited the city (Waldron, 1984, 30). Administrators were appointed by the Emir collected taxes and revenues. Waldron notes in late-1800s under Amir Muhammed that townspeople did not farm land more than 5km outside city walls (1984, 31), but Caulk (1977, 373) cites Burton's visit in 1855 as indicating that Oromo farmers up to thirty miles northeast of the town were paying taxes to Harar, though farmland of townspeople were only in immediate vicinity of town walls.

## Local Representation

A city-state with surrounding farmland, so Emir controlled the city directly. The city was divided into five gates or quarters, each of which was administered by a *malaq*. Quarters were further subdivided into neighborhoods headed by a *garad*. In farming regions, *damin*, akin to a clan head, local administrators. These actors administered justice and collected taxes (Waldron, 1984, 34).

## Method of Succession

Primogeniture, although in the 1820s rivalries within the ruling family over succession weakened the state (Ahmed, 2008, 81).

## State Ideology

Commerce

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.51 Hehe, 1850s-1898

### Overview

Hehe polity that begins to be consolidated under Munyigumba in the 1850s by subduing neighboring chiefdoms and marriage alliances. Pizzo (2007, 52, 59) attributes this to growing pressure from the Ngoni to the south. By the time of Munyigumba's death, Hehe was the strongest political unit in Tanzania's southern highlands (Koponen, 1990, 202). His son, Mkwawa, succeeds him and rules until he commits suicide after resisting the Germans for seven years. Both men ruled with assistance of councilors and senior men, but because Hehe was a polity-in-information, these were not established offices or titles (Redmayne, 1964, 45, 191).

### Social Segmentation

Munyiga dynasty that produces kings as well as other councilors and senior men hold political power.

### Surplus Extraction

Residents near Madibira and possibly others send maize every year, which enables the king to feed troops (Redmayne, 1968b, 427). State also raids caravans.

### Local Representation

The king delegated authority to subordinate rulers (*vanzagila*), many of whom administered the areas they had ruled prior to incorporation into Hehe. *Vanzagila* kept order and circulated information, judged small disputes and assembled men for public works and war. The nature of these territories was variable. Some individuals had more status for ruling over frontier areas deemed more important, but they also had the most autonomy as they were farther from the center. Hehe had no elaborate organization of hereditary officials and the office of subordinate rulers was highly adaptable (Redmayne, 1968a, 45-6). The base unit for the Hehe was the extended family settlement; only in Kalenga was there a village-like organization (Redmayne, 1964, 183).

### Method of Succession

Father to son; Mkwawa, Munyigumba's son, takes over following his death 1878. There is some evidence that Munyigumba intended the throne to go to his brother or to split power between his sons, but it is unclear. Mkwawa's assumption of duties was beset by a succession crisis (Redmayne, 1968a, 46). Ultimately, no clear rules were set (Redmayne, 1964, 191).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. The king was believed to have a special relationship to the spirits because of genealogical position. He was responsible for making offering to the graves of dead chiefs and had war medicine that was believed to assure victory in battle (e.g. Mkwawa's victory over Mwambambe) (Redmayne, 1968b, 424). Still, much of this was tied to Mkwawa as a person (Redmayne, 1964, 191).

### Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.52 Idenie (Ndenye), c. 1700s-1892

### Overview

Anyi polity founded by migrants following the political upheaval of [Ashanti](#) expansion in the late 17th century. Idenie is a misnomer, as Ndenye was one of a handful of small, semi-autonomous micro-politics that were interlinked. Each was headed by a king, who ruled with councilors, some of which are hereditary, while others are created by king, e.g. for his sons ([Perrot, 1969](#), 124-5). Ndenye as the 'first' founder held nominal authority over other prominent chiefs, e.g. Yakasse ([Perrot, 1976](#), 186) or Bettie (which was more autonomous). Ndenye as a name then expanded to cover larger set of interlocking polities ([Sarkodie-Mensah, 2000](#), 42-3). Gold mining was particularly important for the polity (see [Perrot, 1969](#)). Power among the polities was in a period of rebalancing in the late 1800s, with Alangwa, Abrade, Denkyira and Bettie in decline, Ashua relatively stable, and Ndenye and Yakasse along the Comoe the most united, powerful and rich ([Perrot, 1969](#), 296).

### Social Segmentation

Aristocratic society with kings, dignitaries and village chiefs assuring political power ([Perrot, 1976](#), 176). Captives were present in the polity.

### Surplus Extraction

Chiefs extract surplus through obligatory labor, judicial fines and royal levy on gold and ivory production ([Perrot, 1969](#), 139).

### Local Representation

Micro-states were divided into provinces, each controlled by a chief who was responsible for villages under them. New territorial chieftaincies were often allotted to royal princes, expanding the Anyi territory as princes gain the right to settle new land from their father. Marriage alliances further cemented relationship between royal family and territorial chiefs ([Perrot, 1969](#), 180-6).

### Method of Succession

Successors were chosen by consultation within the royal court and the matrilineage. A successor was chosen both for his individual qualities, but also with an eye to principles of alteration within the *abuswa*, or matrilineage, even if this was

not firmly respected (Perrot, 1969, 115).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. The king was the incarnation of the people and guaranteed their prosperity (Perrot, 1969, 103).

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation

## Sources

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## 4.53 Igala, c.1700-1901

### Overview

Polity begins concentrating power around the Niger-Benue river confluence, capturing growing gains to trade, primarily in salt, iron and slaves (see ?). A king, or *Attah*, rules with a number of councilors (Dike, 1982, 334, Ukwedeh, 2003, 126).

### Social Segmentation

Clans within the royal lineage have substantial power and over time, a growing number of titleholders, from royal clans as well as royal servants and other groups, amass political and economic power.

### Surplus Extraction

Toll stations collect customs on river trade and *Attah* grants trading monopolies to specific clans; thus, for example, the Ewo clan granted a monopoly on the salt trade, part of which is paid to *Attah* as tribute. Territorial fiefholders, or *amakwaik*, also collect tribute for *attah* (Ukwedeh, 2003, 128-33).

### Local Representation

Villages have headmen, but their authority is eroded over time as royal lineages in rural areas begin to assert more claims to the territory they settle in. Eighteen councilors, or *amakwaika*, are appointed to fiefs outside of capital, each collecting tribute, serving as an intermediary and mobilizing troops when needed. Because each *Attah* appoints titleholders, *attah* has growing control over time. Even hereditary titles within lineages required *Attah*'s sanction. And because royal clans were highly rivalrous, *Attah* had more leeway to coordinate, as clans sought to emphasize their family ties to any given *attah* as a way to obtain vacant titles (Ukwedeh, 2003, 130-33).

## Method of Succession

Following growing, violent disputes over succession in the 17th century, the *Achadu*, or chief kingmaker, imposes a new system where contending lineages were resettled in the interior and were invited to Idah in a set order to rule as *Addah*. After this, succession rotated among clans. This means that each new *Attah* has the right to bestow titles (with the exception of the *Achadu*), because these are vacated after any given *attah's* death as his lineage returns home (Ukwedeh, 2003, 129-30). Kingmakers retain an important role in the succession process, however, principally by ensuring connections to earth shrines (Ukwedeh, 2003, 145).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. *Attah* and political sovereignty of the polity ritually bound to *attah's* ancestral line. Growing inter-clan conflict in 1830s, lead to a reimagination of this role, as the *attah* is increasingly secluded in Idah, the capital. This is done under an emerging pretext of his sacredness, and new territorial chiefs thus make a pilgrimage to see him, creating new political and economic relationships (Ukwedeh, 2003, 154, Weise, 2013, 320-22).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.54 Kaabu, 1300-1868

### Overview

Mandingue Empire. At its peak, the Emperor of Kaabu ruled over forty-four provinces; starting with Jimara, Sama and Pachana, the ruling dynasty had branched off and established its rule expanding outwards. "Client states took on the role of junior brothers in a large family, which was a logical evolution, since their rulers were all related to each other" writes Sidibe (2004, 22). Thus though composed of decentralized provinces, family ties made for a sense of unity (Hawkins, 1980, 68). Kaabu served as an intermediary between the coastal trade and interior, with Malinke and Sarakole merchants managing caravan trade in gold and slaves (Sidibe, 2004, 22).



## Social Segmentation

Warrior elite comprise ruling class grouped into distinct clans. These clans control state power. Society is highly hierarchical with slavery and caste structuring social life (Mané, 1978, 108-15).

## Surplus Extraction

Residents paid taxes to their *mansa* in kind, with farmers often paying in rice and pastoralists in livestock. *Mansa* would keep the largest share and send the rest to the emperor (Sidibe, 2004, 22). Nyancho and other royals did not farm, but rather lived largely off work of subject populations (Hawkins, 1980, 65). The state had agents who verified prices, taxed traders and resolved any disputes between them (Niane, 1989, 94).

## Local Representation

Each province was ruled by a *mansa*, who had a high degree of independence, but who recognized the emperor's authority and sent taxes and tributes in addition to raising armies to come to the emperor's aid when called upon to do so. *Mansa* were also responsible for defending frontiers (Sidibe, 2004, 23).

## Method of Succession

Kaabu had ruling dynasties, with the maternal line determining whether or not one was eligible to become the ruler (e.g. being a *nyancho*) (Sidibe, 2004, 19). Only members of Sane or Mane families could be emperor with power rotating between their three imperial provinces of Sama, Jimara and Pachana, thus that upon an emperor's death, he was succeeded by the chief of the next province (in order, Sama, Jimara, Pachana) (Mané, 1978, 106-7).

## State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.55 Kaarta, 1754-1854

### Overview

Bamana monarchy known as the *Massassi*, named after *Masa* (a Coulibaly prince who fled [Segou](#)), who formed a close alliance with the Kare, a prominent Soninke lineages from the area ([Hanson, 1996, 23](#)). Kaarta is able to capitalize on Sahelian trade as the state's military provides protection for traders, who largely trafficked in salt and gum arabic ([Hanson, 1996, 23, 67](#)). Kaarta is overtaken by El Hadji [Umar Tall's](#) jihad, and is run as a vassal until French conquest.

### Social Segmentation

Coulibaly royalty and their clients sat at the top of the social hierarchy with all Coulibaly holding a special social rank. Slavery and caste circumscribe social mobility for many, but captive warriors could gain influence through *ton-jon*, the Coulibaly's standing slave army ([Hanson, 1996, 24-5](#)).

### Surplus Extraction

Peasants pay tribute and traders pay for protection ([Hanson, 1996, 23](#)). Kaarta's leaders are almost always at war, either with neighboring [Khasso](#) or raiding neighboring areas, making war booty an important economic asset as well (see Niakate's chronology of leaders).

### Local Representation

All members of the ruling Coulibaly dynasty held some social rank regardless of office, with members establishing residences in regions radiating outside of Gemu, particularly to the North and West ([Hanson, 1996, 23](#)). Niakate (1990) refers to the polity as a parasite, with subjected populations allowed to follow their customs and leaders as long as they submitted to royal authority; kingdom becomes beset by inter-clan rivalry in the years prior to the Umarian jihad, with each clan controlling a province ([Cissoko, 1986, 42](#)).

### Method of Succession

There were no discernible rules that governed succession, but the monarch always originated from one of several royal patrilineages in the Coulibaly family ([Hanson, 1996, 24](#)).

### State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.56 Kabadougou, 1848-1898

### Overview

Dyula state that represents what Person describes as the Dyula revolution in West Africa, Kabadougou was founded by Vakaba Toure after he conquered Nafana (O'Sullivan, 1976, viii). O'Sullivan (1976, 155) argues that Vakaba built state around patronage, e.g. sending gifts to Massala to secure allegiance. Kabadougou was led by a king, or *faama*, who consulted with powerful advisors. For instance, Vakaba was heavily influenced by his advisor Vasanissi, and made decisions with a council of royal lineage heads from across the polity. The *faama* could not make a decision himself, but was instead obliged to consult with this council as well as to apply koranic law, consulting with imams when necessary (O'Sullivan, 1976, 152-4). Kabadougou created an alliance with Samory Touré during his conquest of northern Cote d'Ivoire, retaining its independence until French conquest at the end of the century.

### Social Segmentation

Kabadougou's social system was based on slavery, which saw a large uptick in the region during the era of Kabadougou - French estimates suggest that up to three-fourths of the population was enslaved in the years prior to colonization (O'Sullivan, 1983, 123). Toure formed an emerging warrior class that was itself highly stratified, with relatives of the founder atop the hierarchy. Ordinary slave soldiers could rise through the ranks following exceptional service, but Touré clan members along with religious and trade leaders, dominated the political, social and economic realm (O'Sullivan, 1976, vii, 150-6).

### Surplus Extraction

Trade was taxed (O'Sullivan, 1976, 90) as was other forms of production. *Dugukunnasigi*, regional representatives, collected tribute on behalf of the *faama* (Toungara, 1980, 39-41).

### Local Representation

Kabadougou was divided into provinces, though the market towns of Samatiguila and Tieme were administered as separate political centers outside of the capital, Odiene. Pre-existing *kafu* were the base political unit in the region, and these were integrated into Kabadougou with their old frontiers. Governors, or *Dugukunnasigi*, were appointed to *kafu* capitals to control each province by the *faama* (O'Sullivan, 1976, 155-7). These leaders replaced pre-existing regional heads (Toungara, 1980, 27).

### Method of Succession

Within the Touré patrilineage - Vakaba Toure is succeeded by his sons O'Sullivan (1983).

### State Ideology

Conquest. O'Sullivan (1976, 150-6, viii) describes Kabadougou's warrior class as having its main occupation being wars of conquest, capturing booty and slaves from Bougouni in Mali, the Nohoulou region and beyond.

### Elite Structure Typology

Despotic (Note: a borderline case, could be justified as Regal as well)

## Sources

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## 4.57 Kaffa, 1390-1897

### Overview

Ethnically Kaffa kingdom. King rules with seven councilors in a state structure organized hierarchically around clans (Orent, 1970 estimates these at 48). Seven councilors advised the king on decisions of war and in judging cases before the court. Kingdom was defined by endemic tensions between the king and regional, clan-based chiefs (Orent, 1970, 283, 293). Northern frontier was Gojeb river, and employed deep ditches where no natural defenses were available (1969, 116).

### Social Segmentation

King always originates from Minja clan with seven most important clans producing one of the seven royal councilors each (Hassen, 1983, 383). Kingdom engages in slave trade and has both domestic slavery and artisanal castes (1969, 104, 111).

### Surplus Extraction

Citizens pay land taxes and trade taxes collected at gates (*kello*) placed along ditches marking Kaffa's borders (1969, 125, 116).

### Local Representation

In 1800s, there are eighteen 'lands' or provinces administered by *worafa rasha*, or district chiefs, and beneath these are smaller districts or villages, ruled by *rashe showo*, who was paid from the king's treasury (Orent, 1970, 283). Certain clans inherited provincial governorships. Local hereditary dynasties had rights to certain state positions, in addition to seats on the council (Lewis, 2001, 124).

### Method of Succession

Eight days after the king's death, the royal council announces the successor. In principle, the king designated one of his sons, but the council could choose another son after his death if they wanted (1969, 119). Sons and brothers of the king

were generally seen as a threat to his power and were often denied political roles and kept in semi-imprisonment in the royal palace (Lewis, 2001, 79). Orent (1970, 286) presents this differently, noting that when a king was approaching death, his male relatives were put in prison while state councilors decided successor. During this time, an important medium was consulted to assist in the selection.

## State Ideology

Divine monarch. Public not allowed to see the king (Lewis, 2001, 123; Hassen, 1983, 383). Orent (1970, 280) suggests this role only develops later in 19th century.

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.58 Karagwe, 15th/16thc-1900

### Overview

Karagwe was ruled by a king (*mukanda*) from the Bahinda dynasty. Different clans had specific roles in the kingdom, e.g. certain clans are blacksmiths, people from Kibona in charge of playing royal drums (Katoke, 1975, 32). These individuals were important court figures who were influential; for example, when Rumanyika faced a succession challenge, he attempted to woo many courtiers, caretakers of the royal drums and many followers of the challenger (Katoke, 1975, 84). Karage was connected to lucrative trade routes to the coast, with trade from Uganda often passing through the polity's territory, later this includes trading slaves to the coast (Mapunda, 2009, 101). Although it began the century as one of the strongest kingdoms in Tanzania's Lake Victoria region, by the 1880s Karagwe was beset by a succession crisis (Koponen, 1990, 199). The death of Ndagara I around 1855 – who was succeeded by his son Rumanyika – produced cascading crises that undermined Karagwe's political stability. These rivalries weakened trade and left many vulnerable to slavery. Under Kakoko and then Kateto in 1880s-90s, Karagwe became much poorer, leading many to out-migrate (Katoke, 1975, 133-4, 124).

### Social Segmentation

The Bahima comprised the ruling class. Society was further clan based, with some clans associated with specific activities, e.g. iron working, stipulating class and social position (Reid and MacLean, 1995, 150).

## Surplus Extraction

District governors were expected to pay tribute to the king in kind, labor and in military service. The polity did not maintain a standing army, but warriors did guard the capital and in the event of an attack, governors were expected to raise men to fight. There is no evidence that the king collected *hongo* or customs duties, but small gifts were expected from traders. Mukama often gave free food, livestock and other gifts (including slaves) to visitors (Katoke, 1975, 165, 72-3).

## Local Representation

Karagwe was divided into princedoms, each of which had a small ceremonial drum, mirroring the king's. Princes had little autonomy, but were under the direct control of the King at Bweranyange. Local issues were resolved locally, e.g. property disputes settled in family or by clan heads, and if a dispute crossed clans, but was in the same village, village elders handled it. More serious matters could involve village headmen or district governors. Criminal cases were tried by Omukama or their sons (Katoke, 1975, 30, 39). Some district heads were female.

## Method of Succession

Karagwe saw violent succession crises in the late 1800s (Koponen, 1990, 141). In principle, succession was hereditary, with fathers appointing an heir-apparent according to certain mystical signs. After the death of the father, the heir then had to prove to their brothers that they had the strength to rule, often by fighting them (Katoke, 1975, 31).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. The king had royal regalia with ritual anvils and hammers, leading Reid and Maclean (1995, 153) to conclude that one of the eastern most examples of the *roi-forgeron*. In the capital, a number of houses contained different shrines and places of ceremonial power (Katoke, 1975, 34). The Bahinda introduced the Bachwezi cult and spirits of great ancestors became important deities.

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.59 Kasanje, 1620-1912

### Overview

Kasanje was founded when collaboration between Portuguese and Imbangala lords broke down, leading Kulashingo, a notable Imbangala lord, to move into the middle Kwango river valley and found Kasanje (Miller, 1979, 52). The king, or *kinguri*, ruled, but clan factions remain powerful (see notes on succession). Key to the state was slave trade with Portuguese on the coast, which was centralized within the royal court. Kasanje was particularly concerned about maintaining control over trade between Lunda and Portuguese, in large part because they controlled crossing of Kwango river (Heintze, 2007, 87). Still, the state became increasingly decentralized over the 19th century as the slave trade surpassed the kinguri's ability to monopolize it and the Portuguese began interfering in Kasanje politics to capitalize on this weakness. In fact, the Portuguese effectively occupy the valley in the 1850s, generating a protracted conflict between three major clans from 1860s- 1900. Kasanje never regains its strength and rise of ivory, wax and rubber trade further enables regional chieftains to gain authority, though kinguri's does persist as the leader, albeit considerably weakened, until 1912 (Miller, 1979, 54).

### Social Segmentation

Three Imbangala factions dominated the political scene, with indigenous population as commoners (Miller, 1979, 54), with clear class markers observed between them (e.g. see Vellut, 1975, 118).

### Surplus Extraction

The right to sell slaves at the feira south of the capital required paying a fee to the Kingari (Curto, 2013, 309) and traders were expected to offer gifts (Vellut, 1975, 132).

### Local Representation

Miller (1979, 89) observes that Kasanje's segmentary structure reflected as much a coalition of descent groups and clans as a centralized kingdom. Clan factions meant that every lineage in the middle Kwango valley held an interest in the kingship and who succeeded whom. This generated overlapping interests, especially among local populations who were brought under three ruling lineages as they were given subordinate titles as 'sons', generating three broad coalitions of descent groups around potential heirs. Because titles became permanent possessions of lineages, fictive genealogical ties persisted between whichever of three ruling clans created it and the lineage they bestowed a title too.

### Method of Succession

Kinguri chose from one of three clans, the descendants of Kulashingo, Kalunga ka Kilombo and Ngonga a Mbande, the three founding Imbangala lords. Each clan could nominate a candidate for kinguri, with sides then fighting for the position which went to the strongest. Clans build support in part by enlisting the local populations, often by bestowing noble titles (Miller, 1979, 53).

### State Ideology

Commerce. State militarized to maintain control over trade (see Vellut, 1975, 129-30), often with neighbors.

### Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.60 Kenedougou, 1825-1898

### Overview

Senoufo monarchy led by the Traore dynasty. The *Tiebe* or king ran the state with a royal court, attended by close family, courtesans, marabouts, sofas (slave warriors) and servants (Traoré and Traoré, 1998, 22). Kenedougou withstands the assault of Samory Touré's forces in 1887 and, later, was one of the last to resist French colonization, only falling to French forces in 1898.

### Social Segmentation

Different Senoufo lineages had distinct tasks. Traoré dynasty monopolized political power, while the Berthé lineage was responsible for military affairs, the Diamountene lineage was charged with land, and the Sanogo and Cisse lineages were marabouts (Diakite and Sissoko, 2014, 22). Caste and slavery exist in polity.

### Surplus Extraction

Tribute was paid to the *Tiebe* as part of harvest or in currency. Traders paid a tax for a market places and there was also a tax on Dioula traders in transit. Specific taxes existed for livestock and the sale or transit of slaves. Any elephants or panthers that were killed were taxed and after battles, the king received half of all booty (Sanoko, 2010, 88, Holmes, 1977, 328).

### Local Representation

Kenedougou was based on provinces, each of which had a military and administrative chief. Provinces were called *Kafo*, each were composed of numerous villages. To maintain power, state had a decentralized garrison structure so that state was felt throughout provinces (Diakite and Sissoko, 2014, 21-2). Kenedougou's founder, Massa Daoula, grew the kingdom by placing members of the Traoré family at the head of key villages (Traoré and Traoré, 1998, 17). Local authorities retained key powers, however, with judicial issues being resolved almost entirely within the family or clan. Only capital punishment cases - which could emerge in cases of adultery, poisoning and murder - was handled by the *fama* (Holmes, 1977, 347).



## Method of Succession

Within the Traore lineage. Under Mansa Daoual Traore (1845-60), a pact was established to strengthen inter-family alliances (Diakite and Sissoko, 2014, 23), but intense rivalries over the kingship persisted within the royal family – this is part of why the capital was moved to Sikasso (Sanoko, 2010, 27).

## State Ideology

Hereditary monarchy

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.61 Khasso, 1681-1854

### Overview

Polity that dominated the river trade along the Faleme and Upper Senegal Rivers as well as sitting astride caravan routes into Boundou and the European comptoirs in Senegal (Cissoko, 1986, 144). Khasso was traditionally run by the Khassonké monarchy, with a king (*manso*) ruling with a council. Khasso declined significantly in the 19th century, following the outbreak of civil war between the four royal lineages in the late 1700s, which effectively splits the polity into parts, the Jihad of Umar Tal and conflict with neighboring Kaarta. The state regained its footing as a confederation among rival lineages, however, after the intervention of French General Faidherbe, who hoped to shore up Khasso's authority as a means to advance French riverian trade interests, but it remains quite weak through colonial occupation (Cissoko, 1986, 64).

### Social Segmentation

Power concentrated within the Khassonké royal lineages, which limits political power to themselves alone. Society further structured around caste and slavery. Royal lineages had farms where their captives worked, for example (Cissoko, 1986,

142). Slaves were represented by a chief and casted subjects, such as griots and blacksmiths had the right to participate as well (Cissoko, 1986, 179, 181).

### Surplus Extraction

Khassonké taxed trade on both caravan routes and along the river as well as receiving regular tributes from tributary chiefdoms. Peasants also paid part of their harvest (Cissoko, 1986, 186-7). Cissokho (1986, 349) describes the nobility's main source of revenue as war making, however, with Khassonke nobility constantly at war or engaging in razzias. Principally this is to acquire captives, which helped create nobility's wealth, though not all nobles were wealthy.

### Local Representation

Power was concentrated in the *manso* and his councilors, who originated from lineage heads and who together formed a council, or *Grand Batoo*. Within each lineage's territory, power descended downwards through envoys who worked with local level authorities to enforce king's rule. Important villages were often given to a *manso's* brothers or sons to run, while less important ones were left to autochthons (Cissoko, 1986, 175-81). Some ethnic enclaves were also administered indirectly – with some Soninke villages retaining autonomy under their traditional chiefs while recognizing superior power of *manso* of Khasso in matters of justice, war and taxes. Other areas were ruled directly, notably the provinces of Soroma and Tringa or Diombokho and Konsinga (Khassonke and Peul) (Cissoko, 1986, 189).

### Method of Succession

Starting with Sega Doua, sons are eligible successors. This produces the four lineages that come to dominate the state. Later power passed to most 'legitimate' candidate, someone from paternal lineage. Under weak confederation in late 1800s, Dembaya clan leads confederation as the strongest player, with others, like the Niatiga, struggling to establish their power post-Umarian invasion (Cissoko, 1986, 96, 171-76, 186).

### State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

### Elite Structure Typology

Federation. The federation is, however, quite weak post-Umarian jihad. The Khassonke polities are able to form coalitions to wage external campaigns, but tensions between three main lineages are tense and (Cissoko, 1986, 186).

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## 4.62 Kilindi (Usambara/Shambaai), 18thc-1895

### Overview

Shambaa kingdom ruled by a king and his councilors, who were often commoners. Kilindi emerged on fertile plains and was comprised of a number of sub-chiefdoms, who likely centralized in response to movement of Masai in the early 18th century which increased raids and led to centralized towns for defense (Feierman, 1974, 4). Kilindi then expanded

territory greatly in the late 18th century (Feierman, 1974, Chpt 4), with the system of war drums making it possible for a large number of soldiers to be raised and mobilized in short notice (Feierman, 1974, 123). By the late 1870s, however, the polity was in decline as rivalries between chieftaincies were growing. Kilindi itself was largely isolated from the growing trade in the interior, but many of its neighbors benefited from it enormously, fostering competition for growing wealth from the caravan trade (Feierman, 1974, 137-44).

## **Social Segmentation**

Kilindi dynasty controls political power.

## **Surplus Extraction**

Tribute was often paid in livestock and was collected in Usambara. Peripheral populations who were subjugated to Kilindi had to pay tribute in food or salt. Tribute is estimated to have been collected every two to three years (Koponen, 1990, 280) and was paid via chiefs. Labor was also expected on the farms of kings and chiefs (Feierman, 1974, 100, 121-2). King raised funds on some other forms of economic activity, e.g. one elephant tusk killed by hunters and he occasionally sold war captives, but trade was peripheral to the early kingdom (Feierman, 1974, 123).

## **Local Representation**

Kilindi was comprised of five to six important chiefdoms throughout much of its history. Each chiefdom managed its own disputes and had its own rain magic. The king appointed his sons as chiefs to keep control over his territory and the threat of receiving their father's curse largely kept them in line. As a result, the most risky moment for a king was early on, when he began removing his brothers, who were potential threats, and appointing his own sons (Feierman, 1974, 6). Kings allocated each chiefdom to a 'house' - one of his wives and her children - with the oldest male in the house made chief. The chiefdom's territory was in turn managed by the chief's children or siblings. Almost every chiefdom - even minor ones - was headed by a child or grandchild of Kimweri, who was king in the early 1800s. The chief's maternal uncles were also appointed at the chiefdom level to represent interest of subjects as the maternal uncle himself was often a commoner and served to check the chief's power (Feierman, 1974, 107). Some lowland territories near the coast who only paid tribute governed themselves (Feierman, 1974, 107).

## **Method of Succession**

King nominates a son, specifically the son appointed as the chief of Bumbuli, meaning that the Bumbuli chiefdom is essentially the heir's training ground (Feierman, 1974, 4).

## **State Ideology**

Divine kingship

## **Elite Structure Typology**

Regal

## **Sources**

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## 4.63 Kom, 1730-1900

### Overview

Kom kingdom that was expanding into the late 1800s (Nkwi and Warner, 1982, 175). A king (*fon*), sat at the top of the political hierarchy and consulted with an executive arm of the government, or council, with both parties checking each other's power. This council, the *nkwifoyn*, was comprised of village heads and palace notables (Nkwi, 2015, 59). The state's power structure featured nested territorial rulers with king ruling over chiefs ruling over village and ward heads, though priests and leaders of key associations (e.g. men's associations, defense or ritual associations) are also influential. The *Fon* was seen as the embodiment of the state and had substantial authority, though administration of state fell to *Kwifoyn* (Nkwi, 1976, 40-41, Chpt 3). Kom was one of the major providers of slaves among the Grassland states to middlemen who traded with the coast (Nkwi, 2015, 56) and Kom was an economically powerful state in the 19th century (Nkwi, 1976, 17), with the *Fon's* court a center of distribution where notables received gifts (Chilver and Kaberry, 1967, 134).

### Social Segmentation

Kom society defined by two social categories: royals, the matrilineal kin of and descendants of *fons* and commoners. Aside from four hereditary priesthoods, other officers and *kwifoyn* were appointed by the *Fon* (Chilver and Kaberry, 1967, 135). The *Kwifoyn* were influential and may be best thought of as a regulatory association, with members recruited from families across the kingdom (Nkwi, 1976, 35-9, 67). Slavery present in polity (Nkwi, 1995).

### Surplus Extraction

Kom capitalized on its position between Jukun and Bum markets, with the *Kwifoyn* regulating markets and collecting dues from traders. A specific lodge was appointed to supervise the slave trade (Nkwi, 1976, 90). Village heads paid tribute when they were appointed (Nkwi, 2015, 59); sub-chiefs demonstrated their allegiance to the *Fon* by paying tribute as well as providing the *Fon* with services (including labor), retainers and wives (Nkwi, 1976, 44). The palace also extracted wealth from the economy from the payments notables made to join associations (Chilver and Kaberry, 1967, 147).

### Local Representation

The *Fon's* orders were executed by village heads at the local level and village heads were charged with reporting anything that could threaten the peace and maintained law and order (Nkwi, 2015, 59). Villages were administered by *akum*, a council that male villagers could join, and every village also had a war lodge and other associations. Tributary chiefdoms had a fair amount of autonomy and were administered by their own chiefs according to their own custom (Chilver and Kaberry, 1967, 141-2).

### Method of Succession

Kom had matrilineal succession, but favored brothers, meaning that when a *fon* died, he was succeeded by a brother, but should no brother exist, then by the eldest of his sisters' sons (Nkwi and Warner, 1982, 183). The Ekwu matrilineage provided rulers because it was associated with the foundation of state. Chieftaincies and other state positions were also determined through matrilineal descent. In choosing a new *fon*, heir-apparent had to be approved by king-enstoolers, themselves from prominent clans (Nkwi, 1976, 28-30).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship. *Fon* rules with secrecy and mystical powers (Nkwi, 2015, 58).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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Nkwi, P. N. and Warner, J.-P. (1982). *Elements for a history of the Western Grassfields*, University of Yaoundé.

## 4.64 Kong, c.1710-1897

### Overview

Kong, also known as the Ouattara Empire, was a Muslim polity founded by Dyula immigrants, notably Sekou Ouattara. Kong was a heavily decentralized commercial polity that was based upon linkages between merchant houses, with the king, or *diamanatigi*, protecting trade routes throughout the region with the ruling class's cavalry. The town of Kong itself was a center of Islamic studies in the region and an important commercial center, before Samory Toure's invasion in 1898 razed the city. Kong was based on an alliance between Dyula traders and Sonongui rulers, whose cavalry was notorious in the region (Green, 1984, Introduction). .

### Social Segmentation

Political power concentrated within the Ouattara clan and Sonongui ethnic group more broadly while Dyula traders dominated economy and religious matters (Green, 1984, 233). Non-Mande groups in the area generally lacked political power and influence and slavery existed in the polity (Green, 1984, 11).

### Surplus Extraction

Tax collectors were posted at markets in addition to tribute paid by the population and judicial fees, though the Dyula themselves appear to have not been taxed (Green, 1984, 244, 320-2).

### Local Representation

At the village level, a chief arbitrated disputes, though Imam's also involved in judicial matters (Green, 1984, 250). Above the village, *Sonongui* rulers, descendants of the son's of Sekou Ouatarra, administered the territory, though Kong was highly decentralized, with the capital moving according to who was *diamanatigi*. Thus the Dyula remained concentrated

in the town of Kong, while the Sonongui largely ruled from outside Kong-ville; in village's where the two groups cohabitation, there was a clear division of space (Green, 1984, 270-4). Green (1984, 349) notes that even though Sonongui rulers might have disputes over territory, that their shared family ties created a close alliance that maintained political authority across the decentralized polity.

### **Method of Succession**

Patrilineal descent from Kong's founder, Sekou Ouattara, though there are some disputes over inheritance. Likely that royal lineage heads met to select the new *diamanatigi* (Green, 1984, 318, 344-7).

### **State Ideology**

Commerce. Although Dyula were famed for their Quranic teaching, alliance between Sonongui and Dyula based on trade.

### **Elite Structure Typology**

Regal

### **Sources**

Green, K. L. (1984). *The Foundation of Kong: A Study in Dyula and Sonongui Ethnic Identity*, PhD thesis, Indiana University.

Kodjo, G. N. (2006). *Le royaume de Kong (Côte d'Ivoire), des origines à la fin du XIXe siècle*, L'Harmattan.

Tauxier, L. and Bernus, E. (2003). *Les états de Kong (Côte d'Ivoire)*, Karthala.

## **4.65 Konta, 1800-1892**

### **Overview**

Konta's political form copied many elements from Dawro, with a king ruling with advisors from upper-castes in both areas (Ahmed). Konta forms in space between Kaffa and Dawro 1800, and at times sees high degrees of independence among constituent districts (Haberland, 1981).

### **Social Segmentation**

Royal lineage amasses political and economic power

### **Surplus Extraction**

District governors collect tribute and citizens required to provide communal labor.

### **Local Representation**

Konta divided into districts, which were further subdivided into sub-districts and communities. Districts were headed by *sunta* who were elected locally before being confirmed by the king and a system of royal estates similar to neighbors was in place (Haberland, 1981, 743).

### **Method of Succession**

Father to son, but if no son goes to male lineage (Haberland, 1981).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship with myth of foundation by a supernatural ancestor (Haberland, 1981, 738).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper (though historical record very unclear)

## Sources

Haberland, E. (1981). Notes on the History of Konta : a recent State Foundation in Southern Ethiopia, *Publications de la Société française d'histoire des outre-mers* 5(2): 735–749.

URL: [https://www.persee.fr/doc/sfhom\\_1768-7144\\_1981\\_mel\\_5\\_29\\_73](https://www.persee.fr/doc/sfhom_1768-7144_1981_mel_5_29_73)

## 4.66 Kotoko, mid-15th c-1890s

### Overview

Fourteen principalities (also described as city-states) that were ruled under a federation with a shared king under the ideology of a shared descent from the Sao (Hansen, 2000, 1). Much of the population has converted to Islam by the 19th century (DeLancey et al., 2010, 294). King ruled from capitals (Logone-Birni, Kousseri and Makari) in collaboration with notables attached to the royal court, while each principality was administered by a prince (Lebeuf, 1969, 169, 205). Kotoko is under Bornu c.1600 through the late 18th century and again are subjugated to Bornu in the 1890s before Bornu's defeat by the French in 1900.

### Social Segmentation

Elite draw from Lagwan-Kotoko ethnicity, but a diverse population that included Massa, Kanouri, Arabs. Kotoko linked by prestige assigned due to their putative shared descent from Sao, the original inhabitants of the area (Lebeuf, 1969, 20).

### Surplus Extraction

Peasants pay tribute in-kind, be it part of their crops or fishing yield and pastoralists pay taxes in livestock. Traders are taxed at markets as well as via tolls on rivers and roads (Lebeuf, 1969, 215-7)..

### Local Representation

Numerous villages and cities exist within each principality. Descendants of a city's founding family retain substantial authority in local matters (Lebeuf, 1969, 104). This obliges princes to work with numerous dignitaries, many of which are hereditary. Some dignitaries represent territory, others specific obligations, like military affairs or palace guards (Lebeuf, 1969, 169, 180). Princes thus do not take decisions alone, but in consultation with their councilors and territorial representatives. Princes further do not own all land (though they have personal fields worked by servants), instead land managed by founding families (Lebeuf, 1969, 204-5). Although princes have substantial autonomy, only the king can declare war, and all princes send tribute and resources to him. Thus in times of conflict, villages and principalities send troops and resources to the three capitals (Logone-Birni, Kousseri and Makari). An appointed delegate acted as the intermediary between the Prince and the principalities (Lebeuf, 1969, 201, 209).

## Method of Succession

Succession was hereditary within royal families, but only sons by concubines could inherit the throne while those from official marriages were not eligible to prevent interference from maternal lineages. Princely families thus became a mix of autochthons and outsiders over time (Lebeuf, 1969, 124-5).

## State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation

## Sources

DeLancey, M. D., Mbuh, R. N. and Delancey, M. W. (2010). *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon*, Scarecrow Press.

Hansen, M. H. (2000). *The Kotoko City-States, A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures*, Kgl. Danske Videnskabskabernes Selskab.

Lebeuf, A. (1969). *Les Principautés kotoko. essai sur le caractère sacré de l'autorité*, PhD thesis, Editions du Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique.

## 4.67 Kotokoli, 1700-1888

### Overview

Tem polity, with a King (*uro Eso*) who ruled with councilors chosen from clan patriarchs. The king was also assisted by servants from each of the polity's component chieftaincy. One councilor was responsible for immigrants and defined positions existed to represent griots, blacksmiths, etc. as well as official messengers (Barbier, 1983, 56-7). The army was led by dignitaries named by king, often coming from minority ethnic groups, but chiefs were also obliged to provide men when needed (Barbier, 1983, 51). The region was considered prosperous by the Germans when they arrived in Togo, but the kingdom was facing internal issues as King Uro Djobo Semo attempted to alter succession rules to stay in his lineage, upsetting the long-established balance between the seven royal villages (Barbier, 1983, 58).

### Social Segmentation

Royal clans, based in seven royal villages, assure political power. See Alexandre (Alexandre, 1963) for a discussion of ethnic hierarchy.

### Surplus Extraction

Chiefs collect tribute and anyone visiting chiefs or the king brought a gift. Chiefs in turn paid tribute to the king every year either in cash (e.g. cowries) or in kind. Market trade is also taxed as was caravan trade (Barbier, 1983, 53-4).

### Local Representation

Kingdom was built around villages, grouped into *tedire*, or cantons. Village chiefs were responsible for land redistribution and administering justice and were confirmed by and ruled under the king. Cantons were hierarchically ordered in terms



of importance, with six principal cantons holding the most weight (Alexandre, 1963, x). The *uro eso* had clear authority over canton chiefs, however, and he was the court of last resort. But the state had no centralized bureaucracy and the king's authority was exercised through messengers or royal tours of the cantons (Alexandre, 1963, 253).

### Method of Succession

Rotation among dynasties, each associated with a royal village. Kotokoli's founder, Agoro Dam, consolidated these into a single kingdom and agreed to alternate power between seven royal villages to prevent one dynasty from dominating (Barbier, 1983, 45).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. The king was a spiritual figure who, following a ritual bath, was endowed with magical properties. Islam was present among some clans, having been introduced in the 18th century, but not dominant (Alexandre, 1963, 245).

### Elite Structure Typology

Federation. Alexandre (1963) writes that Kotokoli is almost as much a confederation as Ashanti.

### Sources

Alexandre, P. (1963). Organisation politique des kotokoli du nord-togo, *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 4(Cahier 14): 228–274.

Barbier, J.-C. (1983). *L'histoire présente: Exemple du royaume Kotokoli au Togo*, Centre d'étude d'Afrique Noire.

Gayibor, N. L. (2012). *Le "Togo" au cours de l'ère précoloniale*, Université de Lomé.

## 4.68 Kuba, 1625-1894

### Overview

Kingdom united under founder, Shyaam, who came from outside the area in the early 1600s. Kuba had a complex state structure; with capital was relatively strong relative to subordinate chiefdoms. Kuba was led by a king who ruled with office holders; in the late 19th century, there were three categories of elites: the king, members of the crown council (who represented the royal clan) and the *kolm*, a set of notables with individual titles. These titles were merit-based, even if there was an aristocracy. Over time, Kuba's kings had integrated surrounding chieftainships into the state, increasing Kuba's power from the 17th century onwards, though the king's power was still checked by the crown council who could veto the king's actions (even if this power was slowly eroding over time) (Vansina, 1978, 128-31). Kuba was remarkably stable; it was relatively removed from the impacts of the slave trade, and it had no immediate neighbors to threaten it. At the same time, the process of state-building built up the state's legitimacy and the strength of the king and aristocracy, in no small part through the creation of titles and offices to reward new supporters (Vansina, 1978, 236-7).

### Social Segmentation

Kuba saw a high degree of social stratification, with the *kolm* or bureaucratic class, coming to form a new social class of patricians. More important titles were reserved for elite, either descent from an aristocratic clan or relation to the royal lineage. Slavery was also present (Vansina, 1978, 131).

## Surplus Extraction

Taxes were collected from traders and peasants paid tribute as well as providing labor. For example, free villages paid tribute once a year, in the form of foodstuffs, raffia, salt, iron, knives, hoes, baskets, etc. (Vansina, 1978, 139-41).

## Local Representation

The village was the base unit and was integrated into chieftainships that were absorbed into the state. By the 19th century, kings have substantial authority over provinces, which were headed by provincial governors who were monitored by special 'police', who reported to the king on events in provinces and helped collect taxes, as well as county heads who were directly appointed by the king (Vansina, 1978, 139). Over time, ties were made with society by the king taking a wife from each clan, meaning that each clan had a son or grandson residing in the capital who, in turn, was responsible for the yearly tribute from their mother's village, largely replacing the provincial chiefs in this role (Vansina, 1978, 139, 236-38).

## Method of Succession

Within royal lineage. In principle, the junior brothers of the king by the same mother were first heirs, then the children of the king's eldest sister. It was also prescribed that the successor be the eldest of royal lineage, which clashed at times with other rules – hence succession was never automatic and *kolm* and others often were able to 'participate' by mediating disagreements. Struggles were common and overtime Bushoong chieftaincy gained power over others (Vansina, 1978, 155, 160).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. There was a strong unifying myth of shared descent from Woot and the kingship associated with a wealth of symbolic material. The burial of kings was an elaborate affairs and king gains substantial legitimacy over time (Vansina, 1978, Chpt 3, 129).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

Vansina, J. (1978). *The children of Woot: a history of the Kuba peoples*, University of Wisconsin Press Madison.

Vansina, J. (2017). A Traditional legal system: The Kuba, *Man In Adaptation*, Routledge, pp. 135–147.

## 4.69 Leqa Naqamte & Leqa Qellem, 1841/1871-1882

### Overview

Oromo polities in western Ethiopia that emerged in the 1800s. Leqa Naqamte formed in 1841 and Leqa Qellem (Jote Tulla) in 1871 in what later became the Welega Province of Ethiopia. The former grew around the city of Nekemte, which remained its capital, under the expansionary powers of Bekere Godana. Bekere, builds support by dividing land among followers in areas of defeated populations and his control over land became a source of power for him. He subsequently builds an administration with officers, often the sons or close relatives of the king (Ta'a, 1986, 104-6). Both polities were incorporated into Abyssinia in 1882 under Menelik. In both cases as well, Naqamte and Qellem's leaders negotiated with Menelik to serve as his client, affording both the opportunity to expand their territorial control (Triulzi, 1986).

## Social Segmentation

The consolidation of political power among the Oromo created new forms of wealth accumulation, producing class stratification (Ta'a, 1986, 101-3, 107). Both Leqas had an aristocratic, clan-based ruling class that relied on the peasantry and large slave populations existed in both (FERNYHOUGH, 1986, 52).

## Surplus Extraction

Territorial officers in Leqa Naqamte collected tribute as well as taxes on the caravan trade, including the lucrative ivory trade (Ta'a, 1986, 105). Schuver (Schuver, 1996, 1000) observes that Jote Tulla levies duties on every slave imported or sold and that each district was obliged to provide men for royal fields.

## Local Representation

In Leqa Naqamte, local administrators were elected by local people and approved of by the monarch's named officers appointed to districts, such as the *abba lafa* and *abba goro*. The name officials maintained authority in assigned territories and collected tribute and were often Bekere's sons or close allies. Bekere's consolidation of power had weakened the power of traditional *gada* officials, reducing their power to customary rituals, even though the *gada* system continued to influence the nature of local politics. Bekere quickly built a complex political apparatus. For example, officials ensured that traders could pass peacefully through the area (Ta'a, 1986, 103-6). Schuver (Schuver, 1996, 100) notes that in Leqa Qellem, general assemblies were held where there was open discussion, but that ultimately Jote Tulla were rarely unsuccessful.

## Method of Succession

Leqa Naqamte is a hereditary monarchy, with Bekere succeeded by his son Moti Moroda (Ta'a, 1986, 124). Jote Tulla is still the head of Leqa Qellam upon annexation.

## State Ideology

Conquest

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

Fernyhough, T. (1986). *Serfs, Slaves and Shefta: Modes of Production in Southern Ethiopia from the Late Nineteenth Century to 1941*, Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

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Ta'a, T. (1986). *The Political Economy of Western Central Ethiopia: From the Mid- 16th to the Early 20th Centuries*, PhD thesis, Michigan State University.

Triulzi, A. (1986). Nekemte and Addis Abeba: Dilemmas of provincial rule, *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology*, Cambridge University Press.

Triulzi, A. (1980). *Prelude to the history of a no-man's land : Bela Shangul, Wallagga, Ethiopia (ca. 1800-1898)*, PhD thesis, Northwestern University.

## 4.70 Lesotho, 1822-1884

### Overview

Several independent Sotho-speaking clans consolidate under King Moshoeshoe I following the massive unrest caused by the rise of [Shaka](#) to the South. Lesotho was highly personalized around Moshoeshoe early on, but power was moderated by the presence of councilors, territorial chiefs, and warriors, who all participated in public affairs. Thompson ([Thompson, 1975](#), 204) describes the state as a “fragile association of chiefs and their followers” with Moshoeshoe attracting them as followers due to external pressures and Moshoeshoe’s own skill. Moshoeshoe built on pre-existing customs to consolidate power, recruiting able advisors who assisted in controlling territorial chiefs and bestowing gifts upon people to keep their loyalty ([Thompson, 1975](#), 211). The Sotho kingdom was thus built around complex and variable personal relationships, with Moshoeshoe’s power strongest in the core ([Thompson, 1975](#), 64, 175-8). In principle, major policies were discussed at a *pitso*, or popular assembly, but ultimately the king makes decisions ([Machobane and Karschay, 1990](#), 23-4).

### Social Segmentation

The Lifiquane increased the number of property-less men while concentrating wealth in a small number of individuals who could recruit clients. Moshoeshoe was preeminent among these new powerful men, which facilitated state formation ([Thompson, 1975](#), 62).

### Surplus Extraction

Subjects paid fines in judicial court cases, often paid in livestock and territorial chiefs were expected to send Moshoeshoe a portion of any raided cattle as well as part of any tribute they collected ([Thompson, 1975](#), 208-10). BaSotho chiefs expropriated surplus in the form of labor as well as in-kind good, with peasants required to provide several days of labor each year and pay fines to their chiefs ([Eldredge, 2002](#), 149).

### Local Representation

Moshoeshoe placed kinsmen at specific localities and delegated limited authority to them over surrounding areas. When the king needed to make decisions, he would first meet with councilors, then territorial chiefs and kinsmen and, finally, he might convene a *pitso*, or meetings with the community – territorial chiefs and their male adult followers. *Pitso* were often used to sound out public opinion, though in practice the king and his councilors often monopolized the debate, though it is often understood as an important socializing and nation-building exercise ([Thompson, 1975](#), 208-10). As the Sotho state grows, the desire of chiefs and their families to claim new territory created divisions as younger chiefs formed villages that generated disputes ([Sanders, 1975](#), 245).

### Method of Succession

Hereditary within Moshoeshoe’s lineage; eldest son in the first house (the king’s ‘great wife’) inherits or, if the first house has no sons, the eldest son in second house. The new *morena* is enthroned during a public assembly of all adult males ([Machobane and Karschay, 1990](#), 6-9).

### State Ideology

Hereditary monarchy

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

- Eldredge, E. A. (2002). *A South African kingdom: The pursuit of security in nineteenth-century Lesotho*, Cambridge University Press.
- Machobane, L. and Karschay, S. (1990). *Government and Change in Lesotho, 1800–1966: A Study of Political Institutions*, Springer.
- Sanders, P. (1975). *Moshoeshoe: Chief of the Sotho*, Heinemann.
- Thompson, L. M. (1975). *Survival in two worlds: Moshoeshoe of Lesotho: 1786-1870*, Clarendon Press.

## 4.71 Liptako & Yaga, 1810-1904

### Overview

Fulani emirates in eastern Burkina Faso that were formed following Fulani in-migration into the region in the preceding century. Emir rules with a number of courtiers, who owed their loyalty to the Emir (Irwin, 1981, 136). Judges and imams also play an important role in state functions. Note that Liptako and Yaga in principle under Sokoto, but this was largely theoretical (Thébaud, 2002, 183).

### Social Segmentation

Fulani notables assume political and economic power. Caste and slavery present (Thébaud, 2002, 186. Diallo (2009, 303) notes that many artisans and griots originated from indigenous and neighboring ethnicities.

### Surplus Extraction

Certain courtiers charged with collecting market tasks and peasants paid an annual levy on grain, to the extent they were able (Irwin, 1981, 136, 148).

### Local Representation

Local government left to village heads, who oversaw affairs of local lineages and dependents. Irwin (1981, 136-9) documents how new-comers went to emir to pledge allegiance and ask for a place to settle as the emir was master of the land; the village head was thus the Emir's appointee. Yagha struggles to contain indigenous Gurmantche, negotiating with indigenous village chiefs (see Thébaud, 2002).

### Method of Succession

Within male lineage with a preference for sons and then brothers, but prone to succession battles, e.g. late 1800s son and brother of deceased emir fighting for crown (Irwin, 1981, 79).

### State Ideology

Islamic Theocracy

### Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

Diallo, H. (2009). Naissance et evolution des pouvoirs peuls au Sahel Burkinabé (Jelgooji, Liptaako et Yaaga), *Histoire des royaumes et chefferies au Burkina Faso precolonial*, CNRST, Ouagadougou.

Irwin, P. (1981). *Liptako Speaks*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Thébaud, B. (2002). *Foncier pastorel et gestion de l'espace au Sahel: Peuls du Niger oriental et du Yagha burkinabé*, Karthala, Paris.

## 4.72 Loango, late 14thc-1883

### Overview

Polity headed by a *Maloango*, or king, who had significant authority, including to appoint his own advisors, largely family and trusted followers. These principle advisors included the four provincial governors as well as military leaders and other nobles (Martin, 1970, 21-22). Once the king made decisions, they were made known throughout the kingdom through envoys who held a respected ceremonial role. Loango consolidated around the Atlantic slave trade, but by the second half of the 19th century, Loango was increasingly fragmented. As the aristocracy gained new roles through the slave trade as middle men, they created new alternative centers of wealth and power to the *Maloango* (Martin, 1970, 158-9), but the bureaucracy persisted and polity remained centralized until colonization.

### Social Segmentation

Royal clan assures political power.

### Surplus Extraction

Tribute was paid in kind and labor, with women sowing and working in the *Maloango's* fields. At harvests, special courts were held where people brought their tribute, mostly agricultural products, but others paid with diverse things like ivory (Martin, 1970, 22).

### Local Representation

Loango was divided into four provinces: Loangiri along the coast, which contained the capital and the main coastal trading point; Loangomongo in Mayombe foothills; Pili and Chilongo (Martin, 1970, 10-11). Each has a governor who represented the province before the king. Local administrators collected tribute, administered justice and conscripted soldiers; courts and other services available throughout (Martin, 1970, 22).

### Method of Succession

Succession was matrilineal and elective within the royal clan. Heirs were chosen from among the nephews of the ruling *Maloango*. From the 18th century onwards, Loango adopted the Kongo's method of having a council choose among eligible candidates. The chosen heir was appointed to one of four lordships, with a regent ensuring power immediately after a *maloango's* death (Martin, 1970, 25).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. The king had divine authority and the belief that he had limitless power granted him a right to everything in the kingdom (Martin, 1970, 164, Hagenbucher-Sacripanti, 1973).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

Hagenbucher-Sacripanti, F. (1973). *Les fondements spirituels du pouvoir au royaume de Loango: République populaire du Congo*, FeniXX.

Martin, P. (1970). *The External Trade of the Loango Coast and Its Effects on the Vili 1576-1870*, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies.

## 4.73 Luba, 16thc?-1891

### Overview

A king (*mulopwe*) ruled over Luba with a number (50) of subordinate titleholders, which included both important advisors and petty functionaries who supervised court etiquette. These titleholders had their own clients beneath them (Reefe, 1981, 155). Luba profited from the Shaba-Kasai trade networks, leading to a territorial shift from the Lac Boyo area to the Luba-Songye areas along the Lomani river, which allowed the state to capture gains from the Shaba-Kasai routes in the early 18th centuries (Reefe, 1981, 97). The arrival of Arab-Swahili slave and ivory traders began eroding Luba's client states from the 1850s onwards, facilitating the rise of dynastic disputes. These exacerbated Luba's problems, as clients were often forced to choose between royal males as their patron or were asked to pay double tribute. Even sacred areas of Luba's heartland saw violence and by the 1890s political authority was increasingly limited to the village level even though many political institutions still existed in a reduced form (Reefe, 1981, 159, 190-2).

### Social Segmentation

Power was concentrated in the royal lineage. Luba did see some domestic slavery, but it was limited and the slave trade only penetrated the area in the second half of the 1800s (Reefe, 1981, 153-4).

### Surplus Extraction

Reefe (1981, 5-6) describes the state as a 'tribute monger' as the court acted as a major system of redistribution. Designated royal court titleholders administered tribute payments from specific villages and client states. Over time, this entourage expands as the state developed an 'exploitative and territorially extensive tribute-gathering system'. Trade was also taxed (Reefe, 1981, 96).

### Local Representation

Villages and subchiefs fall under king. Groups of villages were often led by a royal sacred village, important memorials to the royal dynasty (Reefe, 1981, 54). Client states were integrated via secret society of *bambudye*, which became key to the spread of dynastic ideology. Local political leaders of newly integrated states were inducted into *bambudye*, creating lines of cooperation and communication across lineage and regional interests (Reefe, 1981, 83, 102). The *bambudye* proved a critical counterweight to the centrifugal tendencies of the polity, with local chiefs retaining many traditional rights as well as ties to indigenous religious practice (Nziem, 1999, 653).

## Method of Succession

Any royal male could claim a right to rule if he could trace his ancestry back to Kalala Ilunga, the hunter who introduced iron working to the Luba people. The Luba were able to limit divisive succession fights for a long time, even as the expansion of state power proliferated the number of eligible male royals as women were married into the royal family as a means to incorporate lineages into the state (Reefe, 1981, 7). Disputes over succession become more common in the 1800s, ultimately creating fissures within the royal family (Reefe, 1981, Chpt xi, 183).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. The king's powers were so great that he could transmit sacred blood to newly conquered chiefs to legitimize their role (Wilson, 1972, 584-5). Over time, the state developed ideologies, insignia and institutions that were exported to clients on the periphery, thereby enabling local kings and kinsmen to command loyalty. The royal dynasty coopts parts of local religious system around ancestors to link villages and regions (Reefe, 1981, 5).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

Nziem, N. (1999). The Political system of the Luba and Lunda: its emergence and expansion, *General History Of Africa: Vol. V*, UNZA Press, Lusaka.

Petit, P. (1996). Les charmes du roi sont les esprits des morts»: les fondements religieux de la royauté sacrée chez les Luba du Zaïre, *Africa* 66(3): 349–366.

Reefe, T. (1981). *The Rainbow and the Kings: a history of the Luba empire to 1891*, Univ of California Press.

Wilson, A. (1972). Long Distance Trade and the Luba Lomami Empire, *The Journal of African History* 13(4): 575–589.

## 4.74 Lunda, misc

*Mwata Yamvo (Lunda or Ruund), mid-1600-1887*

*Mwata Kazembe (Kazembe), 1740-1860*

## Overview

Lunda kingdoms in the Zambia-DRC borderlands. In both, a king (*mwant yaw*) rules with assistance of courtiers, including: royal office holders, territorial representatives and personal advisors (Macola, 2001, 39). Both kingdoms were declining in the mid- to late-19th century under external pressure; Kazembe's elite increasingly dependent on Swahili traders as the royal monopoly on trade eroded and Yeke began threatening trade routes (Gordon, 2006, 40, Macola, 2001, 42). In Ruund, growing trade encroachment by the Portuguese and Chokwe raiders fractionalized the *mwant yaw*'s power and undermined elite monopoly of power (Macola, 2015, 4-5).

## Social Segmentation

Political power concentrated in king and his courtiers (Macola, 2001); at regional level, 'owners of the land' (pre-integration leadership) retain important political and symbolic power (Macola, 2015, 2).



## Surplus Extraction

Provinces pay regular tribute (Macola, 2001, 38) and king controls long-distance trade, with traders paying a set tax (Chama, 2013, 28).

## Local Representation

In heartland, king's have substantial control, appointing district rulers (*cilol*) from the capital and with specific officers collecting tribute. As states expand, more negotiation with existing elites, who are often integrated as *cilol* while maintaining more autonomy (Nziem, 1999, 602-6). This "lineage power-brokering" helped strengthen state authority in peripheral or newly integrated territories, particularly through marriage alliances and the granting of hereditary offices (Macola, 2001, 39); as a result, district capitals clearly projected state power and regional titleholders cooperated with the centaur, e.g. by paying and issued warnings if threats arose (Macola, 2000, 87, 94).

## Method of Succession

King's sons by an *ntombo* wife - the daughter of an aristocratic title holder - eligible, thereby maintaining ties across aristocratic families (Macola, 2000, 97). At times, heir appears to be appointed, as some heirs were important figures in the royal court (Gamitto, 1960a, 111).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship. Macola (2001, 39-40) observes how integrated populations sought Lunda insignia and symbols of power, leading local leaders to maintain close ties to the center. Chansi (2007) documents various spiritual dimensions of kingship and coronation.

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.75 Macina, 1818-1862

### Overview

Macina was an Islamic theocracy founded by Secku Ahmadou, which continued to be headed by his descendants, with Ahmadou remaining the spiritual chief of the polity (Sanankoua, 1990, 9, 51). The king ruled with a “grand assembly”, composed of one hundred members – 40 title-holders and 60 suppliants who were chosen by Ahmadou (Sanankoua, 1990, 53). Macina capitalized on trade along the Niger river and regulated trade under the laws of Shari’a (Sanankoua, 1990, 102). Macina was one of many states conquered during El Hadji Umar Tal’s jihad (see n the 1860s, but much of the state structure is retained under Tal’s new state until French conquest.

### Social Segmentation

Fulani society extremely hierarchical and only nobility could obtain political power. Slavery existed within the polity.

### Surplus Extraction

Macina collected a portion of war booty, fines (i.e. for a minor delinquency a *cadi* would collect 500-2000 cowries), *zakat*, *Usuru* (or *Ashur*), an in-kind payment for the right to a market spot (representing one-tenth the value of the merchandise), an annual grain payment during Ramadan (with each lineage head paying a given amount for each person who would be fasting), a tax on rice and millet crops and a tax to subsidize the military paid by all those not in combat (Sanankoua, 1990, 103-6). In large towns, merchant communities paid a communal tax, which could be interpreted as a form of tribute or protection money (Johnson, 1976, 487).

### Local Representation

Administrative base was the village, which were grouped into hamlets that then formed cantons and provinces. Macina was home to an estimated 67000 villages in 340 cantons and 26 provinces (Sanankoua, 1990, 65-6). Tombouctou and Jelgooji had special statutes. Each province was run by an *amiiru*, someone elected by the grand assembly. The *amiiru* was generally not from the province in question and represented the central power at Hamdallahi in the province by acting as intermediary. The *amiiru* held administrative and military functions and worked in assistance with a *cadi* (Sanankoua, 1990, 66).

## Method of Succession

Succession within Ahmadou's lineage, but this was never codified and the question remained a problem within the polity. Ahmadou was happy to have his son take over, but this choice was not uncontroversial since Fulani tradition is for younger brother to take over (Sanankoua, 1990, 115).

## State Ideology

Islamic Theocracy

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.76 Mandara, mid-15thc-1902

### Overview

Diverse polity rule by Mandara, that is on and off tributary of Bornu and which becomes an Islamic sultanate in the 18th century (Barkindo, 1989, 140). Mandara was headed by a king, or *tlikse*, who ruled with numerous province and activity-based title holders (see Morrissey's (1984) appendix for list). Power is centralizing at the start of the century; Bukar Jama institutes a class of *arcali* Islamic clerics, for example, in an effort to centralize the judicial system, a process that continued under his successor (Morrissey, 1984, 74, 92). As the 19th century progresses, Mandara faces greater threats and much of its territory is encroached upon by the growth of the Adamawa emirates, which was particularly costly to territorial titleholders (Morrissey, 1984, 1-2).

### Social Segmentation

Mandara nobility are political elite. Mandara has a large slave population as well who were able to gain authority in the military, but were otherwise subordinate. During the 19th century, "control over [slaves] became the principal weapon in the battle for political and economic power" (Morrissey, 1984, 3).

### Surplus Extraction

Appointed officials collect royal dues as well as taxing traders and local markets. Title holders owed specific taxes during Ramadan and peasants paid *Zakat* to the *tlikse* or his representative if they were Muslim. Non-Muslims and certain clans and ethnicities paid separate, specific taxes (Barkindo, 1989, 194-6).

## Local Representation

Local title holders (*galipaha*) traditionally managed territorial fiefs, with all towns, villages and tribal units grouped under one fief or another (Barkindo, 1989, 160). Local title holders had diverse origins: some - those who were ethnically Wandala - were named by the *tlikse*, while many others were indigenous and were designated locally by their own group members according to local custom (Mohammadou, 1982, 167). Both Barkindo (1989, 161) and Morrissey (1984, 66) describe a process throughout the 19th century that eroded the power of the regional title holders, however, following the encroachment of Adamawa. By the mid-19th century, the *tlikse* could largely appoint who he wanted to a title and could reallocate fiefs, although fiefholders retained spiritual control over land. New titleholders were often princes as the royal family expands their authority by appointing family members or loyal clients. Because territory was rapidly falling to the Fulani, there is not an opportunity for these titleholders to consolidate authority to rival the sultan or *tlikse* (Morrissey, 1984, 66-7).

## Method of Succession

The *tlikse* designates one of his sons, confiding his choice in his councilors. The choice is kept secret until after his death to avoid fighting among the princes. The official choice is made by Mandara's twelve major councilors, however, and they elect the new king (Mohammadou, 1982, 97). In principle, title holders could depose the *tlikse* if he threatened their interests (Barkindo, 1989, 124).

## State Ideology

Islamic theocracy

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.77 Manica, c.1500-1891

### Overview

Shona kingdom that emerged in an area known for its gold, though ivory and cattle were also key sectors and the region was of great interest to the Portuguese, who established a number of feiras in the late 1830s. The king, or *Manyika*, sits atop the political hierarchy, but his power was not strictly speaking absolute. The king's councilors were responsible for paying tribute, raising an army and supplying the king with grain and labor (Bhila, 1982, 13-14). Key councilors included

the *mukoyi*, who was responsible for actually crowning the king, the *mu-rasanhi* and others (including a jester). Numerous titled positions exist across the polity, e.g. *Sahumani* who lives in Honde valley and was the only person allowed to perform two rituals: one to ensure king's longevity and one to honor a king who has had a long reign (Bhila, 1982, 24). The king was also assisted by his children in state administration. The 18th and 19th centuries were marked by numerous civil wars, exacerbated by Portuguese interference (Bhila, 1982, 45); Manica came under Gaza hegemony in the 1820s, but it was a loose vassalage, and the state became stronger under Mzila in the 1870s.

## Social Segmentation

Ruling dynasty assures political power; nobility associated with specific symbols, such as the use of umbrellas (Bhila, 1982, 107).

## Surplus Extraction

Tribute was paid as a function of what an area produced, meaning that gold-producing areas paid in gold, shepherds paid in sheep, etc. Tribute likely paid yearly (Bhila, 1982, 14). King regulated trade.

## Local Representation

Manica's smallest political unit was the village, administered by a headman. Villages were aggregated into *dunhu* or wards, headed by a *sadunhu*, a hereditary position. Ward heads - which could be women - served as the king's magistrates and kings rarely interfered in a ward's internal matters, though the king had the right to dismiss or replace a *sadunhu* at any point (Bhila, 1982, 13). The king's sons who were not eligible for succession were often given land or territory to alleviate competition over kingship (Bhila, 1982, 21).

## Method of Succession

King was ritually selected through the ancestral spirit of Nyamandoto who manifested himself through the *semukadzi*, who headed the entire royal clan and became the spirit medium that channeled Nyamandoto, allowing the *Manyika* to speak to Mwari, the creator of mankind. In reality, succession often produced violent fights. Once under Rozvi, Rozvi delegation at times appears to have been involved. Only sons of the first or chief wife of king were eligible (Bhila, 1982, 15-21).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. King chosen through *Semukadzi*, a spirit medium, who was consulted for succession and rain-making.

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.78 Mankon, early 1800s-1891

### Overview

Mankon is one of the oldest monarchies among the grassfield people of Cameroon's Northwest Province. The fondom is ruled by a *fon* (king) with rights to kingship acquired by birth. The *fon* was traditionally assisted by two brothers, who helped administer the polity and who were leaders of state-cult societies (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 71).

### Social Segmentation

Royal and commoner state societies were distinct (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 65). Slavery was also present.

### Surplus Extraction

Citizens paid tributes (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 65-6) in addition to court fees paid by disputants, payments for secret society memberships, and for chiefdom level offices (Warnier, 1975, 188-9).

### Local Representation

Mankon was built upon three clans and a number of satellite chiefdoms. Satellite chiefs retained ceremonial privileges and stools, but surrendered regulatory societies and certain regalia. Under these were lineage settlements and wards, with the *utshe*, or patrilineage head, playing a key role. Local lineage and ward heads were then linked to the center through regulatory societies, attendance at royal drinking days and at times through service to the court (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 65). Local chiefs had a fair amount of autonomy (Ndenge, 2005, 29), including resolving almost all judicial disputes, (Warner, 1999, Chpt 17).

### Method of Succession

Patrilineal descent. The crowned *fon* is usually a designated son of the deceased king, a child who was born only during his reign.

### State Ideology

Divine kinship; Mankon had cults around dead kings (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 70).

### Elite Structure Typology

Federation

### Sources

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## 4.79 Maradi, c.1820s-1899

### Overview

Originally part of Katsina, Maradi was a Hausa polity that gained its independence in the 19th century. Maradi was one of several traditional Hausa rump states, formed by rulers and nobility who fled the rise of the [Sokoto](#) Caliphate. Maradi largely replicated the fallen Hausa state of Katsina with a king, or *Sarki*, ruling with 130 titled officers. The ruling council had substantial power and members represented main status groups in the kingdom: Muslims and pagan, natives and immigrants, freemen and slaves; e.g. royal slaves had specific offices. Titled officers had specific tasks, e.g. the *Galadima* presided over the kingdom during rulers absence, regulated dynastic affairs, and the marriages of princes and their appointments. Some titled officials were appointed by king from the ruling dynasty, while others were hereditary ([Smith, 1967](#), 157-6). Maradi was constrained by the more powerful [Gobir](#) exilic state to the west, the Sultanate of [Damagaram](#) based at Zinder to the east, and Sokoto to the south. The arrival of the French in 1899 saw the bloody destruction of the town by the Voulet-Chanoine Mission, but Maradi-town the town recovered to become an important regional center of commerce by the 1950s.

### Social Segmentation

Hausa nobility rules. Slavery exists in kingdom (e.g. [Smith, 1967](#), 108).

### Surplus Extraction

Resident chiefs (*barazaki*) collected taxation and levies for the *Sarki* and population was also obliged to serve in the military if required. The most important tax was a grain tithe, *zakka*, collected annually, but others included a bundle of guinea-corn or millet out of every ten. Pastoral Fulani pay cattle tithe (one beast in ten) and Muslim craftsmen and traders liable to occupational taxes ([Smith, 1967](#), 102-4). [Smith \(1967, 108-114\)](#) notes that war booty was a key economic resource of the state and assigns a key role for the queen mother, who levied grain taxes as well as annual taxes on prostitutes and cult specialists.

### Local Representation

Indigenous, pagan resident chiefs administered several contiguous villages, themselves led by local headmen. The Hausa reoccupation of Maradi depended on resident chiefs' cooperation. All twelve resident chiefs held office by hereditary right and lived in their administrative areas. Note that Tessaoua is more independent than others and immediately before colonization declares itself an independent sultanate ([Smith, 1967](#), 100-1).

### Method of Succession

Selected from royal princes, often using Muslim divinatory techniques ([Smith, 1967](#), 110).

## State Ideology

Islamic theocracy

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

Smith, M. G. (1967). A Hausa Kingdom: Maradi under Dan Baskore, 1854–75, *West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century*, Routledge.

## 4.80 Maravi (Kalonga, Undi, Lundu), late 16thc-1890

### Overview

Chewa monarchies that ruled with a council. Undi and Lundu break away from Kalonga early on, likely due to succession disputes within the royal family, resulting in three highly similar kingdom (Langworthy, 1969, 107). For all three, trade with the Portuguese in ivory, gold and other goods, including slaves, was important (McFarren, 1986, 70, 209, Phiri, 1975, 118). Growing pressure from the Ngoni and Yao exacerbated the insecurity wrought by raiding for slaves (McFarren, 1986, 238), meaning that by the mid to late 1800s, the states were disintegrating as subordinate chiefs sought autonomy. In the case of Lundu, the polity has all but ceased to exist by the 1870s (McFarren, 1986, 257-8, 268).

### Social Segmentation

Royal family dominates political sphere, which is quite extensive as all subordinate chiefs, whether truly related or not, were thought linked by ties of perpetual kinship to the king (Langworthy, 1969, 109).

### Surplus Extraction

Tribute was paid in ivory, skins and food stuffs (McFarren, 1986, 52) and was organized by members of the royal court. In principle, the king maintained a monopoly on the external sale of ivory. Much of the tribute collected was used to for the royal entourage in the capital, as well as for receiving visitors and redistributing downward across the kingdom (Langworthy, 1969, 113-4, 117).

### Local Representation

Territorial chieftaincies were established early in the kingdoms and represented king at village level while retaining control over land and any tributary chiefs below him. Villages had headman and lineage leaders, many of whom were incorporated into the state at its foundation (McFarren, 1986, 51-2). This means that kings did not appoint their subordinate rulers, with selection remaining a local affair, although the king at times sent representatives to arbitrate succession disputes. The interests and loyalties of subordinate rulers primarily lay with members of their own lineages and those who lived near them, rather than the monarch. This created a decentralized polity, with monarch's obtaining loyalty through the distribution of gifts, such as cloths or beads, as well as practices of perpetual kinship, e.g. the king of Undi exchanged sisters for marriage with conquered chiefs, integrating new populations into the state and, eventually, the Chewa identity (Langworthy, 1972, 106, 110-3).



## Method of Succession

Matrilineal succession, with brothers and nephews eligible for succession. The king was first selected by female members of the matrilineage before the final approval of councilors and senior male members of the royal family. In Lundu, succession rotated between two lineages and was subject to considerable dispute (McFarren, 1986, 54, 156).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. The spiritual authority of the king over ancestor cults became central to the state and chiefs and headmen had rights to perform initiations and other religious rituals that also maintained power. Secret societies were especially important in this (McFarren, 1986, 53-5).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.81 Merina, 1540-1895

### Overview

Originating in Madagascar's highlands, the Merina expanded rapidly in the late 1700s and early 1800s as King Andrianampoinimerina and later his son Radama consolidated several modest town-states within the highlands to form the kingdom as it became known. Merina consolidated in the highlands around the growing slave trade (Campbell, 2005, 9) and grew into a highly bureaucratized polity, with standardized weights and monies and regulated markets and high degree of control over the economy. For example, the state invested in plantations and encouraged domestic manufacturing (Campbell, 2005, 161). Merina also invested heavily in irrigation to increase rice production and built garrisons across the territory (Crossland, 2001, 23). Merina was a monarchy, ruled by a king or queen, and councilors which Deschamps (1965, 202) describes as an oligarchy. Some of these ministers were quite strong, e.g. the Prime minister. As Merina expands outwards in the 19th century, conquering most of its neighbors including the Sakalava polities, it successfully projected an evolving identity across its territory (Larson, 2000, 170).

### Social Segmentation

Merina society was socially stratified, with nobility, *hova*, commoners and slaves. Each class was further subdivided into hierarchies (Campbell, 2005, 25).

## Surplus Extraction

Taxes were collected by the monarchy, with subjects required to pay in silver although poor households could pay in kind. For example, peasant producers paid a 'single spade' for each hectare of rice they cultivated, and others could pay in manioc if need be (Larson, 2000, 196). This changed as the state expanded outward, with households required to pay taxes for each 'spade' or worker rather than land (Cole, 2001, 41). Slave traders were expected to present gifts (La Rue and Lovejoy, 2003, 66-7) and foreign merchants were required to pay customs duties at Merina controlled ports (Campbell, 2005, 70).

## Local Representation

Merina was divided into *toko* or districts, beginning at the turn of the 19th century with six *toko* around Antananarivo. Local groups of male elders (*fokonolona*) at village or local level managed local conflicts (Larson, 2000, 170, 180). The 27 non-Merina provinces created during Merina's expansion were headed by governors and sub-governors who were placed in key localities. These officials were from Merina aristocracy, but their authority varied, with those posted to Tamatave of Boina being very powerful while others, such as at Ihosy and other outskirts, seeing much more circumscribed authority over their subjects (Deschamps, 1965, 200-5). The posting of administrators outside of the highlands was aimed at increasing central administrative control (Cole, 2001, 42), but in reality descent based political groups were critical to Merina strategies of expansion and incorporation. Some areas, like Isandra saw existing leaders retained as Merina's representatives while others, e.g. Lalangina, were replaced by more favorable figureheads (Berg, 1975, 88, see Campbell, 2005). Thus Cole (2001, 40) notes that early Merina occupation didn't radically change life on the eastern coast, as local princes were largely granted autonomy in exchange for recognizing Radama as their 'father' and for accepting a Merina governor to rule over them. Merina intrusion amplified under Queen Ranaivalona mid-century, as efforts to counter French influence led the monarchy to impose new districts with forts.

## Method of Succession

Succession was hereditary within royal lineage – both males and females were eligible - with a key role played by nobility and army chief in the choice of a successor. For example, Queen Ranaivalona was put in place after the death of Radama because military leaders thought they could influence her. Ranaivalona was then succeeded by her son, who she named as her successor (Deschamps, 1965, 164, 173).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.82 Moronou, 1730-1907

### Overview

Federation of nine micro-states, with each micro-state or province run by the oldest member of the ruling lineage. Each province head was assisted by a council of notables, with this system replicated across levels of the kingdom. All micro-states were structurally equal and formed a council that ruled with the king (*blengbi*) who held the throne. The council had no executive power and only met rarely, however, generally during crises (Ekanza, 2016a, 42-3). Moronou was declining in the 19th century; as the polity's micro-states demanded more autonomy at the same time that a series of succession disputes undermined the center's ability to hold them together (Ekanza, 2016a, 109).

### Social Segmentation

Power linked to genealogical ties to the Ebrosa state. This made Ngatianou and its ruling lineage the first-rank micro-state. A lineage's ties to the migration founding the state thus structures power. Weaker lineages often placed themselves under the 'protection' of stronger ones, acquiring a servile status (Ekanza, 2016b, 37-43).

### Surplus Extraction

Tribute was collected annually at the yam festival within each micro-state. Taxes were also collected on the ivory and gold trade (Ekanza, 2016a, 44-5). Tribute was also paid by each *famyen* as well as by dignitaries to the *blengbi*, who presented gifts to affirm their allegiance.

### Local Representation

Power was executed locally by *famyen*, or province heads and a governing council of notables that had well-defined tasks, e.g., councilors were responsible for justice, the military, state finances, etc. Execution of the council decisions lies with *famyen* and notables represent different lineages in the province (Ekanza, 2016a, 42).

## Method of Succession

The oldest member of lineage succeeds province head (*famyen*), with all micro-states run by families who could claim to have arrived together in first migrations. The kingship is in the matrilineage (Ekanza, 2016a, 63).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. The *blengbi* retained the allegiance of other micro-state leaders because he was seen as an intermediary with ancestors and invisible forces.

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation

## Sources

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## 4.83 Mossi Kingdoms, late 15thc-1896

*Boulssa, Boussouma, Busu, Darigma, Gourma, Kayao, Konkistenga, Kupela, Mane, Nysega, Ouagadougou, Ratenga, Riziam, Tema, Tenkodogo, Yako, Yatenga, Zitenga*

## Overview

Mossi kingdoms ruled by a *Naba* with a shared mythical descent from Ouedraogo and Oubri, the founders of the Mossi nation. Over time, lineage segmentation gave rise to different kingdoms and districts as conflicts over sovereignty arose (Skinner, 1989, 15). The *Naba* of the four large kingdoms - Ouagadougou, Yatenga, Tenkodogo and Fada N'Gourma - were all independent, with many of the smaller polities recognizing the supremacy of Ouagadougou though retaining effective autonomy (Skinner, 1989, 33, 63). In each, the *Naba* ruled with ministers, who had well-defined roles and were often in charge of specific lineages or groups (e.g. blacksmiths). Although the Mossi kingdoms were able to capitalize on the Saharan trade, with six main caravan routes passed through the country (Skinner, 1989, 112), the Mossi had weaker commercial development than other polities in the Sahel belt (Izard, 1970, 385).

## Social Segmentation

Mossi society structured around a clear distinction between noble and commoner lineages with established social obligations on both ends (Skinner, 1989, 21).

## Surplus Extraction

Peasants pay in-kind tribute collected by district officials and Fulbe pay cattle (Skinner, 1989, 109-12, Zahan, 2018, 159. Market chiefs also collect dues and the *Naba* collect tolls on goods in transit through their territory in exchange for protection (Zahan, 2018, 158-9).

## Local Representation

Districts were the most important unit of any kingdom, with villages and hamlets attached to each. Districts and villages alike were administered by chiefs who were accountable upwards (Skinner, 1989, 26, 60). District or canton chiefs were selected by ministers of royal court, but canton chiefs often had more authority than court officials and ministers and were typically descendants of indigenous populations (Zahan, 2018, 161-5). thus while the *Naba* theoretically served as the ultimate judicial body, local chiefs retained substantial judicial autonomy (Adelaja, 1976). Throughout Mossi territories there remains an important distinction between power obtained through politics (immigrant political rulers) and earth chiefs (autochthonous populations) (Zahan, 2018, 157).

## Method of Succession

Important state positions were restricted to those who could claim descent from Ouedraogo and Oubri, the mythical founders of Mossi nation. Within patrilineage within kingdoms, e.g. in Yatenga, kingship transmitted from elder brother to younger brother or to eldest son of eldest brother of dead king (Zahan, 2018, 173).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. Any given *Naba's* claim to descent from founding ancestors associated them with supernatural powers (Skinner, 1989, 129).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.84 Moundang (Lere), mid-18th c-1894

### Overview

King (*go-Lere*) heads the state, ruling with two councils of elders that are responsible for maintaining ritual and political order. The first council represents different clans, particularly those that first settled in the area, while the second is chosen by the king to both advise him and serve his interests (Adler, 1987, 141-3).

### Social Segmentation

Kings and princes have substantial political and social authority, as do lineage/clan heads. Slavery exists (see Adler, 1982, 138-9).

### Surplus Extraction

Peulhs residing in Moundang territory have livestock taxed by king (Kari, 2015, 56, fn. 81). Adler (1982, 77-9) suggests that extraction from subjects is minimal, but the king maintains an effective monopoly on the trade of slaves (used as labor on king's farms or redistributed to notables), horses and prestige goods like cowries or certain tissues. Traders paid tax or toll in territory.

### Local Representation

King appoints sons to villages and thus rules via royal princes. Village chieftaincy inherited from indigenous lineages, but their political authority is bestowed upon them ceremonially from their reception by the king in Lere (Adler, 1987, 143-4). At local level, the clan is the key source of social organization and it is the clan that organizes important rituals (Kari, 2015, 126).

### Method of Succession

Patrilineal with sons - often the oldest - succeeding father. Sons who do not inherit essentially lose their royal status and are integrated into the villages where they were posted (Adler, 1987, 148, 168).

### State Ideology

Divine Kingship

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.85 Nafana, 1760-1844

### Overview

Dyula monarchy in northwestern Cote d'Ivoire that formed astride north-south trade routes. Nafana was destroyed by Vakaba Toure in 1848, who established Kabadougou in its territory (O'Sullivan, 1976, 9). Nafana was ruled by the Diarrassouba clan, though not much is known about the polity.

### Social Segmentation

The Diarrassouba clan dominated political power. Slavery was present in the region and the Dyula have occupational castes that structure access to power and economic sectors (O'Sullivan, 1976, 91).

### Surplus Extraction

Taxes were collected on trade (O'Sullivan, 1976, 90).

### Local Representation

At its peak, Nafana is estimated to have controlled 170 villages (see Toungara, 1980), but seems to have been a loose association between member of the Diarrasouba clan, who implanted themselves in the region after chasing out the autochthonous Senufo.

### Method of Succession

Within Diarrassouba clan; other details unknown.

### State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.86 Ndebele, c.1838-1894

### Overview

Polity founded by Mzilikazi, the grandson of Zwide (Ngwande) who battled [Shaka](#). Mzilikazi rebelled against Shaka by refusing to deliver all cattle captured during a raid and fled northward. Mzilikazi and his followers traveled for over twenty years northward before settling in Zimbabwe, where they occupied the territory of [Rozvi](#). In some ways, Ndebele was a successor state to Rozvi, even if the ruling lineage itself was a newcomer to the territory. Ndebele's influence was more limited than Rozvi and some local populations, e.g. the Kalanga, did not have absolute loyalty outside of raids or tribute and continued to live on their own ([Msindo, 2012](#), 47-8). The king was permanently seated in the capital and ruled with an inner court circle, comprised of councilors and his close kin and confidants. Councilors have delegates in major administrative posts and settlements. For example, *Mncumbata* was a prominent official who maintained contact with foreigners and took part in supervision of borders, collecting information through spies ([Livneh, 1976](#), 299-300). The king's legitimacy was tied to redistribution of wealth to subordinates, e.g. Mzilikazi and Lobengula kept secular power by redistributing cattle and land ([Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008](#), 390). Mzilikazi brought along the Zulu age-set system, which had unmarried young men reside in special settlements that kept fighting groups easily mobilized ([Livneh, 1976](#), 315).

### Social Segmentation

Ndebele (or Zansi) and many Sotha who followed them north were core followers of Mzilikazi. Hereditary, caste divisions separated Ndebele from other groups and were estimated at 15% of the population in 1880; enhla or Sotho estimated at 25% and indigenous Shona comprised the rest of the population ([Chanaiwa, 1976](#), 60-1). Ndebele assured political power, early on through military prowess, but later a stratum of elite Ndebele families dominated the state and captives were also present in the society ([Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008](#), 384).

### Surplus Extraction

Tribute was either brought to the court annually or, for those farther away, was paid when an Ndebele tribute collecting party came along ([Livneh, 1976](#), 321).

### Local Representation

Ndebele had four provinces (Amahlope, Amakanda, Iqaba, and Amabuto), each with clearly demarcated boundaries ([Chanaiwa, 1976](#), 56). Messengers ensured contact between the center and periphery, traveling by feet. Territorial chiefs had a fair amount of authority, due in part to their wealth and kings often married women from influential families to tie them into the monarchy ([Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008](#), 384). Royal women were often posted to provincial towns as intermediaries because their gender prevented them from usurping power. The most powerful queen of each provincial town was called *unina Womuzi*, serving a symbolic role and channeling information to the court ([Cobbing, 1974](#), 622). Age-set system fostered national identity downwards as *amabutho* integrated and structured society, but local chieftaincies remained key organization of the state ([Cobbing, 1974](#), 608).

### Method of Succession

Power was hereditary and confined to the royal house. No clear rules for succession existed, however. Mzilikazi, the polity's founder, died with no named successor, creating significant competition and rivalry between families and leads



to a civil war when Mbiko challenges Lobengula for leadership (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008, 384-5).

## State Ideology

Conquest

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

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## 4.87 Ngonde, c.16th c-1894

Polity headed by a king (*Kyungu*) which alternated between two royal families from different ethnic groups. The king ruled with powerful councilors as the kingdom prospered from the ivory trade, particularly the Swahili caravans in the second half of the 19th century (Kalinga, 1985, 89, 126). Still, Nguni incursions from the south in the late 1800s and increased pressure from the Hehe in the north put pressure on Ngonde, exacerbating tensions between the *kyungu* and subordinate princes (Kalinga, 1985, 114).

## Social Segmentation

Power concentrated in the two royal lineages, the Ngana and Kerenge (Kalinga, 1985, 100).

## Surplus Extraction

Peasants paid tributes in foodstuffs and were expected to provide labor in royal fields, with the lesser nobles collecting tribute from their subjects. The *Kyungu* retained the rights to certain things, such as the right tusk of all elephants killed by hunters (Wilson, 1939, 39-42).

## Local Representation

Overtime, a network of territorial noble families emerged that represented the king locally. As this class of princes emerged, however, they came to have more authority in managing areas outside Mbande (Wilson, 1939, 12), with the surplus of princes being put in place as provincial governors (Kalinga, 1985, 92). This means that by the 19th century, there were four kinds of political units: a) chiefdoms ruled by hereditary chiefs related to the *Kyungu* and b) fiefs ruled by unrelated hereditary nobles, with these two types prominent in the plains, and in the hills c) fiefs ruled by hereditary nobles and d) chiefdoms of the two royal houses (Wilson p. 22). Under these were villages and family units. King would only hear cases of treason and insubordination, with the great chief of a territory hearing other cases (Wilson, 1939, 57).

## Method of Succession

*Kyungu* and other great chiefdoms were passed to men constitutionally chosen from appropriate families, not to immediate heirs. Nobles of Ngonde discuss the successor amongst themselves (Wilson, 1939, 52).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship; power was imbued in the royal ancestor-cult, leading kings to be seen as divine ruler, though this fades in importance over time (Kalinga, 1985, 65-6, 154).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.88 Ngoyo, c.1700-1830s

### Overview

Ngoyo paid tribute to Loanga through the 17th century, but gained independence through its ability to command the slave trade. Kongo, Loanga and Ngoyo maintained trade and political cooperation even after independence given shared language and religious ethos (Sommerdyk, 2012, 141). The king (*mankoyo*) ruled from the capital where he was sequestered. Over time, the state reorient itself towards the bay, with coastal trade managed by king's agents. This means that economic power is often on the coast, while political power is in the interior. Although the king is assisted by a royal council, clans ultimately provide structure to the socio-political order (Mulinda, 1993, 6-9). Ngoyo collapses in the 1830s after it fails to appoint a king due to rivalries between powerful families that leads the kingdom to disintegrate. In following decades, families became the site of political power since no one wanted to be elected King because the title imposed enormous burdens as the real gains came to be had on the coast (Martin, 1970, 70).

## Social Segmentation

The socio-political basis of the state are clans, with a series of grand families dominating power. These clans also structure material accumulation (Mulinda, 1993, 6-7).

## Surplus Extraction

Ngoyo relies heavily on revenue from the coastal trade, though taxes were collected domestically as well (Martin, 1970, 69, 49).

## Local Representation

Officials, such as *mambouk* and *mafouk*, were posted in villages on Cabinda Bay to oversee the Coastal trade and were quite powerful (Martin, 1970, 69). The *Mafouk* were pointmen for European traders while *Mambouk* oversaw the *mafouk* and acted as liaisons with the king (Sommerdyk, 2012, 141).

## Method of Succession

Kings (mostly) come from three prominent families, as do *mambouks* on the bay. Mulinda (1993) argues that monarchy was hereditary until it switched to an elective system among eligible families in the late 18th century. Even if this date is imprecise, the nature of Ngoyo's breakdown suggests it was definitely not hereditary by the early 1800s since no clan wanted the post.

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. Volvaka (1998) argues against seeing Ngoyo as a case of divine kingship since the king himself was not divine, only his authority was. Still, the *Mankoyo* was a spiritual figure.

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.89 Nkomi, late 1700s-1892

### Overview

King (*rengondo*) ruled, in collaboration with a council of title chiefs who were chosen from among the nobility, or powerful clans. The Queen mother plays an important role. Among the king's principal jobs was settling inter-clan disputes (Gaulme, 1981, 244, 226); biannual meetings were held on the Ondjingo plain where the *rengondo* traditionally heard cases (Gaulme, 1974, 412). Nkomi developed around the slave trade and was in decline during the 19th century as a result of in-fighting and the declining coastal trade (Gray, 1995, 97). Nkomi was often in conflict with Orungu for control over the coastal trade, but by the end of the century remained stronger than Orungu (Gaulme, 1981, 219).

### Social Segmentation

Clans organized hierarchically under the royal dynasty, with subjugated groups treated as vassals of the royal clan. The coastal trade exacerbated the social hierarchy as elites grew rich from trade. Slavery exists in Nkomi (Gaulme, 1981, 244, 177, 205).

### Surplus Extraction

State official appointed to coastal trading points and taxed traders (Gaulme, 1981, 177-180).

### Local Representation

Village and clan heads administered land and managed their own territories. Balance between clans was critical for the polity and each clan retained substantial autonomy (Gray, 1995, 152).

### Method of Succession

The king came from the Apogo clan and was elected from among potential contenders by clan and village heads (Ambouroue-Avaro, 1981, 186).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship; *Rengondo* endowed with spiritual powers (Gaulme, 1981, 219).

### Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

### Sources

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## 4.90 Nkore, 15th c-1901

### Overview

A Banyankore monarchy ruled by the *mugabe* (pl. *omugabe*), who was always a leader from the Bahinda clan (Pirouet, 1995, 66). The *mugabe* was considered to have divine powers, but there were numerous restrictions on his power and many groups and individuals participated in decision making (e.g. *mugabe's* mother, sister and senior chief) with the result that “the system depended heavily on reaching agreement between the political elite” (Doornbos, 1975, 32-3, 40). A *mugabe's* power rested on his use of patronage, notably appointments of state functionaries and the distribution of war booty (Karugire, 1971, 104-5). Nkore was expanding, especially toward the north and west as its neighbors weakened on the eve of colonization (Kirindi, 2008, 1).

### Social Segmentation

Power restricted to Bahinda clan and agriculturalists were considered social lessers of pastoralists. Karugire (1971, 66) describes Nkore as a class society, with possession of cattle weighing heavily on one's social status. The ruling class thus drew from wealthy Bahima, whose wealth was measured in cattle.

### Surplus Extraction

*Abakungu*, a specific chiefly title, collected tribute and were responsible for public works (building of public palaces, for *mugabe* and chiefs) (Karugire, 1971, 204). Cattle were a common form of tribute to the ruling “cattle herding” clan in the kingdom (Kirindi, 2008, 3) and sub-chiefs and household heads would visit royal courts, bringing gifts (bulls or productive cows from pastoralists, crops and beer from farmers), all with an eye to ensuring ‘visibility’ and loyalty to court (Karugire, 1971, 64).

### Local Representation

The *Mugabe* appointed chiefs to administer regions within the kingdom. The *emitwe* were the most important political figures below the *Mugabe*, and commanded military units across the territory, with *emitwe* serving as the top regional administrators. The *mugabe* could appoint and dismiss officials at will and he was in principle very powerful. In practice, most *mugabe* were circumspect in their use of these rights, and consulted with clan heads who were conduits of information and who administered justice locally (the *Mugabe* retained ultimate judicial authority) (Karugire, 1971, 6-7, 106-16). Clans had personal connections with the king, who bestowed patronage downwards, effectively generating a common allegiance to the *mugabe* (Karugire, 1971, 163). As a result, the political structure was fragile, with the king providing a sense of unity through his personal qualities (Doornbos, 1975, 34, 36)..

### Method of Succession

Traditionally succession passed from father to eldest son, but sometimes other sons or nephews of the previous *mugabe* could be chosen with clan elders ultimately making the decision on who would be the next king (Kirindi, 2008, 13). Morris (1957, 13) describes the death of a king as producing a “customary scramble for power among the princes.”

### State Ideology

Divine kingship (Doornbos, 1975, 32). Because the political system was highly vulnerable to fragmentation, a *mugabe's* ability to give an aura of higher sanction helped command acceptance and enactment (Doornbos, 1975, 44). This was evidenced in the role of the royal drum (Karugire, 1971).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

### Sources

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## 4.91 Nso (Nsaw), 14th c.-1901

### Overview

Nso (Banso) confederacy in the Cameroonian Grasslands. *Fon* rules with help of state officials, particularly the seven *vibai*, who were influential on state policy making. *Vibai* were traditional lineage heads with hereditary titles (Aletum Tabuwé and Fisiy, 1989, 36-9). In addition to the role of officials, the political system had spiritual checks and balances. A *fon* who is seen as violating traditional norms understood to be annoying ancestors and punishable by them (Masquelier, 1993, 444).

### Social Segmentation

Lineage heads retained significant socio-political and economic authority, e.g. many participated in the slave trade (Nkwi and Warner, 1982, 147), more so than in other kingdoms of the Bamenda grasslands (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 119). Regulatory societies also existed, which linked commoners to nobility (Aletum Tabuwé and Fisiy, 1989, 50-51).

### Surplus Extraction

Village chiefdoms under Nso paid tribute and the *fon* demanded their regality and that they surrender their authority over making war and executing criminals. All villages were additionally required to provide labor (Nkwi and Warner, 1982, 135).

### Local Representation

Confederate chiefdoms that had been conquered by Nso retained their hereditary dynasties and were allowed substantial autonomy in the management of local affairs, with the *fon* retaining control of war-making and capital punishment (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 116). In addition, there were many independent village-level *fons* who paid tribute (Aletum Tabuwé and Fisiy, 1989, 36). Nso's leaders used marriage as a means to consolidate power, with founding lineage using marriage to gain acceptance and support from other populous lineages; this was a means to tie themselves to potential rivals. For instance, the Ndzendzev lineage granted one daughter in marriage to the royal family, creating a powerful

bond and making the Ndzendzev Duiy, or those that were considered the Fon's family by affinity. Marriage was also a common diplomatic tool (Aletum Tabuwé and Fisiy, 1989, 24-5).

## Method of Succession

Succession was in patrilineal line, but only some sons were eligible for succession, for instance it was required that their mother must be free-born (Chilver and Kaberry, 1970, 255). A council of electors selected the next *fon* from among eligible sons (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 125).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. Like other kingdoms in the Bamenda grasslands, the *fon* was the head of all associations, including spiritual ones and state cults (Chilver and Kaberry, 1966, 124). Aletum Tabuwe and Fisey (1989, 35) note that not although the *fon* himself was not divine, he was seen as the link between living and dead.

## Elite Structure Typology

Federation

## Sources

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## 4.92 Nyamwezi Politics, 1850s-1895

*Mirambo, Nyungu ya Mawe*

### Overview

Arguably polities-in-formation that were emerging in Tanzania in previously uncentralized areas. These states are consolidating in the late 1800s as they capture more rents from the caravan trade and larger political units become a means of securing allegiance and enforcing authority (Roberts, 1968, 131). Mirambo's state was heavily reliant on his military

power, but Nyungu-ya-Mawe created a class of territorial governors – *mutwale* - that were more politically entrenched. As a result, Mirambo's state was more vulnerable after his death because power depended more heavily on his *ruga-ruga* – or warriors – who were only loyal as long as they were receiving booty (Roberts, 1968, 138). Nyungu-ya-Mawe in contrast integrated thirty separate Kimbu groups into the polity and proved quite stable. Because *mutwale* and descendants were loyal to Nyungu-ya-Mawe, the state survived until the Germans broke it up in 1895 (Bennett, 1971, 163). These states were fighting each other for much of their existence, resulting in fluid borders as territory shifted.

## Social Segmentation

Warriors and traders hold political and economic power.

## Surplus Extraction

Tribute was paid in kind or ivory and Mirambo was receiving tribute quite regularly and he and others extracted heavy tolls on caravans. He also conscripted young men to serve in army (Roberts, 1968, 134, Kabeya, 1976, 35).

## Local Representation

As states-in-information, both rely heavily on local dynasties, though Mirambo often posted men in or near conquered villages to ensure obedience and guard the frontier as the state spread outwards. Chiefs who did not comply were replaced (Roberts, 1968, 134). Nyungu-ya-Mawe combined the chiefdoms he conquered and placed *watwaale* representatives at the head of each. This structure outlived Nyungu and only collapsed after conquest (Koponen, 1988, 202). The well-being of land and people was thought to depend on the chief's physical health and observance of rituals. Chiefs had subordinates, including councilors, priests, headmen, etc. some of which were hereditary and some appointed (Roberts, 1968, 119). By the mid-19th century, local chiefs ruled with trained troops at their hand, though chiefs continued to fulfill ritual functions (Abrahams, 2007, 39).

## Method of Succession

Patrilineal descent from the 19th century on, though some groups had been matrilineal before that (Abrahams, 2007, 38). Mirambo, however, was succeeded by a younger brother.

## State Ideology

Conquest

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.93 Orungu, c.1700-1882

### Overview

Ruled by a king, or *Ogoa*, Orungu became increasingly despotic as the slave trade cemented the state's power, but a council of clan heads and titled dignitaries remained key institutions of the state (Ambouroue-Avaro, 1981, 144). One official was appointed to a sort of ministry of foreign affairs (e.g. with Europeans), but less is known about any other ministers (Patterson, 1975, 76). By the 19th century, Orungu was declining, in large part due to the abolition of the slave trade and growing French presence along the coast (Patterson, 1975, 74-5). This led clans to claim more autonomy at the expense of the center. The polity did see a brief revival following the creation of plantations on Sao Tomé and Príncipe in late 1800s and renewed French interest as Orungu became the key to trade along the Ogowé river (Patterson, 1975, 140).

### Social Segmentation

Most significant slave exporters in the region (Patterson, 1975, 68), which undermined and reconstituted the social fabric (Ambouroue-Avaro, 1981, 137). Clans remain structuring factor in society and one's position in one's clan and one's clans position in the polity shaped access to political and economic power.

### Surplus Extraction

Taxes were collected on coastal trade and from broader economy. For example, the king collected one piece of ivory per elephant (Ambouroue-Avaro, 1981, 143).

### Local Representation

Clan and sub-clan leaders as well as village-chiefs exist below the king, though they had little authority independent of that granted by the king (Patterson, 1975, 76).

### Method of Succession

King was elected by chiefs of clans from among the sons and brothers of the deceased on the maternal side. The Council of elders was particularly influential in this decision (Ambouroue-Avaro, 1981, 144). European slavers at times also influence this selection. But, once elected, kings were quite powerful (Patterson, 1975, 75).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. The king had ritual and religious power – was believed to be able to predict disasters (Patterson, 1975, 75).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.94 Ouaddai, 1630-1909

### Overview

Sultan, or *melik*, rules with the assistance of important military chiefs, who each have their own independent authority as rich and influential descendants of noble, ethnically Maba families. Most powerful of these chiefs is the *Grand Ecuyer*, but *aqid des Salamat*, traditionally a slave, also influential (Zeltner, 1988, 4-6). Sultan renders justice from the palace with councilors (El-Tounsy, 1851, 265, 363). Although Ouaddai's core was ethnically Maba and it was among the Maba that attachment to the state was strongest, Fresnel (1849, 18) counted at least ten languages spoken in the kingdom in mid-1800s. Ouaddai benefited from shifts in lucrative Saharan caravan routes away from Fur and Bornu in the early 1800s (Cordell, 1977, 30-4), which facilitated the state's expansion as the Sultan facilitates Sanussian traders. Thus, Triaud (1996, 9) argues Ouaddai under Muhammad Sharif (1835-1858) and his son Ali (1858-74) the state was at its peak.

### Social Segmentation

Aristocracy controls political, economic and social life. Slavery exists in the polity as, apparently, does caste as Nachtigal observes that blacksmiths were caste (Nachtigal, 1971 (1889, 179).

### Surplus Extraction

Territorial governors and vassals pay tribute to the sultan, seemingly in kind, and are expected to visit the capital upon the enthronement of a new Sultan (El-Tounsy, 1851, e.g. LXXIII, 143). Nachtigal (1971 (1889, 174, 179-82) similarly describes customary tribute rights collected by provincial heads and various territorial administrators, often in kind, but including *zakat* and *fitra* at the end of Ramadan. *Aqa'id*, the important military chiefs, collected their own tribute (Zeltner, 1988, 4). Al Tounsy (1851, 472-3) chronicles how the Sultan received a set quota of slaves captured during raids. It is unclear if the Sultan taxed the Sanoussian trade across the desert, but this certainly proved profitable for the Sultan and it is known that some traded items, e.g. ivory, were paid to the Sultan (Nachtigal, 1971 (1889, 182). Still, Triaud (1996, 17) observes that the Sultan offered gifts to the Sanussiyya traders as well, in recognition of their role in the trans-Saharan trade, estimated around 5% of the value of caravans.

### Local Representation

Ouaddai was divided into provinces, each of which was headed by a governor appointed by the sultan, who paid tribute upward (Burckhardt, 1822, Appendix II). For example, Al-Tounsy (1851, 60, 364) met with provincial governors, the *Aguid-el-Sabah* (there was also an *Aguid-el-Gharb*, governor of the Western province), when he entered Ouaddai from Dar Fur, from whom he was obliged to obtain permission to travel into country. Under each provincial governor there were district governors and tributary chiefs. Nachtigal (1971 (1889, 177-80) writes that royal princes were sent to monitor

provinces and villages and describes a layered system of authority in provinces. The Sultan's authority was felt clearly in the provinces. Nachtigal (1971 (1889, 70-1) also documented that his departure to Darfur was delayed because the Sultan of Ouaddai, upon hearing that the Sultan of Darfur had died, has closed the road between the two kingdoms out of fear that the inevitable succession battle to succeed the Sultan would generate tumult and trouble relations between the two states.

## Method of Succession

Succession is father to son, and Zeltner (1988, 1) implies that important military chiefs choose among eligible sons. Only the son of a Sultan and a noble woman (from the five privileged clans or tribes) could inherit the throne since the lineage of an enslaved mother was unknown (El-Tounsy, 1851, 362).

## State Ideology

Islamic theocracy

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.95 Oualo (Walo), 1630-1855

### Overview

Wolof kingdom in Senegal that gains independence in 1630 when it stops paying tribute to [Djoloff](#). The Oualo is led by the *brak*, who is elected by a council of electors and rules with influential advisors, including the *Diogmaye*, *Diaoudine* and *Malo*, who together serve as the *Seb ak Baouar*, an assembly for the election, coronation and deposition of a *Brak*. These three dignitaries each came from one of the first three noble (*meen*) families, though there is some debate about whether electors pulled more broadly from eight notable families in Walo or just these three (Coifman, 1969, 207). *Brak* thus had theoretically absolute power, but in reality was limited by members of *Seb ak baour* and the rights held by other social actors, even casted members (Barry, 1972, 77). Oualo's Close proximity to French traders in Saint Louis means that

the Oualo sees more French intervention early on. Thus while at its peak the Oualo straddled the Senegal river, growing pressure for neighbors - [Fouta Toro](#) to the east, the French to the West and Maures to the north, gradually eroded its extent.

## Social Segmentation

Wolof society is structured by a strong caste system, with nobles, freemen, slaves and caste professions. Social, political and economic advancement heavily restricted to nobles. Oualo's political structure closely mirrors social structure with family lineage determining political and social opportunity (Barry, 1972, 72).

## Surplus Extraction

Clear tax structure, including taxes on trade, fishing and agricultural production and for those crossing the river at Dagana. *Brak* entitled to part of all war booty (Coifman, 1969, 206). Annual festival, the *Gamu*, brought together different chiefs of the kingdom to receive yearly tribute (Barry, 1972, 76).

## Local Representation

Local nobility serve as territorial title-holders and exercise direct authority in their territory, with all large family lineages having political chiefs who represent them. As Oualo's territory is encroached upon by neighbors, the authority of many territorial land holders shrinks (Barry, 1972, 78-9). Although the *Brak* is the supreme judicial authority, lineage heads, landowners and ethnic minority or caste leaders administered justice at lower levels (Barry, 1972, 81-2). The base social unit was the village, each of which was headed by a chief, who would pay tribute to territorial title-holders. A smaller number of large villages had direct administrative oversight (Barry, 1972, 240-1).

## Method of Succession

*Brak* always chosen within the Mbodj patrilineage, but not hereditary father-to-son. The mother of any eligible candidate was obliged to come from one of three *meen* families, Loggar, Dyoos or Teedyek. A new *Brak* was then elected from all eligible members, with the goal of finding the most capable (Barry, 1972, 73). Three meetings were held to name a new ruler and at the third, voice was granted to the crown slaves. In the interim, court officials like the *Diaoudioune* or *Diogomaye* managed the military and land respectively (Coifman, 1969, 208).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. *Brak* traditionally had a sacred authority to bring abundance to the country, though this role had weakened by the 1800s; Oualo did not have a cult of authority, e.g. no annual festivals apart from *Gamu*, so a more moderate divine kingship than seen elsewhere (Barry, 1972, 75-6).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.96 Ovimbundu, early 1700s-1890s

### Overview

There were several Ovimbundu kingdoms, of which Bailundu was the largest. The kingdoms were more or less stable in territory and number by end of 18th century, but sub-chiefdoms do appear to have been expanding (Edwards, 1962, 11). In each, a king (*soba*) ruled in consultation with other elites. Specifically, three origins of the Ovimbundu were represented on the council: the *Mwekalia* and the *Galamboli* represented the indigenous, pre-Jaga population, the *Kesongo* was the war leader, a slave from another tribe, and the *Otjinduli* was of immigrant stock (Edwards, 1962, 13). The power of the king varied, but kings could declare war and raise armies, were the final word in court, could raise taxes and appoint certain officials (Heywood, 1984, 197). Social control was exerted through a kinship system and peace between Ovimbundu kingdoms must have relied on marriage ties across kingdoms and royal houses to support caravan trade (Edwards, 1962, 18).

### Social Segmentation

Aristocracy controls political power. Childs (1949, 204-5) notes economic specialization of different kingdoms, e.g. Ndulu in Ironworks, Ngalangi in Cattle, etc.

### Surplus Extraction

The king had the power to enforce tribute and labor service. Kings and other authorities, like *Sekulus* (village chiefs, represented before king by *erombe sekulu*, for each subchiefdom), could tax citizens. Foreigners were also taxed, including Portuguese traders (Heywood, 1984, 197, 83-6). Heywood (1984, 70, fn10) notes the existence of *ocibanda*, originally a toll tax but which by the 18th century was a gift to the *soba* in exchange for the *soba's* help.

### Local Representation

Variation across kingdoms, but in each local lower nobility controlled local land and could select sites for new villages (Heywood, 1984, 198). Bailundu was divided into 200 sub-chiefdoms, with some headed by ministers or relatives of the king, though their amount of autonomy was unclear (Edwards, 1962, 11). Subchiefs judged cases with a court of titled ministers and some village headmen and represented their populations externally as well as led communal rituals. Subchiefdoms had cross-cutting relations with a partner sub chiefdom, with whom they traveled to pay their yearly tribute, e.g. in Bailundu (Edwards, 1962, 13). In Viye, districts were controlled by hereditary family lineages, while in Bailundu rulers could be removed, but not selected, by a court of nobles (Heywood, 1984, 193). Heywood (1984, Chpt 5) describes most of these kingdoms as loosely centralized in the mid-19th century, but as some *soba* tried to centralize power, conflict emerges between the center and local nobility, undermining state strength.

### Method of Succession

For both subchiefdoms and kings, individuals passed through a series of rites to become chief/king. To be eligible, an individual had to be of chiefly stock (of patrilineal or matrilineal descent from former chief). The *Mwekalia*, or kingmaker, represented the people vis-à-vis the king, and was critical in selection. Edwards cites a local saying “the chief is a guest, the *Mwekalia* is a man of the country” (Edwards, 1962, 12). Still, there was variation. In Viye, eligible candidates descended from the female line with electors from lesser nobility not eligible for succession. But in Bailundu there was no election, the crown was hereditary within the female line and the ruling king would choose a successor (Heywood, 1984, 192-3).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship. The Ovimbundu polities centralized around the caravan trade, but the ideological role provided by the *kimbanda*, who provided spiritual guidance to the state, was key (Heywood, 1984, 199-202) and the king held an important spiritual role via ancestors (Childs, 1949, 20).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.97 Owambo, early 19th c -1915

### Overview

Series of polities - including Kwanhama, Ondongo, Ukwami, Ombandja - ruled by kings who administered with councils. Councils were comprised of district and ward heads, high priests and heads of key economic centers, such as salt pans and mines, with each king choosing his own councilors (Williams, 1991, 105-6). Hayes (1992, 52) argues that kings are centralizing power over time, thus that when King Mweshipandeka of Kwanhama refused to ceremonial circumcision when he ascended the throne, he established his dominance over lineage elders. These polities were declining by the turn of the century. As long-distance trade increased, so did rivalries among kings and their *omalenga*, who themselves grew

more powerful from trade (Hayes, 1992, 51). In particular, they did so by providing local justice, with trade increasing bottom-up demand for dispute adjudication.

## Social Segmentation

Ruling clan dominates economy and political sphere.

## Surplus Extraction

Long-distance trade in ivory, cattle, captives, salt and iron ore generated significant rents for rulers from the 1850s onward, with kings retaining a monopoly on key commodities (Dobler, 2008, 15). Peasants effectively paid taxes through cattle raids on subjects, but by the late 1800s these had become violent and extortionary (Kreike, 1996, 25-8). Peasants also had to provide obligatory labor in elites fields and rulers demanded 'gifts' from traders (Hayes, 1992, 46, 86).

## Local Representation

Locally, *omalenga*, regional elites served as royal retainers in provinces, with village headmen administering at the village level. The ruling monarchies' raiding systems financed their ability to expand power, as horses, firearms, ammunition and brandy were all distributed downward to maintain locally loyalty (Kreike, 1996, 26-7). Tensions between the center and periphery were a defining feature of the Ovambo polities, which were divided into *oshikandjo*, or districts, with an *omalenga* appointed to each. *Omalenga* were either members of the royal clan, relatives of the king, or individuals appointed by the current or past monarch (Hayes, 1992, 48).

## Method of Succession

Within royal clan. Upon a monarch's death, the chief minister administered as interim ruler as the next leader was chosen. Princes were eligible through the maternal line (Williams, 1991, 101-2). Once inaugurated, a monarch could not leave their land, so diplomacy and war were conducted by emissaries (Dobler, 2008).

## State Ideology

Conquest. Polities were incipient military states, with a king's reputation bolstered when they displayed strong military power and could raid captives and slaves. Kings did employ religious officials to engage in rain-making activities, but no evidence of a systematic religious system across polity (Hayes, 1992, 58-60).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.98 Porto Novo (Hogbonou), 1690-1908

### Overview

Ethnically Gun state with considerable Yoruba population that was headed by a King who ruled with 20 hereditary councilors. There were seven principle ministers which 'constituted the real boundaries' of the kingdom and protected the material and moral domains of the king (Akindélé and Aguessy, 1953, 43). Porto Novo was heavily involved in the Atlantic slave trade, serving as an intermediary between Dahomey to the north and Europeans; Porto Novo itself an important slave market (Pineau-Jamous, 1986, 551).

### Social Segmentation

Guan were lineage based with hierarchies within and between lineages. *Hennou*, or those who could trace their descent from Porto Novo's founder, were considered superior and dominated political power. Below this were commoners and slaves (*kannoumon*) (Videgla, 1999, 285-8).

### Surplus Extraction

Taxes are collected at markets and one royal councilor, the *ahigan*, is responsible for its collection (Videgla, 1999, 249). Prisoners and slaves worked on the king's royal farms and lineage and vassal chiefs collected tribute to forward to the capital (Videgla, 1999, 262-4).

### Local Representation

Porto Novo largely preserved the political structures of populations they conquered or incorporated (Videgla, 1999, 251). Lineage heads and/or local chiefs maintained local authority and managed family death cults and spiritual matters; these were often the oldest male in the family (Akindélé and Aguessy, 1953, 94-5). Local temple personnel also held local power (Akindélé and Aguessy, 1953, 112-3).

### Method of Succession

Kingship rotates among five royal branches of the royal lineage, all of which descended from the founder. Once the death of a king was officially announced, candidates presented themselves. Then ministers and notables deliberated in closed-quarters in a temple and voted (Akindélé and Aguessy, 1953, 35, 42).

### State Ideology

Divine kingship. Videgla (1999, 206) clarifies that the king was not himself considered divine, as in some neighboring kingdoms, but he was seen as in dialogue with the ancestors and hence had spiritual powers. Notables and ministers also took part in rituals to reinforce spiritual value of their power (e.g. Akindélé and Aguessy, 1953, 54).

### Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

### Sources

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## 4.99 Quiteve, 1560-1830s

### Overview

Polity led by a King (*kiteve/sachiteve*), that largely imitated the structure of Mwenmutapa. The *sachiteve* and his council were the center of state and each *sachiteve* appointed his councilors (Mtetwa, 1984, 110-11), e.g. *Tateguru* or the 'father of the king' was the arbiter of all matters affecting the Teve (Mtetwa, 1984, 127). In early 1800s, Quiteve was ruled by queens who do not appoint a *sachiteve* until 1808. Quiteve was in early contact with the Portuguese, with some evidence suggesting that at numerous points, e.g. in the 1600s, the Portuguese were directly influencing who was elected *sachiteve* (Newitt, 2017, 95). In the early 1800s, Portuguese traders were permanently posted at the royal court and trade caravans, trafficking ivory, iron and gold, regularly connected the interior to the Portuguese on the coast. Trade declined dramatically following the famines of the 1820s, further amplifying Quiteve's decline (Newitt, 2017, 290-1). Nguni raids in the 1830s undermined Quiteve's stability, and the state was already over-extended as it had incorporated new territories shortly before becoming beset by succession crises (Mtetwa, 1984, 239). By the mid-1800s, Quiteve had effectively disintegrated into territorial chiefdoms (Mtetwa, 1984, 323).

### Social Segmentation

Population historically divided between 'conquerors,' or Karangas and 'conquered,' often Tonga. Royal clan from the Karanga. Slavery present in the kingdom (Mtetwa, 1984, 104).

### Surplus Extraction

Villagers were required to work in the *sachiteve's* fields (Mtetwa, 1984, 128) and traditionally paid part of their millet harvest to the king (Roufe, 2016, 65). Portuguese traders paid tribute at Sofala and brought presents to Quiteve's court (Newitt, 2017, 94, 291) in addition to trade taxes collected more broadly in the kingdom (Boston, 1976, 186).

### Local Representation

The village, headed by a chief, was the basic administrative unit and fell under provinces which were led by governors (Mtetwa, 1984, 114). The Tonga often retained some autonomy in villages. Kinship groups also had heads responsible for the clan regardless of location (Mtetwa, 1984, 127). As Quiteve incorporated neighboring territories, *sachiteve* increasingly ruled through existing power structures (Mtetwa, 1984, 240-1). The *sachiteve* also appointed regents to *sembaza*, or markets (Boston, 1976, 186).

### Method of Succession

Princes could succeed the throne in one of three ways: the eldest son by any of the deceased *sachiteve* first two wives had first priority, creating a tendency towards linear succession. When this son was not qualified, it could go to the brother of the deceased. Third, it was possible for a nephew to inherit. Because the *sachiteve* appointed councilors and other chiefs, there was substantial interest in who was ultimately appointed (Mtetwa, 1984, 110-11), though the state increasingly saw prolonged succession struggles over time.

## State Ideology

Divine kingship (Mtetwa, 1984, Chpt 3). King was supported by chief priests for rites of national significance and these priests played an important role as advisors and defenders of tradition (Mtetwa, 1984, 115).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.100 Rozvi (Changamire), 1683-1838\*

### Overview

Shona kingdom founded by Changamire Dombo that was under considerable stress by the early 1800s, with many subsidiaries breaking off in late 1700s. The *Mambo*, or emperor, held executive, legislative and judicial powers. He was assisted in these duties by a council (*dare*), comprised of priests, military leaders and provincial governors as well as members from the royal families (Mudenge, 1974, 376-7). Religion, specifically the Mwari cult, was an integrative factor within the empire. The Mwari cult was not controlled by the *mambo*, however, and priests often checked a *mambo's* power (Mudenge, 1974, 382). Still, power of state largely derives from religious authority and, to a lesser extent, control over the region's rich resources (Sutherland-Harris, 1970, 263). Rozvi was far from a unified despotic organization, with state control over territory fluctuating and with power traveling between different centers (Sutherland-Harris, 1970, 244). Rozvi was ultimately toppled Ngoni invaders, leading the Ndebele to settle in the territory where they built a new state (Alpers, 1970, 203). State is coded at a more conservative extent to reflect the fact that only core regions (Danangombe, Manyanga, and Khami) were under its control in 19th century.

### Social Segmentation

Rozvi aristocracy, consisting of Rozvi royals, autochthonous chiefs, religious figures, and military officials, dominate state power.

## Surplus Extraction

The head of Tumbare clan held the office of chief collector of tribute, which was in principle annual and paid through vassal chiefs in gold, ivory, skin, cattle, cloth, beads, foodstuffs, etc. (Mudenge, 1974, 383). In reality, the fact that the army sometimes traveled to collect tribute from certain provinces suggests Rozvi was not sufficiently strong to demand tribute from all rulers at all times (Livneh, 1976, 291). Traders also paid taxes (Sutherland-Harris, 1970, 246-7).

## Local Representation

Province chiefs were hereditary, with the center exerting control over provincial chiefs through investiture ceremonies, whereby local chiefs went to the Rozvi court for approval and were then granted ceremonial gifts that conferred their legitimacy and authority. Rozvi further appointed regional governors or representatives to monitor the provinces (Mudenge, 1974, 382-3). Rozvi integrated autochthonous families, much of this was done through marriage (Livneh, 1976, 236-8). The base social unit in the area was the family or hut, who was under a household head and village heads (Mudenge, 1972, 139).

## Method of Succession

Patrilineal adelphic succession: the kingship went from brother to brother until it reverted to the first son of eldest brother, then son of next brother, etc. In practice, a candidate's support in court was critical in his success and sons could and did succeed their fathers. Still, Rozvi saw fewer succession crises than elsewhere in the region because the head of Tumbare dynasty served as regent when no successor was immediately apparent, allowing time for a new *mambo* to be elected. As a result, candidates that were in good favor with the Tumbare clan head were often strong candidates (Mudenge, 1974, 374-5).

## State Ideology

Hereditary monarchy

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.101 Rwanda, c.16thc-1897

### Overview

Monarchy led by a *Mwami* (Dorsey, 1994, 7). The kingdom was supported by a powerful royal court, whose authority consolidated in the 18th-19th century, employing increasingly elaborate rituals to legitimate itself overtime. Because court could bestow prestige and increasingly controlled material assets in society, the *Mwami* and royal court came to dominate the distribution of resources across the polity, effectively centralizing power in the process (Newbury, 2009, 210-1). This process generates strong state norms. For example, military units were not geographically concentrated, meaning that most members of the military spent time outside of their home regions, focusing the army around the court; while positions of authority were retained by Tutsi, the military incorporated virtually all social groups. Rwanda's army was a principal mechanism for incorporating new populations into the state's administrative structure. The presence of a standing army so structured thus served as a means of assimilation (even if limited) and helped spread the administration across the territory (Newbury, 2009, 209-11, 319). Rwanda was still expanding its territory at the onset of colonialism, with *Mwami* Rwabugiri's reign marked by a continued effort to capture states to the west (e.g. Bushi, Butembo). Although these campaigns were largely unsuccessful, they did serve to achieve internal political consolidation (Newbury, 2009, 333) even as the late 1800s saw significant rise in internal violence (Vansina, 2005, 181-3).

### Social Segmentation

The Rwandan state was defined by a rigid class system, both within the Tutsi, who dominated positions of power, as well as across ethnic groups. As the court centralized power, it increasingly excluded rewards from 'outsiders', which came to include the Hutu in addition to the Twa. For example, under Gahindiro in the early 1800s, the number of *abiiru*, or ritualists, was expanded tenfold, with new members drawn from the Tutsi aristocracy and allies of the court, reducing the power of Hutu ritualists considerably. During this time, clientelist relations between the court and commoners became more entrenched, particularly in relation to land access (Newbury, 2009, 327-30).

### Surplus Extraction

Hutu were required to pay tribute to the ruling Tutsi through cattle (Dorsey, 1994, 7). Booty from war and other forms of tribute were also given to the court (Newbury, 2009, 210). Peasants paid tribute through goods, e.g. baskets of sorghum and beans collected on an ad hoc basis (Chrétien, 2003, 180).

### Local Representation

Rwanda had a detailed and multileveled system of control. The *Mwami* appointed chiefs to each region of the kingdom (Murera, Bufumira, Bigogwe, Buberka, Rusenyi). From the early 19th century onward, *Mwami* began to appoint positions directly and refrain from making them hereditary, to minimize the emergence of autonomous power sources in the kingdom. Thus Rwabugiri in the late 19th century appointed his own administrative authorities who would depend on his favor and sought to check elite alliances by moving his capital (Newbury, 2009, 327, 332). In the regions with the highest percentage of Hutu people, there would be two chiefs, one of Hutu descent who would administer the region and one of Tutsi descent to deal with the cattle tribute for the king (Dorsey, 1994, 7). As Rwanda expanded its boundaries, both the military and early administrative structures served as alliance mechanisms and intermediaries between local population and court (Newbury, 2009, 323).

### Method of Succession

Dynastic succession involved mobilizing matrilineal kin, since it was the naming of the queen mother - and by extension the king - that was critical. The dynastic code prescribes alternating cycles of clans for the position of queen mother,

though in practice this is not upheld, with seven of the nine queen mothers following the reign of Rujugira came from the Abega clan. Most episodes of succession resulted in conflict (Newbury, 2009, 331).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship. Newbury cautions that we should moderate this term in the Rwanda case to 'sacral kingship' as the king's power and legitimacy was derived less from supernatural sources than from his role as a mediator between realms and groups, e.g. from integrating commoners and the natural world together rather than from something beyond or above society (Newbury, 2009, Chpt 10).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.102 Sakalava, late 15th c. -early 1800s/1885

*Menabe, Boina, Ambongo, Bemihisatra (1830-)*

### Overview

A number of Sakalava kingdoms on Madagascar's north and west coasts that engaged in trade with Swahili, Arab and European traders before being conquered by the Merina in the early 1800s with the exception of Bemihisatra, which signed a treaty of protection with the French (Covell, 1995, 219). Cascading succession disputes from Menabe led to the foundation of other kingdoms and some areas, like Ambongo, were populated by a number of small principalities in the early 1800s (e.g. Ballarin, 2019). In each, a monarch ruled in what is described as a dual monarchy: the living monarch held power in conjuncture with all deceased monarchs, who ruled from the royal cemetery. Living monarchs had to possess relics from their deceased predecessors to hold political power. Monarchs were assisted by councilors

and ministers, many of whom were tasked with maintaining relics, as well as lineage representatives and spirit mediums (Feeley-Harnik, 1976, 162).

## Social Segmentation

Society was divided into classes with ruling dynasties and a class of nobles (those who did not descend from the first wife of the polity's founder or commoners who had shown extraordinary service) at the top. Then were clan groups, comprising commoners. This system was reinforced in marriage practices, with nobles taking their first wife with an eye to political alliances, after which they had the right to take whomever they wanted as a wife, a right not granted to commoners (Lombard, 1988, 79-83). Slavery appears to have existed in the region (Goedefroit, 1998, 110) and clans were ranked (Feeley-Harnik, 1976, 148).

## Surplus Extraction

Tribute collected from subjugated populations and clan chiefs received benefits, like corvée labor and part of harvest, from subjects (Schlemmer, 1983, 108, 115).

## Local Representation

Clans retained social and economic independence within their territories, but the king had nominal rights to all land (Lombard, 1988, 99). Royal leaders maintained authority over *mpanjaka*, or clans, through a body of royal functionaries, who ensured royal wishes were followed, collected port dues, etc. In exchange for complying with local wishes, *mpanjaka* had complete independence within the territory allocated to them and could exercise their own privileges, collect labor and tribute, etc. as they wished (Schlemmer, 1983, 117). As a result, all clans had links to the monarchy, be it via representation from a councilor at the court or via a permanent government administration (Feeley-Harnik, 1976, 149).

## Method of Succession

Political power was reserved for descendants of each polity's founders. For example, in Menabe, only members of the maroserana clan, agnatic descendants by the first wife of the polity's founder, could be legitimate claimants. A royal council, representing main feudal clans, then chose from among contenders (Schlemmer, 1983, 113). No ruler could assume power without being in possession of the *dady* (ancestor) cult, notably relics of ancestors, however, which meant that Merina (and later French) seizure of the relics preempted this process.

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. Defunct monarchs spoke through royally appointed mediums (Kent, 1970, 162) and this ideology legitimated the king (Lombard, 1988, 101). Schlemmer (1983, 110-1) describes the real integrative force of the polity was its value system, notably the royal ceremony of *fitampoha*, or worship of deceased kings; "thus any reference to the sacred, at any level, is a reference to the sanctity of the monarchy."

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.103 Saloum, c.1500-1891

### Overview

Serer monarchy headed by a *buur* who rules with councilors, the most prominent of which is the *Grand Diaraff* followed by the *Grand Farba* then the *Farba Birkeur*. Saloum was less centralized than [Sine](#), as the *Bour* relies heavily territorial power holders, some of whom were never completely integrated into polity ([Klein, 1964](#), 51). Although the monarchy was controlled by Serer, Saloum was very diverse, with significant Wolof, Peulh and Mandinka minorities.

### Social Segmentation

Serer society is casted, meaning that only notables were eligible for political advancement.

### Surplus Extraction

Peasants paid a tenth of their millet harvest and each village also cultivated a special plot of millet for the court. Those who owned cattle additionally paid one head annually. *Bour* also taxed large slave markets and earned royalties from salt mines in addition to war loot, gifts from those he protected, fines in compensation for criminal acts ([Venema, 1978](#), 29). The *bour* appointed the *Alkati* to French trading posts, e.g Kaolack ([Bourgeau, 1933](#), 24) with the *bour* entitled to approximately one-tenth of passing merchandise in addition to an obligation for traders to partake in ceremonial reciprocal gift-giving ([Curtin, 1975](#), 286-97).

### Local Representation

The *bour's* authority spread over territorial commanders, though direct control is limited to the state's core. Taxes are collected by the *tieddo*, a warrior slave caste. Thus while although in the center titleholders were named by the *bour*, in the state's east, e.g Djilor, there was far more autonomy and the *bour* was obligated to work with someone chosen from local lineages (e.g. the *Bour Djilor* always originated from the Mbodj family) ([Klein, 1968](#), 17).



## Method of Succession

Maternal descendants (*Guelwar*) of Saloum's founding lineage were eligible to become *Bour* (Klein, 1964, 49). Each *bour* nominates successor in the *Boumi*, who serves as the *Bour N'Gaye* until a *bour* passes away (Aujas, 1931, 302). The *Grant Djaraff* was not bound by this choice, however, and there were succession crises. Because a candidate's ability to maintain clients and mobilize support was important, the *Djaraff* often weighed these attributes heavily (Klein, 1964, 51). Selection ceremonially took place in Kahone.

## State Ideology

Divine Monarchy, though *bour's* spiritual powers are weaker than in Sine.

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.104 Samory (Wassalou), c.1860s-1898

### Overview

Polity formed by Samory Touré, a Dioula leader, who began centralizing power in present-day Guinea in the 1860s. Samory's empire was first established as means of control over the kola and gold trade (Person, 1968, Chpt III), upsetting the regional balance of power in the process. Samory remained the center of state power, using marriage alliances by himself, his sofa (military elite, often enslaved persons) or other high ranking members of society to solidify his relations



with key chiefs (Osborn, 2001, 100-1). The polity's political rule was relatively loose in the early years, but Samory's hegemony expanded as the provincial system was established (Legassick, 1966, 96). Samory's empire expanded through the late 1880s, and he mounted the most significant resistance to French colonial conquest. By the late 1880s, however, a number of provinces, or *kafu*, were revolting and Samory's efforts to conquer Kenedougou met defeat. Beginning in 1891, Samory shifted his power eastward in the face of France's advance, establishing a new capital in Dabakala in northeastern Cote d'Ivoire. Much of the core of Samory's empire was transplanted (Griffeth, 1968, 142), but it is less clear if this 'second' state ever truly institutionalized (Jansen, 2002, 22). France finally defeats Samory in 1898, exiling him to Gabon.

## Social Segmentation

Toure's family and close associates, including sofa and religious leaders, dominate political and social power. Mande society and many assimilated groups are casted and many conquered populations were enslaved.

## Surplus Extraction

Local tribute systems were largely left undisturbed (Griffeth, 1968, 132), with in-kind payment of tributes organized by the local representative of the polity who channeled it upwards (Camara, 1970, 27). Resources are also extracted from trade, with each *Kafu* holding at least one market (Person, 1968, Chpt III).

## Local Representation

Empire is divided into provinces (based on traditional *Malinke kafu*) and Samory appointed his sons, uncles and other trusted members of his family as supervisors within each province, each tasked with seeing to its day-to-day administration (Osborn, 2001, 95). The backbone of state authority enforced by the sofa or soldiers. In this way, Samory has direct control over his provinces (Griffeth, 1968, 132), though local chiefs continued to hear cases within their villages. More serious judicial matters, such as disputes with Dyula traders, were heard by Samori's appointees or, in the most serious cases, by Samori himself (Person, 1968, 885) State organizes rotating *Barabo*, meetings that group numerous groupings into the new empire and discuss specific issues of governance (Camara, 1970, 24).

## Method of Succession

None. Samory appears to be preparing his sons to take over, but polity falls to France before this happens.

## State Ideology

Islamic Theocracy. Samory organized the polity around Islam and posted marabouts to each province and were required to recruit students for Islamic schools from animist villages (Osborn, 2001, 96). Samory comes to conceptualize himself as waging Jihad (Peterson, 2008, 271).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.105 Sanwi, c.1740-1894

### Overview

Anyi state based around the Aby Lagoon, where it profited from trade with Europeans, primarily in rubber, gold and slaves (Horowitz, 1977, 2). Sanwi was run by members of three notable clans, based at Krinjabo, Kouakro and Ehia, who first invaded the area and established the state. The day to day administration of Sanwi was handled by the king with a constellation of actors, including the seven quarter chiefs of Krinjabo, the capital, as well as other regional leaders and office-holders (Horowitz, 1977, 30). Sanwi was an on and off again vassal of Ashanti, and became a protectorate of the French in 1843; though the French only really occupied the territory at the end of the 19th century (Mundt, 1995).

### Social Segmentation

The three notable clans ran the state, and were considered the ‘true dignitaries of the country (land)’ (Dagri Diabate, 2013, 42-3). Horowitz (1977, 37) refers to these as a ‘warrior aristocracy,’ as elite status was tied to the descendants of the original invaders of the territory, who sat above commoners and slaves.

### Surplus Extraction

European traders were not taxed, rather the Sanwi state itself controlled trade and derived profit directly from this, with *watafwe*, or Anyi dignitaries, conducting commercial transactions for the state. Citizens obligations varied by their place of residence and lineage; some owed labor, while others provided foodstuffs during yearly yam festival (Horowitz, 1977, 7, 32, 238).

### Local Representation

Chiefs controlled individual villages, with larger villages bestowing more power and status (Mundt, 1995, 151). Descendants of three noble clans and three military leaders administered Sanwi’s territories, and overtime formed an assembly (*ashemu*) (Horowitz, 1977, 29-30).

### Method of Succession

Sanwi had five laws of succession: kings would be replaced by a brother, but if no brother existed, by the son of the oldest sister. If there was no nephew, then by a cousin who was the son of the oldest woman. Then a son could inherit, but only if his mother was a captive married to the king. If there was no other family, the kingship went back to the extended clan (Dagri Diabate, 2013, 74).

### State Ideology

Commerce

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.106 Segou, c.1712-1861

### Overview

Bambara kingdom headed by a *fama* that sat astride rich agricultural land and lucrative commercial routes along the middle Niger river (Djata, 1997, 3). Segou was captured by El Hadji Umar Tal in 1861 and the ensuing years saw continued conflict as the Bambara dynasty resisted Tal's rule until French conquest in 1890.

### Social Segmentation

Access to power mediated through age-grade association, or *ton*, until Ngolo takes power in the late 18th century and destroys the existing *ton*'s check on his power by concentrating power in his lineage, the Jara, instead. Slavery existed, though as noted by Robinson (1987), captive members of the *ton*, could fill military and bureaucratic positions and gain influence through loyal service and military heroism.

### Surplus Extraction

All districts provided tribute, but provisions were made for different groups, e.g. the Maraka were not required to provide soldiers, but they were required to pay tribute. Other groups, like Somono paid a specific tax (Djata, 1997, 22-25). Roberts (1987) describes Segou as having a war economy with warfare and captive-taking critical for the expansion of commerce and production.

### Local Representation

Segou granted considerable autonomy to its political units, especially those on the periphery, but it simultaneously maintained a standing professional army and built an integrated local economy that enriched the aristocracy while also providing opportunity for ethnic minorities, like the Fulani or Maraka (Djata, 1997, 3). The village remained the central political unit, over which sat a military officer, *kuntigi*, who administered a district, *kafa* (Djata, 1997, 24). At Segou's foundation, the first *fama*, Biton, placed clients in major villages, but after he died "kingdom only existed in episodic collaboration" and allied rulers could keep their own troops and contract their own alliances (Djata, 1997, 18, 23).

### Method of Succession

Succession was first within Coulibaly and later the Jara families, generally father-to-son. Following the death of Segou's founder, Biton Coulibaly, his sons ruled in quick succession before three leaders of the *ton*, or age-grade association, took over. Following this, Ngolo Jara, a freed slave, established the Jara dynasty that ruled until Tal conquered Segou.

## State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.107 Shilluk, 1490-1861

### Overview

Ethnically Shilluk monarchy headed by the *reth*, who held an important spiritual authority (Evans-Pritchard, 2011, 16). The *reth* consulted loosely with a council, but Shilluk never developed an extensive administrative apparatus. Still, the *reth* reinforced his power with royal body guards in addition to deploying wealth strategically throughout kingdom to ensure allegiance. This meant that the *reth's* orders were obeyed, e.g. the *reth* could demand that trade caravans not be attacked and he would be obeyed and Shilluk collected tribute from across the polity (Mercer, 1971, 422-3). There is a debate about whether the *reth* had absolute political or merely spiritual power (as emphasized by Evans-Pritchard, 2011). Arens (1979) suggests it was likely in between the two.

### Social Segmentation

Shilluk had a rigid social hierarchy of four classes with the aristocracy at the top, which ruled over commoners, lesser royals and serfs (Evans-Pritchard, 2011, 11-3).

### Surplus Extraction

The *reth* received tribute from herders for the right to use the kingdom's pasture as well as cattle or grain from peasants (the *reth* could additionally demand their labor for royal land) as well as part of any booty from raids (estimated at 10%) (Mercer, 1971, 415-6, 422). The *reth* could also fine villages if they waged unjustified fights amongst each other (Evans-Pritchard, 2011, 15) and traders were both expected to send the *reth* a gift and to provide part of their gains on trade, making some trade centers, like Kaka, a central source of royal revenue in 1800s (Mercer, 1971, 418-20).

## Local Representation

Settlement chiefs have substantial local autonomy as the *reth* did not appoint settlement heads, whose authority instead derived from their descent from their settlement's dominant lineage (Evans-Pritchard, 2011, 14). Lineage heads nonetheless obeyed orders that they received from the *reth* via royal messengers (Mercer, 1971, 422) and they had ritual duties towards the king, e.g. at his enthronization, upkeeping shrines, etc. (Evans-Pritchard, 2011, 18). Because royal children were raised in their mother's natal village, royal family members were present throughout the countryside, e.g. princesses could be appointed as governors, especially if their brother became *reth*. Royal wives and widows could also return to natal villages to oversee royal shrines, key places for reproduction of divine kingship (Graeber, 2011, 86-7).

## Method of Succession

Only a king's son could inherit, which led to great contest among sons (Evans-Pritchard, 2011, 9). The new king was elected a few days after his father's death, with territorial chiefs participating in the election. Key was for the chiefs Golbany and Kwom, from Shilluk's northern and southern divisions, had to agree. Although there was a broader 'electoral college,' they were effectively the key kingmakers (Evans-Pritchard, 2011, 24).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship. All kings believed to descend from Nyikang, who was believed to have led the Shilluk to their current homeland. Nyikang's spirit is believed to be in every king – a 'mythological personification of the timeless kingship which itself symbolizes the national structure, a changeless moral order' (Evans-Pritchard, 2011, 9).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

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## 4.108 Shoa, c.1800-1889

### Overview

Traditional province of [Abyssinia](#), that emerges from the era of princes semi-autonomous and is revitalized under Menelik until he becomes emperor of Abyssinia. Shoa was a monarchy, with the king holding substantial authority. The Orthodox church was critical for state power, and the clergy was often consulted by rulers. The king was assisted at court by a number of councilors ([Abir, 1968](#), 157, 165-7). Darkwah ([1966](#), 216-7) describes the king's power as absolute, more so than in other Ethiopian kingdoms, with all land belonging to the king and king seen as the supreme symbol of the state. The state administration was highly centralized. The state is expanding rapidly under Menelik, with Marcus ([1975](#), 65) describing the erection of *katama*, or fortified villages, around the border, as Shoa colonists disseminated Amhara culture, religion and language. Wars in area had created significant migration and sped up acculturation

### Social Segmentation

Landed aristocracy and royal family dominate social and political life. Slavery existed as a legal category ([Ege, 1996](#), 57) and slaves were the most important commodity at markets like Roggie or Abdel-Rassul ([Kofi Darkwah, 1966](#), 308).

### Surplus Extraction

Villages paid taxes based on their population and the amount of land they cultivated and local citizens also had to contribute labor to the royal domain. Taxes were also collected on trade, with governors supervising important markets. Merchants are estimated to have paid ten percent on the value of their imports and exports as well as fees for market stalls. Royal monopolies prevented citizens from participating in the gold, ivory or musk trade ([Abir, 1968](#), 171-2).

### Local Representation

Shoa was divided into four major provinces, headed by governors, and thirty-nine districts in the early 1800s ([Abir, 1968](#), 149). Many governorships were hereditary in old aristocratic dynasties, but the king could repossess them and they were all heavily dependent on the king ([Abir, 1968](#), 168). Districts were subdivided into parishes, each of which was headed by a *chiqa shum*, who was elected by the population and who was charged with collecting taxes, executing public works and cultivating the king's estates. Under the *chiqa shum* were hamlet or family group heads. Districts were integrated differently, with some, like Yifrat and Tegulet, completely integrated into the kingdom, while others like Menz were semi-autonomous, paying tribute but not required to send troops for military expeditions ([Abir, 1968](#), 162). Sub-units are integrated through the church and marriage alliances, with royal's taking daughters and sisters of province leaders as royal concubines ([Abir, 1968](#), 164).

### Method of Succession

Succession within the male lineage and kings often had a favorite who is an heir apparent ([Ege, 1996](#), 105). Because possible successors were a threat, male relatives were traditionally kept in a state prison under the care of the governor of lower Yifat ([Abir, 1968](#), 165).

### State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

### Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.109 Sine, 1500-1898

### Overview

Serer monarchy headed by a *maad* who ruled with a well-defined hierarchy of notables (*gelwars*) who filled key positions in the state, including the *Grand Djaraff* (prime minister and minister of justice), the *Grand Farba* (chief of captives and the army), *Farba Birkeur* (minister of the royal court), etc. (Aujas, 1931, 299).

### Social Segmentation

Serer society is casted, meaning that only notables were eligible for political advancement.

### Surplus Extraction

*Sakh-sakh* collects taxes at the village level, with regular rates including one bull per herd and set quantities of millet. Any fines collected locally are also partially shared with king (Aujas, 1931, 302). As in the *Saloum*, regional custom stipulates that the *maad* is entitled to approximately one-tenth of passing merchandise and traders obligated to partake in ceremonial reciprocal gift-giving (Curtin, 1975, 286-97).

### Local Representation

The *maad's* power rested directly on the village. In 1891 no territorial chief commanded more than 3 of Sine's 125 villages, meaning that power was quite direct. In all villages that were not under a major titleholder, the *Maad* was represented by a *Sakh-Sakh* (who must be a freeman) who lived in the village and was judge and tax collector. All villages also had a *Djaraff* - or chief - chosen from patrilineage of village's founder. *Maad's* control over appointments of most major titleholders and all *sakh-sakh* gave him far vaster control over Sine that neighboring rulers did not always have (Klein, 1968, 16)(Klein 16). Peulhs often have own representative, the *Dialigue* (Aujas, 1931, 299).

## Method of Succession

Each *Maad* is named by *Grand Djaraff* after consulting with principle chiefs, but he must be a male of royal blood, a status confirmed by the mother's lineage – a child is a *gelwar* or noble if mother was. Power not hereditary within a male lineage, therefore, though after being enthroned, many *maad* chose a younger brother to name as their *boumi*, or successor. The *Grand Djaraff* could formally block this, but this only happened rarely (Aujas, 1931, 300). Still, there were numerous succession crises as in Saloum, and a candidate's patronage potential weighed heavily on the *Djaraff* (Klein, 1964, 51).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. The *maad* was a sacred figure who played both important political and religious roles.

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.110 Sokoto Emirates, misc

*Agaie, 1804-1903*

*Bauchi, 1804-1902*

*\*Lafia and Wase included here because paid tribute*

*Daura, c.13thc-1903*

*Gombe, c.13thc-1903*

*Gwando, 1804-1903*

*Jama'are, 1835-1903*

*Hadejia, c.1810-1903*

*Kano, c.13thc-1903*



*Katagum, 1804-1903*

*Katsina, c.13thc-1903*

*Kazaure, c.1820s-1903*

*Kebbi, 1804-1903*

*Kontagora, 1804-1903*

*Missau, 1835-1903*

*Nassarawa, 1835-1900*

*Nupe, 1836-1903*

*\*including Lapai, Pategi and Lafiagi, which all pay tribute to Nupe*

*Rano, c.13thc-1903*

*Sokoto, 1804-1903*

*\* including Zamfarawa which is absorbed into Sokoto early on*

*Yauri, 1804-1903*

*Zaria, c.13thc-1903*

*\* including Jema'a which pays tribute*

## Overview

Fulani emirates established in Northern Nigeria beginning in 1804 following Usman dan Fodio's jihad against indigenous Hausa states. Seven original Hausa states are captured and a number of new emirates founded as polity expands southward in a period of political consolidation that takes a few decades. Sultan rules at center, with composite emirates owing allegiance to Caliph (Last, 1967, 42-3). Sultan's rule over emirates often described as a system of indirect rule, where emirs are given considerable authority as long as they pay tribute and obey Sultan's orders when issued. As state consolidates under Bello, a system of titles and posts facilitates patronage downwards within and across emirates while also establishing the *kofa* system of intermediaries as a vehicle of communication between emirates and Sultan (Johnston, 1967, 126-8).

## Social Segmentation

Fulani notables rule over indigenous populations, notably Hausa. Slavery was prominent in the emirates.

## Surplus Extraction

Sokoto spans Saharan trade routes and taxes traders at set levels (Chafe, 1999, 84) and Muslims obligated to pay *zakat*, with other set tax rates for non-Muslims. Emirs send some of this up to Caliph as tribute, with whom they were also obligated to share booty from raids and expeditions. Caliph also raises funds through sale of titles (Last, 1967, 106).

## Local Representation

Emirs owe allegiance to Sultan. Within each emirate, dynamics largely repeat. Emirate ensured within a ruling dynasty, though often rotates between houses with final choice made by electors. Emirs have to maintain confidence of Sultan, but otherwise had substantial authority.

In most cases, Fulani emirs kept intact the feudal systems they inherited from Hausa or other previous leadership. Titles and positions that defeated Hausa ruling class left vacant were awarded to Fulani who had distinguished themselves in the jihad and Emirates come to proliferate the number of titles (e.g. see Last, 1967, 94 on Sokoto Caliphate). These posts thus were a form of patronage that the emir could grant to loyal followers who, in turn, provided tribute and troops. A fair amount of autonomy in the system, but judicial and military questions purview of higher-ups. While some fief holders

administered their fiefs personally, others used village chiefs and councilors to administer (Johnston, 1967, Chpt 16). “A feature of the feudal system of the empire was that authority was first centralized and then extensively delegated. The role of the Emir was consequently of vital importance, for on him everything turned” (Johnston, 1967, 170).

## Method of Succession

Election among contenders within male lineage of Shehu. Shehu initially succeeded by his son, Mohammadou Bellow. Electors were territorial leaders; ruling lineage could not participate (Last, 1967, 65, 97, Johnston, 1967, Chpt 10).

Within emirate, succession remained with male lineages of leadership. In Katsina, for example, succession limited to royal princes who were selected by kingmakers, themselves comprised of royal officials, senior members of the royal family and other miscellaneous titleholders (Usman, 1981, 78).

## State Ideology

Islamic theocracy.

## Elite Structure Typology

Composite Emirates: Regal; Sokoto Caliphate as unified whole: Gatekeeper

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## 4.111 Solima Yalunka, c.1780-1884

### Overview

Soso/Yalunka federation founded in response to growing dominance of Muslim, Fulani as Fouta Djallon expands westward circa 1800. Although individual territories, or *khori*, had substantial autonomy, the polity center of Falaba facilitated cooperation across *khori* and was able to ensure loyalty of towns and villages with military force (Donald, 1968, 58-9). Solima Yalunka saw rising political fortunes until Falaba's destruction by Samory Toure's forces in 1884, which undermines federation (Fyle, 1979, 125).

### Social Segmentation

*Khori* administered by a ruling clan; four most significant ones are: Samura in Solima, Mansary in Sinkunia, Jawara in Dembelia and Kamara in Folosaba. Ruling clan lineage forms upper class, with elders (from ruling lineage, prominent warriors and traders) serving as advisors to *manga* (Fyle, 1979, 78). *Manga* always from lineage of polity founder who first rebelled against Fouta Djallon (Fyle, 1979, 147).

### Surplus Extraction

Each *khori* required to pay tribute (Fyle, 1979, 76).

### Local Representation

*Khori* controlled their own internal affairs and sub-villages, but *manga* in Falaba coordinated on key issues, including the distribution of booty, trade, military issues and judicial cases involving murder (Fyle, 1979, 47-8). Although *khori* obliged to help defend Falaba, but Falaba does not defend *khori* with same consistency (Fyle, 1979, 67). The system was aided by a network of dynamics marriages between *khori* and Falaba occasionally used military power to ensure a *khori*'s compliance with its wishes (Donald, 1968, 58-9).

### Method of Succession

Within male patrilineage; leadership passes to younger brothers of deceased ruler before sons. Younger brother of chosen successor appointed war chief (Fyle, 1979, 45).

### State Ideology

Hereditary monarchy. Central power vested in lineage of founder who first revolted against Fulani.

### Elite Structure Typology

Federation

### Sources

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## 4.112 Somali Sultanates, misc.

*Bardera, 1819-1843; c.1863-1960*

*Garsoogaue, 1400-1908*

*Geledi (Afgoy), 1650-1908*

*Hoby, 1878-1925*

*Jiddu (dates unknown, but [Mukhtar \(2003\)](#) notes among the oldest and was in loose Geledi confederacy until mid-1800s when reasserts independence) Majerdeen, 1800-1927*

*Warsanguli (Garaad), 1200-1886*

### Overview

Series of sultanates along the Somali coast that arise to capture gains from coastal trade, with the exception of Bardera, which was an Islamic religious center run by a Sheikh along the Juba river. Bardera still engaged in trade, though the Sheikh would not trade in 'unclear' goods like slaves, ivory or tobacco ([Mukhtar, 2003](#), 54). Jiddu was slightly in-land, but taxed caravan trade through Shaballe valley en route to the coast. Sultans had great authority, e.g. in Garsoogaue, the sultan, or Gereed, appointed officials and managed dispute resolutions, with a secretary recording his activities. At times, southern Sultanates such as Geledi pay tribute to Oman, but Luling ([2002](#), 23) suggests that real power was local. Note that Geledi destroys Bardera for interfering with ivory trade in 1843 and it takes approximately twenty years for religious community to reestablish itself.

### Social Segmentation

Ruling clans control political power. Sultans were generally the chief of their clan, as in Majerteen and Hobyo, but not all clans were eligible to produce a Sultan ([Lewis, 1958](#), 204). Slavery existed in many, e.g. Geledi.

### Surplus Extraction

Sultans were offered gifts as tribute or taxes from traders; Lewis ([1958](#), 206) notes that only Warsengeli had a robust tax-based bureaucracy. In Majerdeen and Hobyo, military officers are tasked with collecting taxes, with land and herds taxed and the state gained money from England to guard their shipwrecks ([Miles, 1872](#), 62, 69). In Geledi, surrounding farmers and inhabitants pay tribute ([Mukhtar, 2003](#), 28).

### Local Representation

In city-states, Sultan controls cities directly, e.g. in Gasaaragude, the *gereed* received audiences and appointed officials himself ([Mukhtar, 2003](#), 119). In other sultanates, like Majerteen, the sultan had extensive authority and appointed officials to his council and to subsidiary cities, even if some degree of restiveness was common ([Miles, 1872](#), 69). Geledi has more of a territorial reach, and family members were appointed to three key towns to administer with a fair amount of autonomy, with cooperation clearly disintegrating as the century progresses ([Luling, 2002](#), 26).

### Method of Succession

Within clan lineage ([Lewis, 1958](#), 210; [Mukhtar, 2003](#), 88). Note that Bardera only lasts one generation. There are often disputes, as in Geledi which can barely agree upon a sultan in the late 1800s ([Luling, 2002](#), 26).

### State Ideology

Commerce

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic. Exception: Geledi: regal (see [Luling, 2002](#)).

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## 4.113 Swahili, c.1000-1895

### Overview

Series of coastal city-states that, though once independence, fell under Omani rule from early 1700s onward with the level of any city-state's independence varying after that, e.g. Mombasa falls to Sultan of Zanzibar during 1830s century ([Maxon and Ofcansky, 2014](#), 230). Most rulers only reigned over their own city ([Horton and Middleton, 2000](#), 157), though Zanzibar expanded its authority along the coast in the mid-1850s to gain control over other cities ([Nicholls, 1971](#), 320-1). Omani control was dependent on domestic politics in Muscat and governorships were often insecure positions, creating a fairly decentralized governance structure as the Omani practice was to retain local leaders since their key interest was trade. Along the northern coast, Omani influence was more consistent given the dominance of the Mazrui clan ([Nicholls, 1971](#), 23-31, 45). As Cooper ([1977](#), 32) writes, "The Omani empire was a network of ports, held together more by shared commercial interests than by a state structure." The Swahili sultans grew rich off of trade with Arabia and India, and later served as middlemen between inland and foreign trade, including in slaves ([Davidson, 1969](#), 101).

### Social Segmentation

Growing wealth from Indian trade created clear class divisions by the 16th century ([Kusimba, 1999](#), 148). Following Omani occupation, status becomes tied to kinship with Arabs, as upper-class families and Omani elite intermarried. Many coastal elite thugs fictionalized their town histories to validate their roles as an elite class ([Kusimba, 1999](#), 172-4). These town patricians held socio-economic power over 'African' and enslaved residents, with many patricians owning slaves, often for work on their plantations ([Horton and Middleton, 2000](#), 205, 134).

## Surplus Extraction

Traders are taxed (Freeman-Grenville, 1988, 158), though sultans often loose substantial authority over revenue collection under the Omani (Nicholls, 1971, 34).

## Local Representation

Sultans (or *mfalme* in northern Swahili towns and *maliki* in southern ones) rarely controlled more than a single town, which they often administered justice and other bureaucracies with town officials and councils, often formed from the heads of the patrician lineage groups. A Sultan's authority depended in part on maintaining their allegiance (Nicholls, 1971, 33). Sultans also acted as liaisons for subsequent Portuguese, Omani and British colonizers (Horton and Middleton, 2000, 157-9). Most Swahili towns are divided into wards or quarters, which often reflected shared kinship or affiliation (Horton and Middleton, 2000, 131).

## Method of Succession

Patrilineal descent within the Sultanate clan.

## State Ideology

Commerce

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.114 Swazi, 1815-1884

### Overview

Several independent Sotho-speaking clans in area consolidates following unrest in area, making the Swazi kingdom one of many states that emerged during Mfecane when the Dlamini clan, outsiders to the area, founded the polity. Note that

some date Swazi's founding to the late 1770s when Ngwane III began making conquests in the area; but King Sobhuza I is considered the first Swazi king. The Swazi kingdom as a dual monarchy, with a ruling king who reigned with his mother. The king was the 'father' of the nation while his mother was its 'mother'. An undefined and delicate balance of power existed between them, with each possessing their own councils, advisors and governors. The kingship functioned through *libandla*, a national council that was composed of every male in the land, that normally met once a year, but could in principle be called at any time. The *liqoqo*, or inner council, dealt with every-day matters of the state, with membership to the *liqoqo* selected by merit (Matsebula, 1976, 9-10).

## Social Segmentation

Dlamini clan emerges as elite class in the polity, amassing considerable wealth and power. Class was more broadly determined by a man's wealth in cattle, wives and agricultural production (Genge, 1999, 121). Regiments served as one vehicle of redistribution, however, and offered an avenue of upward mobility to dominated classes (Bonner, 1977, 427).

## Surplus Extraction

The age-regiment system became a vehicle for royal extraction of surplus as youth were withdrawn from their homesteads and worked in king's fields. War booty was also retained by king, with part redistributed to warriors or other favored members of the court. The king also extracted fines and all of this concentrated money in the royal house and Dlamini clan. This was used to build loyalty to the monarchy through patronage at the same time that contribution of tribute labor or bravery became associated with upward mobility (Booth, 1983, 10-11).

## Local Representation

The king was represented locally by princes, blood relatives of the monarch, and *tindvuna*, influential commoners who had been elevated to take charge of certain areas or royal village on behalf of the king. This granted some power to commoners while preventing kinsmen from becoming too powerful. The *tindvuna* was not necessarily a hereditary position and they were never from the Dlamini clan, hence they were not eligible for kingship. Still, the *tindvuna* were influential advisors who were charged with maintaining royal assets, organizing labor for the king, arranging ceremonies, etc (Matsebula, 1976, 11). Manelisi (1999, 116-7) notes that Dlamini kings established hegemony in Swaziland through marriage alliances; Sobhuza I and others used polygamy to both integrate strong chieftaincies and to amass wealth. By the end of the century, the powers of the Swazi king were strong. Writing on Mbandzeni's granting of land concessions to the British, Bonner (1977, 368) observes "however theoretically unconstitutional it may have been, Mbandzeni could grant concessions in defiance of his councillors' wishes, and whatever the consensus arrived at in the *liblandla*, Mbandzeni could override it by refusing to implement its decisions. Ultimately, the only sanction they had was his assassination, but since they were reluctant to employ that, the centre of decision making in Swaziland was largely paralyzed and the concession invasion proceeded unchecked."

## Method of Succession

Succession was through paternal line. The successor was chosen from among the younger sons of the deceased king. After a king's death, the royal family met to decide who among the queens will be queen mother, a decision usually based on the mode of marriage and the queen's (or their father's) rank. The chosen queen's son becomes heir. If she has no son, she is asked to 'adopt' one of her husband's sons. The Queen mother acted as regent if her son was a minor, helped by the deceased king's brother (Matsebula, 1976, 8).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship. Ritual innovation accompanied centralization under Mswati, including through the 'first fruits' ceremony during the harvest where the king invoked special powers to bring forth rain and abundant crops (Booth, 1983, 10). The Queen mother's homestead was the spiritual center of the kingdom (Bonner, 1977, 13).

## Elite Structure Typology

Despotic

## Sources

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## 4.115 Taqali, c.1790-1880

### Overview

Polity founded by the warrior Muhammad Wad Jayli, and later his son Ismail, on the Taqali massif, where the warriors provided defense to highland farmers, Muslim holymen and refugees from the cascading effects of conflict in Kordofan and, later, the Egyptian advance (Ewald, 2005, 11). Taqali's leadership is headed by a *makk* (pl. *mukuk*) who rules with the *awlad al-makk*, a retinue of soldiers, slaves and princes. Taqali remained a very weak polity, barely meeting my threshold for entry. Ewald (1990, 182) describes the polity's political edifice as 'improvised' with the warrior-kingship resting on a dichotomy between consent and coercion: the *mukuk* struggled to translate their military power into power over economic production while highland subjects both sought the benefits of the *makk's* protection while retaining as much autonomy as possible. Thus while the *makk* did provide services, this was largely managing relations among groups and outsider more so than domestic services though the *makk* did administer some justice (Ewald, 2005, 114).

### Social Segmentation

Taqali's political elite was relatively open. The state lacked hereditary offices apart from that of the *makk* and the position of queen mother. King's had a fair degree of autonomy in appointing advisors and any wealthy or strong man could gain followers and hence influence (Ewald, 1990, 73). But an upper class did exist as did a noble court culture (Kapteijns and Spaulding, 1990, 65). Kings raided and kept slaves, some of whom served in the state (Ewald, 1990, 63, 67).



## Surplus Extraction

Peasants pay tribute, but Taqali relies heavily on booty from raids and 'gifts' from traders (Ewald, 2005, 110-2). Although the *makk* had the right to distribute grains collected by subsidiaries, he cannot transfer it to his own compound, leading *mukuk* to strengthen their hold over their maternal kin's homesteads where they can control land and labor more directly (Ewald, 1990, 79-83).

## Local Representation

Taqali's warrior kings failed to unseat local leaders, whose authority remained rooted in local religious practice and tradition (Ewald, 2005, 110-1). *Mukuk* instead claimed hills by force, extracting what they could in exchange for protection, but exerting minimal local authority in much of the highlands. The *makk*'s authority was quite strong in the *hayshan*, or royal compounds, which tended to be founded near their maternal homelands. The *makk* did have nominal authority over the territory of some local leaders, however, the 'big men' or *shuyukh al-tin*. Royal authority was also felt locally through the *makk*'s entourage, the *awlad al-makk*, who often maintained ties to highland communities through their mothers; these maternal ties offered them followers, food and local identities. Geography was an important factor in shaping state reach, with communities residing on high hills better able to resist demands for tribute (Ewald, 1990, 74-5, 68, 62).

## Method of Succession

Patrilineal descent; in practice often father to son but this is not a rule. State founder, Ismail, is succeeded by his son Abakr, who's son Umar takes over, but Umar is succeeded by his brother. Ewald (Ewald, 1990, 67) argues that the king's entourage profited from keeping succession rules vague, as this left space for them to compete for succession; following the death of Ismail's brother, who had served as a de facto kingmaker, every *makk* came to office through violence.

## State Ideology

Conquest. Taqali formed in the face of threats coming from the plains. Highlanders submitted to *makuk* because of their military power to force submission and tribute, but this meant that when a *makk*'s coercive powers weakened, so did their authority as the state had a minimal and uneven bureaucratic apparatus (Ewald, 2005, 114).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

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## 4.116 Toro, c.1830-1873

### Overview

Bunyoro kingdom founded when Prince Kaboyo of Bunyoro rebelled against his father and set up a rival kingdom in Bunyoro's former province of Toro. The king of Bunyoro retook this territory in 1873, reverted it to a province of Bunyoro, although Lugard shored up Toro immediately prior to colonization by posting Sudanese troops to protect it (Furley, 1961, 184). Toro was based heavily on Bunyoro and in the last half of the century was besieged by succession battles and provincial rebellion, enabling Bunyoro to regain authority in the region (Wilson, 1971, 5).

### Social Segmentation

Social and political elite were members of royal Babito clan or wealth cattle owners (*Bahuma*); commoners (*Bairu*) were agriculturalists; slaves were of lowest social status (Childs, 1998, 111).

### Surplus Extraction

Villages pay tribute to the royal family in cattle (Wilson, 1971, 8).

### Local Representation

The king's sons are appointed to administer smaller regions of the kingdom. Below the sons and family members of the king, autochthonous clan chiefs ruled. Those who were most loyal to the king had the most power (Wilson, 1971, 18).

### Method of Succession

Toro adopts Bunyoro's system, with the *Omukama* inheriting power through the royal clan. Kaboya is succeeded by his son Kazana, but a succession battle ensued (Ingham, 1975, 41).

### State Ideology

Hereditary Monarchy

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.117 Toucouleur Empire (El Hadji Umar Tal), 1852-1893

### Overview

Empire built by El Hadji Umar Tal, originally from [Fouta Toro](#), who began a Jihad in 1852 that defeated a string of states in present-day Mali. Beginning in animist, Mandinka territories, Tal captured the states of [Kaarta](#), [Segou](#) and [Macina](#) in the following fifteen years, converting the local population where they were not already Muslim. After a failed attempt to conquer [Khasso](#) in 1860, an area of growing French influence, Tal signed a treaty with the French that recognized his sphere of influence. Tal pursued a commercial policy that linked his territory to French traders in the Upper Senegal Valley, trading in gum arabic, slaves and salt ([Hanson, 1990, 203](#)). Following Tal's death in 1864, his nascent empire immediately faced growing resistance from conquered kingdoms, with Macina regaining independence. Rivalries among Tal's sons over who should take power undermined the empire and led to civil war which, combined with the French advance inland, led the empire to collapse by 1893 ([Ryer, 1969, 82](#)).

### Social Segmentation

Tal's empire gave a prominent role for military elites as well as Futanke settlers, particularly in Kaarta, who moved in following conquest and reap commercial rewards ([Hanson, 1990, 200](#)). Caste and slavery are present throughout the empire.

### Surplus Extraction

Taxes were collected. For example, in Kaarta, Umanian state collected taxes on everyone, but Futanke colonists who had moved near Nioro and Konyakary eventually negotiated to not be taxed. This created resentment between indigenous groups and Futanke colonists. Tax was also collected on the lucrative gum trade ([Hanson, 1990, 203-5](#)).

### Local Representation

Tal installed delegates to run his conquered territories when he moved on to new territory. For example, he left one of his most trusted talibé, Alfa Omar Bayla, in charge of his operations in Kaarta as he moved onto Segou, where he installed his son, and then Macina ([Ryer, 1969, 57-72](#)). This leaves conquered territories restive, e.g. Sansading welcomes Tal but later revolts once he moves on to Macina. Indeed, Tal shows little interest in administration, focusing instead on the jihad, leaving the empire vulnerable once he dies as no real administration is in place ([Ryer, 1969, 71-84](#)).

### Method of Succession

Father to son and El Haji prepared his son Ahmadou to succeed him ([Ryer, 1969, 68-9](#)), appointing Ahmadou the king of Segou when Tal moved on to conquer Macina ([Ryer, 1969, 72](#)).

### State Ideology

Islamic Theocracy

### Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.118 Tswana, misc

*BaKgatla* – c.1825-1885

*BaKwena* – c.1829-1885

*BaLete* - c.1840s-1885

*BaNgwato* – late 18thc-1885

*BaNgwaketse* – 1805-1885

*Tawana* – c.1850s-1885

### Overview

A series of Tswana monarchies or chieftainships (Morton et al., 2008, 121) that consolidate into centralized polities in the wake of the *mfecane* and upheaval in present-day South Africa. Schapera (1963, 159) describes the Tswana as a 'multi-kingdom tribe', whereby a number of small polities were formed by members of a shared ethnic group. In all cases, a king/chief led with a council or assembly that broadly represented royals and commoners, though chief's sons, brothers, uncles and paternal male cousins were principal advisors (Schapera, 1963, 160-1). Most Tswana polities were largely based on cattle herding, e.g. the BaNgwaketse (Ngcongco, 1977, 71), but others, such as Ngwato or BaKweno profited from trade routes connecting Mataberland, Bulozhi and Ngamiland and the trans-Kgalagadi respectively (Nangati, 1980, 126, Tlou, 1972, 176; key commodities included ivory, skins and ostrich feathers. BaLete are most itinerant in this period, settling occasionally among the BaKwena (see Sillery, 1952, Chpt 16).

### Social Segmentation

Tswana society based around three classes that were historically rooted in distinctive patterns of integration in the polity: *dikgosana* (nobles or those in the ruling lineage); *batlhanka* (commoners) or *basimane ba kgosi* (foreigners long ago absorbed into the group, often retainers); and *bafaladi* (refugees, members of community more recently conquered or admitted) (Schapera, 1952, v).

### Surplus Extraction

Tswana society was heavily clientelistic, with clients paying tribute, often in cattle or cattle-derived products, e.g. Kgalagadi gave milk and part of meat when cattle died (Tlou, 1972, 140) and the Kwena chiefs demanded cattle (Ellenberger and Goodwin, 1937, 46). For the Tawana the paying of tribute and carrying out the king's orders were the only real obligations of residents and those far from the capital felt little other from state (Tlou, 1972, 156).

## Local Representation

Among all Tswana groups, families resided in villages, but it was the ward (*kgotla*) that was the key social and political unit. *Kgotla* were headed by a hereditary headman, who most families shared a relationship with via a common ancestor. The ward was the highest level of social organization and the lowest territorial unit, with Tswana kings delegating power to ward heads (Tlou, 1972, 95). Tswana chiefs allocated wards and power over cattle grazing land to their sons and their wives (Ngcongco, 1977, 68). The MaLete had graded executive powers, with chiefs controlling tribes, headmen villages and elders in their group. Most legal issues were settled within families, only if this failed did it go to higher authorities (Ellenberger and Goodwin, 1937, 55).

## Method of Succession

Largely father to son, all tracing back to Maislo, the common ancestor. This varies, somewhat, however, and brothers could succeed if sons were young (e.g. see Sillery, 1952 on Kwena in the 1830s). It is difficult to know how regularly succession was father to son however because many Tswana groups name leaders after former leaders (Ngcongco, 1977, 66). Disputes often occurred within families (Schapera, 1963).

## State Ideology

Hereditary monarchy. Tswana all claim mythical descent from common ancestor Masilo, with Kwena, Ngwatom Ngwaketse and Tswana all further sharing ancestor to his son Malope (Schapera, 1952, 8).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.119 Tyo (Teke, Anziku), c.1500s-1882

### Overview

BaTeke kingdom ruled by a King, or Makoko, who presided over a decentralized polity. Vansina describes the *makoko* as serving as a common arbiter among lords; his sovereignty rested on his control over the male spirit that held sway across the polity. Tyo never develops a standing army or unified courts or bureaucracy, but unlike other polities in the area there is a sole figurehead in the *makoko*. Tyo was animated by two competing ideologies, the *nkira*, which surrounded the king, and the *nkobi* of the territorial lords (Vansina, 1973, Chpt 14, conclusion). Vansina (1973, 430) suggests that Tyo was more cohesive than ever in the late 19th century (in contrast to Coquery-Viditch's argument that it was in crisis), as the king lost control over the pool area, which was a lucrative base in the coastal trade.

### Social Segmentation

Coastal trade accentuates the existence of distinct social classes, as political leaders and wealthy amass growing power. One reason for this was that the pool of free men and women shrunk as the wealthy grew richer and the number of slaves increased. Growing merchant class did increasingly challenge the political elite, but chiefs were still received with honor and could collect tribute (Vansina, 1973, 309-11).

### Surplus Extraction

Squires collected tribute for the king and were entitled to tithe of every hunt for themselves. "The kingdom was a concept which found its expression mainly in the collection of *ingkura* tribute," Vansina writes (390). French traders also paid tribute to the lord posted at major market sites (Vansina, 1973, 317, 320, 409).

### Local Representation

Tyo's base political unit was the chiefdom, with a clear territorial subdivision between the chiefs-of-the-land ('squires') and the chief-of-the-crown ('lords'), who ruled over the squires. Both actors provided protection, administration and justice, but chiefs-of-the-land were seen as masters of a territory's spirit, or *nkira*, that protected an area and originated in an aristocratic family. Local lords did fight between each other, but the king could mediate and resolve these issues (Vansina, 1973, 391). Vansina notes that the key problem facing all authorities was to prevent the emergence of rival leaders, esp. 'big men' in late 1800s – particularly a problem at village level where there were less resources (guns, slaves, etc) to ward off challengers (Vansina, 1973, Chpt 7).

### Method of Succession

Anyone who could claim descent from an ancestor originating in woods of Ndua, Mbe aNdzieli or Ikie was eligible to become king, although succession became patrilineal during the colonial era. In practice, succession always concentrated in certain lineages as candidates came to desire at least one king among their ancestors. Candidates also had to be wealthy

enough to pay lords who played a large role in choice, which generated substantial politics around election (Vansina, 1973, 394-5).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

## Sources

Vansina, J. (1973). *The Tio Kingdom of The Middle Congo: 1880-1892*, Oxford.

# 4.120 Ugweno, 16th c-1870s

## Overview

Pare polity known for its iron-working. Ugweno was led by a king, who ruled with ministers, the chief minister (*mloli wa mangi*) being his most trusted counselor. Anyone wishing to see the king had to pass by the *mloli wa mangi*. Other ministerial posts were charged with initiation, foreign affairs, etc. and two advisory councils – one of elders who could hear cases and one representing districts – helped administer state (Kimambo, 1967, 72-3). Ugweno profited off the caravan trade, at first in iron and ivory, but later slaves as well, but growing rivalry between Wasangi and Wambaga clans of the royal family lead Ugweno to fragment into 12 chiefdoms in the face of opportunistic politicians as the slave trade picks up (Kimambo and Roberts, 1968, 27-8, Chpt 11).

## Social Segmentation

The base unit of society was household and lineage, with household status determined by size of cattle herds (Håkansson and Widgren, 2007, 242).

## Surplus Extraction

Tribute was collected by the *mgheghadhanyika*, or minister of agriculture, and was paid in livestock, traditional beer or agricultural produce (Kimambo, 1967, 151). Like in Kilindi, tribute was distributed by the king to councilors and military. Caravans were also taxed, although it is not clear how regularized versus occasional this was (Kimambo and Roberts, 1968, 27, Chpt 11).

## Local Representation

The king's sons rule across ten districts, known as *mangi*, with local council or elders. District chiefs were in charge of land and tribute collection, assisted by village leaders (Kimambo, 1967, 74).

## Method of Succession

Sons were eligible for succession, though evidence that this was contested (e.g. Kimambo, 1967, 191).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship; rainmaking and initiation rituals legitimize chief's rule and role in economy. Initiation rights a critical part of integrating people into the polity (Sheridan, 2002, 82).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

### Sources

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## 4.121 Wolayta, 1250s-1894

### Overview

King (*kawo*) rules with *balimola*, or council, as well as consultative body, the *mochionia* (Yimam, 2020, 561). Chiatti (1984, 283) writes that kings rotated potential leaders in and out of different positions and appointed potential rivals to peripheral territories. King comes from Tigre malla dynasty, who gained power in the area in the 16th century after marrying into the Wolaita dynasty. Because King came from royal free clan, his power was conditional on their continued support (Abbink, 2003, 1092). Like other kingdoms in southern Ethiopia, Wolayta built a defensive border system, relying on rivers, stone walls and ditches.

### Social Segmentation

Society stratified into three classes; royal lineage and ruling elites, followed by ordinary Wolaitans (divided into clans and subclans), underneath which were occupational castes, smiths, tanners and potters (Yimam, 2020, 554). Slavery also existed in the kingdom.

### Surplus Extraction

Districts have set tribute amounts to collect each year. District governors met with household heads at markets to decide how many slaves, cows, goats, sheep, clothes, etc. each family owed (Chiatti, 1984, 427). Regular citizens also faced labor demands. Foreign traders paid an annual tax and were also expected to provide 'gifts' to officials (Chiatti, 1984, 481).

### Local Representation

Wolayta was divided into seven districts (*lapun danna*), underneath which were counties and markets and villages (*shucha*); king represented down to village level (Yimam, 2020, 561). County officials responsible for maintenance of roads and bridges and territorial governors adjudicated low-level legal questions (with more serious matters judged by the king) (Chiatti, 1984, 434, 465).



## Method of Succession

Council, or *balimola*, selects a new king from among the royal princes. Although the king could name a successor, the *balimola* could overrule his wishes following his death. In principle, the *balimola* could also remove a king for poor behavior (Chiatti, 1984, 453).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship (Yimam, 2020, 557).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.122 Yeke (Garangeze or Msiri), 1850s-1891

### Overview

Polity founded by Msiri who came to the area from Tanzania. Garangeze's fundamental problem is legitimating Msiri's rule as the *mwami*, or ruler, as an outsider. Msiri attempted this by manipulating indigenous Sanga traditions to legitimize his slow seizure of power (Legros, 1994, 41-5). Specifically, Msiri adopted local sacred kingship models, and ruled with notables he appoints in a central court. These notables are hereditary and charged with specific areas of expertise, e.g. magic, war, etc. Following the establishment of his rule, Garangeze sees a period of military and political expansion. During this time, the *mutoni* and *mugoli* (Msiri's principle wives) see their power grow while other dignitaries see power contained within their domains. Conquered territories are integrated with less emphasis on the Mwami's sacred nature, producing a bifurcated state where only the core was ideologically integrated (Legros, 1994, Chpt 4). In 1891 the state is overstretched and faces Sanga revolt, which is barely suppresses when Stairs expedition arrives and kills Msiri (Legros, 1994, Chpt 7).

### Social Segmentation

Aristocracy comprised of Mwami and notables that Msiri created upon his arrival. This included ritual dignitaries and close associates of Msiri. Over time, ritual dignitaries see their authority increasingly circumscribed while power if *mutoni*, effectively court attendants, and *mugoli*, the Mwami's principle wives, expand. Beneath the royal court are regional notables and military chiefs (Legros, 1994, 75-77).

## Surplus Extraction

Villagers provide tribute to regional intermediaries who forward it to the center (Legros, 1994, 83). Producers, e.g. salt harvesters, owe tribute to the *Mwami* each year. The *Mwami* has a monopoly on slave and ivory trade and caravan traders presented gifts to *mwami*, e.g. see Legros's description of Ovimbundu caravans (Legros, 1994, 110-1, 121).

## Local Representation

*Mwami Mutemiwa* and *Mwanangwa*, natives of Busumbwa or Unyamwezi, appointed to manage villages, relegating autochthonous chiefs underneath them; these officials serve as link between periphery and center (Legros, 1994, 61, 83).

## Method of Succession

Never established; Msiri is only king and is killed by Belgians. Traditionally in area a council of notables would choose successor (Legros, 1994, 65).

## State Ideology

Divine kingship (Legros, 1994, 61).

## Elite Structure Typology

Regal

## Sources

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## 4.123 Yoruba Kingdoms, c.1300-1896\*

*Egba, Egbado, Ekiti, Ife, Igbomina, Ijebu, Ijesha, Ketu, Ondo, Owo, Owu, Oyo, Sabe*

### Overview

Series of Yoruba kingdoms, with a well-defined political arrangement, that dominated what is now Western Nigeria. All Yoruba kingdoms shared a myth of Ile Ife, which could explain both the creation of the world and the kingdoms (Smith, 1988, 9). Among them, Oyo was historically the most powerful (Smith, 1988, 87). Each kingdom was headed by a king, or *Oba*, who ruled with the council by a council (in Oyo, the *Oyo Mesi*), seven chiefs or councilors who held hereditary titles. The Yoruba Kingdoms had political structures that assigned political, judicial and religious responsibilities to a diverse set of actors (Smith, 1988, 93-4). The kingdoms were thus internally autonomous, but they were allies within a federation headed by the *Ooni* of Ile Ife. This facilitated shared gains to trade with the Yoruba sharing a language and currency (Akintoye, 2010, 169). The Yoruba kingdoms were under stress in the late 19th century. Oyo had begun to

decline in the late 18th century, after having been one of the most powerful and wealthy kingdoms on continent (Morton-Williams, 1951, 39), with tributaries declaring their independence during this time while at the same time the Fulani began threatening the kingdoms from the north.

## Social Segmentation

Yoruba society defined by four differentiated social categories – royals, free people, eunuchs and slaves. The king's wives and palace officials also had a distinct rank (Morton-Williams, 1951, 50-1).

## Surplus Extraction

Subjects paid assigned taxes to a local tax collector who forwarded them to each kingdom's central bureaucracy (Ejiogu, 2011, 601). *Obas* also collected tolls at markets (Smith, 1988, 87) and tolls and taxes on commerce were a major source of royal income. Labor was also provided, with each kingdom responsible for clearing paths used by traders that traversed their territory twice yearly. These paths were well-protected and maintained since authorities had vested interest in maintaining trade routes – the more goods that pass through one's territory, the more one can tax (Akintoye, 2010, 179, 167).

## Local Representation

All citizens belonged to a town, most of which were heavily populated and the site of commerce and state power. Each kingdom had a capital town where the *oba*, his chiefs, officials and priests resided. Other towns were headed by a village head and other notables who represented the king locally (Smith, 1988, 87). Each kingdom was responsible for its own political and judicial affairs (Adelaja, 1976). Mid-century, Ibadan stationed political agents who travelers had to report to before presenting themselves to local rulers in many villages (Morton-Williams, 1951, 49).

## Method of Succession

The King of Oyo was chosen from candidates within the royal lineage (Munoz, 1977, 19) and this system was followed from 1700s onwards in most other kingdoms and towns. Kingmakers, who represent commoners, then chose the most suitable candidate (Smith, 1988, 91-2).

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship

## Elite Structure Typology

Individual kingdoms: Regal; though Ijebu and Egba are federations as described by (Smith, 1988, 95).

Yoruba System: Federation

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## 4.124 Zulu, 1816-1872

### Overview

Monarchy established under Shaka following his innovative military techniques. Shaka build the polity around a territorial hierarchy of chiefs, with sub-chiefs kept loyal through ties of dependence and patronage (Gump, 1990, 130). Core to Shaka's innovations was to modify the age-set (*amabutho*) system. Prior to Shaka, individuals were incorporated as members of their lineage, with each chieftaincy representing a hierarchy of lineages. As the population expands, Shaka forms age-based *amabutho*, who were housed in permanent settlements, weakening the previous kin-based system. The youngest and most disciplined regiment kept in capital and fifteen *amabutho* were housed in the homesteads of the royal lineage (Gump, 1990, 130-6). This produced a militarization of society – all young men were enrolled first as baggage carriers and then young warriors – linking people of the entire region together (Eldredge, 2014, 78). State is declining in late 19th century under pressure from the British which generates substantial conflict, allowing many sub-chiefs to acquire more power and retainers.

### Social Segmentation

Princes of royal clans and great chiefs were high-status persons. Anyone of royal birth, even if they did not have an official position, was an elite (Laband, 2007, 24). Regional officials, *Induna*, also formed an elite class (Wylie, 2006, 232).

### Surplus Extraction

Great chiefs collected tribute, fines and royal gifts. *Amabutho* at times tasked with collecting tribute from outlying people (Laband, 2007, 22-3). The Zulu were engaged in the ivory trade, especially towards Delagao Bay, and likely taxed this as well.

### Local Representation

The homestead was the base social unit of Zulu society and several homesteads were administered by a chief (*inkosi*). Conquered groups were grafted onto the existing hierarchy, with these chiefs becoming territorial sub-chiefs under Shaka. All chiefs paid ceremonial visits to Shaka's royal kraal to confirm their allegiance (Gump, 1990, 133). Central state authority was thus delegated to existing political hierarchies, with great chiefs maintaining their own personal followings, which

gives them substantial power (Wylie, 2006, 231). The king had more authority over individuals who were appointed to perform administrative functions, e.g. commanders of age-sets, or individuals appointed to rule over districts where there was no hereditary power-holder. This often included distant members of the royal family, who were eligible for recruitment into the administration (thereby consolidating elite power) (Hamilton, 1997, 90). These *Induna*, regional officials, helped collect taxes, administered local justice, etc (Wylie, 2006, 232). *Amabutho* also serve as police force, collecting fines for king, etc (Laband, 2007, 22-4).

## Method of Succession

Within royal family. Since Shaka had not children, this opened up room for competition among his brothers, who he is ultimately succeeded by.

## State Ideology

Divine Kingship. Ritual integration was critical to the construction of the Zulu kingdom, e.g. the king assured rainmaking rituals and there were elaborate rituals related to warfare, even as Shaka altered the traditional use of ritual authority by Zulu chiefs (Gump, 1990, 140-1).

## Elite Structure Typology

Gatekeeper

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